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砲灰：俄軍戰術改進 -- Dr Jack Watling/Nick Reynolds
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瀏覽1,022 ｜回應1｜推薦2 |
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以下是英國皇家三軍研究協會新出爐的：烏國境內雙方軍力布署與運用研究和分析報告的《總結》。
我對《總結》內容中：「烏軍每月損失1萬台無人機」這個數字高度質疑。上網搜尋相關資料後，找到本欄第二篇針對該數字的報導。請參考。
不論烏克蘭政府是否長期買得起，一年12萬台無人機的產量應該會有問題。我相信事實是：烏國軍方故意誇大其數字，來爭取捐款和軍援。
Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine
Dr Jack Watling/Nick Reynolds, 05/19/23
DOWNLOAD PDF(11MB)
Russian tactics are changing as lessons are learned from military failures in the war in Ukraine.
Executive Summary
The scale of Russian losses in 2022, combined with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation confronting NATO systems they had not previously contended with, has caused a significant deviation in Russian operations from the country’s doctrine. This report seeks to outline how Russian forces have adapted their tactics in the Ukrainian conflict and the challenges this has created for the Ukrainian military that must be overcome. The report examines Russian military adaptation by combat function.
Russian infantry tactics have shifted from trying to deploy uniform Battalion Tactical Groups as combined arms units of action to a stratified division by function into line, assault, specialised and disposable troops. These are formed into task-organised groupings. Line infantry are largely used for ground holding and defensive operations. Disposable infantry are used for continuous skirmishing to either identify Ukrainian firing positions, which are then targeted by specialised infantry, or to find weak points in Ukrainian defences to be prioritised for assault. Casualties are very unevenly distributed across these functions. The foremost weakness across Russian infantry units is low morale, which leads to poor unit cohesion and inter-unit cooperation.
Russian engineering has proven to be one of the stronger branches of the Russian military. Russian engineers have been constructing complex obstacles and field fortifications across the front. This includes concrete reinforced trenches and command bunkers, wire-entanglements, hedgehogs, anti-tank ditches, and complex minefields. Russian mine laying is extensive and mixes anti-tank and victim-initiated anti-personnel mines, the latter frequently being laid with multiple initiation mechanisms to complicate breaching. These defences pose a major tactical challenge to Ukrainian offensive operations.
Russian armour is rarely used for attempts at breakthrough. Instead, armour is largely employed in a fire support function to deliver accurate fire against Ukrainian positions. Russia has started to employ thermal camouflage on its vehicles and, using a range of other modifications and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), has significantly reduced the detectability of tanks at stand-off ranges. Furthermore, these measures have reduced the probability of kill of a variety of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) at ranges beyond 1,400 m.
Russian artillery has begun to significantly refine the Reconnaissance Strike Complex following the destruction of its ammunition stockpiles and command and control infrastructure by guided multiple-launch rocket systems (GMLRS) in July 2022. This has resulted in much closer integration of multiple UAVs directly supporting commanders authorised to apply fires. Russian artillery has also improved its ability to fire from multiple positions and to fire and move, reducing susceptibility to counterbattery fire. The key system enabling this coordination appears to be the Strelets system. There has been a shift in reliance upon 152-mm howitzers to a much greater emphasis on 120-mm mortars in Russian fires; this reflects munitions and barrel availability. Responsive Russian fires represent the greatest challenge to Ukrainian offensive operations. Russian artillery is also increasingly relying on loitering munitions for counterbattery fires.
Russian electronic warfare (EW) remains potent, with an approximate distribution of at least one major system covering each 10 km of front. These systems are heavily weighted towards the defeat of UAVs and tend not to try and deconflict their effects. Ukrainian UAV losses remain at approximately 10,000 per month. Russian EW is also apparently achieving real time interception and decryption of Ukrainian Motorola 256-bit encrypted tactical communications systems, which are widely employed by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Russian air defences have also seen a significant increase in their effectiveness now that they are set up around known, and fairly static, locations and are properly connected. Although Russia has persistently struggled to respond to emerging threats, over time it has adapted. Russian air defences are now assessed by the Ukrainian military to be intercepting a proportion of GMLRS strikes as Russian point defences are directly connected to superior radar.
Russian aviation remains constrained to delivering stand-off effects, ranging from responsive lofted S-8 salvos against Ukrainian forming-up points, to FAB-500 glide bombs delivered from medium altitude to ranges up to 70 km. The Ukrainian military notes that Russia has a large stockpile of FAB-500s and is systematically upgrading them with glide kits. Although they only have limited accuracy, the size of these munitions poses a serious threat. The Russian Aerospace Forces remain a ‘force in being’ and a major threat to advancing Ukrainian forces, although they currently lack the capabilities to penetrate Ukrainian air defences.
Following the destruction of Russian command and control infrastructure in July 2022, the Russian military withdrew major headquarters out of range of GMLRS and placed them in hardened structures. They also wired them into the Ukrainian civil telecommunications network and used field cables to branch from this to brigade headquarters further forward. Assigned assets tend to connect to these headquarters via microlink, significantly reducing their signature. At the same time, from the battalion down, Russian forces largely rely on unencrypted analogue military radios, reflecting a shortage of trained signallers at the tactical level.
An overview of Russian adaptation reveals a force that is able to improve and evolve its employment of key systems. There is evidence of a centralised process for identifying shortcomings in employment and the development of mitigations. Nevertheless, much of this adaptation is reactive and is aimed at making up for serious deficiencies in Russian units. The result is a structure that becomes better over time at managing the problems it immediately faces, but also one that struggles to anticipate new threats. The conclusion therefore is that the Russian Armed Forces pose a significant challenge for the Ukrainian military on the defence. Nevertheless, if Ukraine can disrupt Russian defences and impose a dynamic situation on them, Russian units are likely to rapidly lose their coordination. Changes in the air combat environment, for example, have led rapidly to incidents of Russian fratricide.
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烏軍每月損失1萬台無人機？ -- David Hambling
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New Report: Ukraine Drone Losses Are ‘10,000 Per Month’
David Hambling, 05/22/23
A new report by British military thinktank RUSI published on May 19th claims that Ukraine is losing an incredible 10,000 drones a month, mainly due to Russian electronic jamming. While this figure may not be entirely accurate, it indicates the key role that drones are now playing in this war and the sheer number involved – and that thousands of cheap drones are more sustainable than a few expensive jets.
The report, ‘Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine’ looks at several aspects of the war and the Russian use of armor, infantry, and air power, but the section on electronic warfