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《資本家們為了中國(市場)群起對抗帝國主義》讀後
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我最近才接觸到《獨立思考》雜誌。由於瑞普利教授《美元獨霸地位的黃昏時刻》一文的「前提」和「立場」都跟多數西方評論家差異很大,我特地去察看過該雜誌的作者群。發現幾乎全是名不見經傳的年輕人,而瑞普利教授不在其中。該雜誌可稱另類或異類。 法西先生此文非常有意思。他首先指出歐、美兩大陣營在對中國經貿政策上有歧見(請參考《讓歐美峰會各懷鬼胎的中國議題》)。繼而聚焦在歐盟內部政治領袖和企業領袖之間在軍事和經貿政策兩個層面的利益衝突。然後他報導美國政治領袖和企業領袖之間也有同樣衝突。接著他分析這個衝突的弔詭。他從「反帝國主義立場」入手,內容非常精采;下面這一段可做代表: Such open defiance of Washington’s foreign policy stance by some of the most powerful CEOs in America represents a striking development. Critics of US-Western foreign policy and military interventionism have traditionally (and correctly) seen the latter as being essentially aimed at enforcing the Western-led global capitalist order — in other words, as being in the service of big business by opening up new markets, securing control of resources or intervening whenever Western business interests were threatened. As New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman put it in 1999: “The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist — McDonald’s cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the builder of the F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for [American corporations] is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.” 在此老王賣瓜一番;法西先生的分析跟我的分析意旨相近(該文第2.1節),只是在表達文采和邏輯細膩度上我頗遜數籌。 該文最後四段他從「階級矛盾」進一步分析這兩個政治和企業集團在軍事和經貿政策上產生利益衝突的根源。更是擲地有聲,值得欣賞和參考。 在此做個補充。我過去多次批評過替財團抬轎子、擦脂抹粉、胡說八道、或炮製「宰制論述」的知識份子們。我稱這類人為打手、圍事、或「『小』資產階級」。請參考下文倒數第2段對這類人的分析。這是為什麼我常常說:「凡論述必有前提;凡判斷必有立場」;因此,許多「論述」只要看看就好。
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資本家們為了中國(市場)群起對抗帝國主義 -- Thomas Fazi
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The capitalists are revolting over China Western hawks face an unlikely resistance THOMAS FAZI, 06/06/23 After marshalling Europe in its proxy war against Russia, America is now determined to repeat this success against China. Here, the consequences for Europe could be even more significant than the economic shock of the past year. Yet, despite a few grumbles from Macron and others, European leaders are largely playing along with this increasingly aggressive approach: at last week’s biannual US-EU Trade and Technology Council, both parties claimed to “see very much eye-to-eye” on the issue.
Below the surface, however, views are hardening against the EU’s efforts to emulate America’s hawkish approach, which includes economic decoupling (or “de-risking”, as it’s now called) and increasing Nato’s presence in the Indo-Pacific. Over the past four years, von der Leyen has worked tirelessly to keep Europe aligned with America’s aggressive geopolitical strategy, often appearing to prioritise Washington’s desires over Europe’s strategic interests. No wonder Politico dubbed her “Europe’s American president”. On China, von der Leyen has taken an increasingly tough line, recently urging Europe to “de-risk” its relationship. The bloc’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, has echoed her tone, calling President Xi’s support of Russia “a blatant violation” of its UN commitments. Brussels is also devising a Sustainable Corporate Governance initiative, which would force European companies to ensure that EU social and human rights standards apply throughout their supply chain. Germany has already introduced a softer version of the rule, which currently applies only to 150 companies, though the number is set to rise to 15,000. Already many European companies are pushing back against the measures, claiming that they place an excessive regulatory and bureaucratic burden on industry at a time of massive economic challenges. Unsurprisingly, German companies are leading the charge: China is the country’s largest trading partner, with total trade last year of nearly €300 billion. Europe’s economic powerhouse has already taken a heavy it from its decoupling from Russian gas and other commodities; with its economy in recession and an inflation rate of 7.2%, Germany cannot afford to lose China as well. The same can be said for the EU as a whole. The fact that the von der Leyen insists on mimicking the American strategy despite the bloc’s deep interdependence with China highlights the extent to which the EU, wedded as it is to a subservient interpretation of the bloc’s relationship to the US, is now a threat to Europe’s core interests. As Wolfgang Münchau noted: “The EU economy is not built for Cold War-style relations because it has become too dependent on global supply chains… The underlying reality of modern-day Europe is that it cannot easily extricate itself from its relationship with China.” In this context, it is hardly surprising that German businesses are pushing back against Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s call to weaken Germany’s economic relationship with China. Abandoning China is “unthinkable” for German industry, Mercedes CEO Ola Källenius said in April, in comments that echoed across the country’s boardrooms — from Siemens to BASF to BMW, all of which have vowed to continue investing in the country. “We won’t give up on China,” Volkswagen’s chief financial officer made clear. Yet while similar views are being expressed in Italy and France, China’s other two largest trading partners in the EU, it remains unclear whether this will translate into a decisive shift in Europe’s official China policy. For now, most national and EU leaders seem more interested in pleasing the US establishment than thinking about Europe’s long-term economic and geopolitical interests. However, European business leaders can count on some powerful allies in the US — not in Washington, but among fellow capitalists. For in America, a similar revolt is brewing over the administration’s decoupling with China. Despite the fraying of Sino-American relations at the political level, several American CEOs have continued to visit China. While the bosses of J.P. Morgan, Starbucks, GM and Apple have all flown in since March, it was Elon Musk’s visit, which took place last week, that predictably caused the biggest shockwaves. According to the Financial Times, “in just two days… Elon Musk had more top-level Chinese meetings than most Biden administration officials have had in months”, including with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang. The foreign ministry quoted Musk as saying that he was willing to expand business in China and opposed a decoupling of the US and China economies, adding that he described the world’s two largest economies as “conjoined twins”. Musk’s trip coincided with that by J.P. Morgan boss Jamie Dimon, who in a speech in Shanghai called for “real engagement” between Washington and Beijing. Such open defiance of Washington’s foreign policy stance by some of the most powerful CEOs in America represents a striking development. Critics of US-Western foreign policy and military interventionism have traditionally (and correctly) seen the latter as being essentially aimed at enforcing the Western-led global capitalist order — in other words, as being in the service of big business by opening up new markets, securing control of resources or intervening whenever Western business interests were threatened. As New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman put it in 1999: “The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist — McDonald’s cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the builder of the F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for [American corporations] is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.” However, in light of the growing rifts between America’s economic and political elites, does this analytical framework still hold? It’s hard to see, after all, how the West’s aggressive US-led foreign policy — aimed at antagonising and militarising relations with China, the world’s second-largest consumer market and largest rare-earth mineral exporter, in the same fashion as it has with Russia — serves the “general interests” of Western capital, or even how it serves a strictly capitalist logic. How is Nato “helping McDonald’s”, to borrow Friedman’s phrase, by forcing it to exit Russia at a cost of more than $1 billion? No wonder major representatives of Western corporate interests aren’t peachy about the prospect of a new Cold War — not to mention an actual war with China, which would have devastating effects on the US and global economy. However, their appeals today seem to fall on deaf ears in Washington and other Western national capitals. As Adam Tooze has observed: “The ‘peace interest’ anchored in the investment and trading connections of US big business with China has been expelled from centre stage. On the central axis of US strategy, big business has less influence today that at any time since the end of the Cold War”. Yet this begs the question: if US-Western foreign policy no longer serves the interests of big business, whose interests does it serve? Well, there is really only one social class that stands to benefit from the militarisation of great-power relations: the military-industrial complex, Eisenhower’s description for the network of corporations and vested interests that revolve around a country’s defence and national security sector. What’s changed since the Sixties, however, is that these interests are no longer aligned with those of the Western corporate community — in fact, the two are diametrically opposed. The paradox, of course, is that for decades big business has encouraged the continuous expansion of the military-industrial complex as a tool to promote its interests abroad. Yet in a Frankenstein-like twist of fate, the beast has been allowed to become so powerful that it has broken free from its masters — and is now turning against them. No longer is the military-industrial complex subordinated to the general interests of the capitalist class; rather, it is the latter that is increasingly subordinated to the interests of the military-industrial complex. Now, the military-industrial complex follows a capitalist logic as well, of course: war, or even just the constant preparation for war, is clearly good for business. But, ultimately, it’s about more than just profits: it’s about ensuring the reproduction of the military class, which extends well beyond the big defence companies to include civilian auxiliaries in defence-related government agencies, think tanks, academia, and many others. What’s slowly becoming clear, however, is that the old capitalist class doesn’t seem willing to go down without a fight. Indeed, we may be on the verge of a new historical class struggle: the owners of the means of production against the owners of the means of destruction. Whoever wins, the peculiar nature of this conflict should not be underestimated: the greatest resistance to the new Cold War isn’t coming from a global peace movement, but from the boardrooms of Western corporations. Faced with China’s supremacy, they have nothing to lose but their chains.
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針對中、美衝突的歐洲民調 -- Yasmeen Serhan
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根據「歐洲外交關係協會」進行的民調顯示:大多數歐洲人民認為中國是一個「必需的夥伴」,而不是多數美國人民所認為的「競爭對手」或「敵人」。不僅如此,如果中、美之間因為台灣問題發生衝突,62%的歐洲人民認為歐洲應該保持中立。此民調取樣對象為11個歐洲國家的16,000位人士。 這份民意調查結果,基本上和開欄文與《讓歐美峰會各懷鬼胎的中國議題》這兩篇評論的分析,以及我的相關看法相容。 原文後半段引用的瑟卡博士所做評論可謂「引喻失據」或一廂情願。俄烏戰爭就在歐洲各國的後院發生,歐洲人民會改變她/他們對俄國的觀點可謂理所當然和人之常情。如果瑟卡博士認為發生在千里之外、不關歐洲人民痛癢的「台海衝突」,會帶給歐洲人民同樣的刺激,引起歐洲人民同樣的反應,我看他的「認知障礙」或「認知偏差」也太過分了些。 Would Europeans Back Washington in a U.S.-China War? A New Survey Might Surprise You Yasmeen Serhan, 06/07/23 In recent months, the U.S. and the E.U. have sought to portray a mostly united front when it comes to China. Both Washington and Brussels have called out Beijing over its support for Russia amid its ongoing invasion of Ukraine, and both have firmly opposed any attempts to alter the status quo around Taiwan, the self-governed democracy to which Beijing lays claim. But as much as American and European leaders may appear to be in lockstep on China, the same cannot be said for their respective populations. According to new findings published by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) on Wednesday, a majority of Europeans see China as a “necessary partner” rather than as a rival or adversary, unlike most Americans. What’s more, in the event of a potential conflict between the U.S. and China over Taiwan, most Europeans would prefer to stay out of it. The findings, which stem from a poll of more than 16,000 people across 11 E.U. member states, offer a stark contrast to the conventional view that there is a certain symmetry between what is happening in Ukraine and what could yet happen in Taiwan. Both have had their sovereignty denied by more powerful, authoritarian neighbors in Russia and China, respectively. But this isn’t necessarily all that surprising. Whereas U.S. President Joe Biden has put forward a hawkish stance against China—dubbing Beijing the most serious competitor to America and pledging to defend Taiwan against Chinese incursion —European leaders have held more mixed views, ranging from E.U. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s calls to “de-risk” the bloc’s relationship with Beijing to French President Emmanuel Macron’s more conciliatory approach of treating China as a strategic partner. This discrepancy bears out in public opinion. Whereas more Americans are likely to regard China as a competitor (52%) or enemy (38%), according to a recent study by the Pew Research Center, European attitudes toward China are more mixed. On average, 43% of Europeans view China as “a necessary partner” as opposed to 24% who see the country as a rival or 11% who see it as an adversary. This is despite the fact that a majority of Europeans recognize China as being a close partner to Russia, which a majority of Europeans regard as a rival or adversary to Europe. It’s perhaps for this reason that, when asked how their country should respond to a potential conflict between the U.S. and China over Taiwan, a majority of Europeans (62%) said that they should remain neutral. Pawel Zerka, a Paris-based senior policy fellow at ECFR and a co-author of the report, tells TIME that this position isn’t a reflection of Europeans’ feelings toward the U.S. (which most Europeans recognize as a close ally and partner) or Taiwan’s territorial integrity. “The Taiwan or China question is still very abstract to European citizens,” Zerka says. “For Europeans, these are incomparable things: the war in Ukraine, which is actually happening next to our borders and that we are closely following, versus a very distant Taiwan, where there is not yet any war and which is not very much discussed.” This position has been most prominently articulated by Macron, who following a visit to China in April warned that Europeans should avoid becoming “America’s followers” when it comes to Taiwan, noting that Europe should avoid the “trap” of getting involved in crises “that are not ours.” It’s a position that earned Macron flak among his allies, including fellow E.U. member states such as Lithuania, which has deep ties with Taiwan and has even opened a de facto embassy for the island nation. Europe’s position vis à vis China could yet change—particularly if Beijing wades into the war in Ukraine. While China remains an important trading partner for Russia, it has yet to support Russia militarily. If Beijing were to supply Moscow with weapons and ammunition, as the U.S. claims it is considering, as much as 41% of Europeans would support imposing sanctions, even if it resulted in damage to Western economies. Just as Europeans’ views of Russia hardened following its invasion of Ukraine, Zerka says the same could yet happen if Beijing were to do the same with Taiwan. But so long as it remains a distant hypothetical, the scope of that movement will be difficult to gauge. “Before the war in Ukraine, most Europeans were seeing Russia as partners, not as rivals or adversaries,” says Zerka. “But the war radically changed their perception. … It’s only when such events happen when we would really be able to see whether European perceptions and attitudes have changed or not.” Read More: Why China Won’t Invade Taiwan Anytime Soon
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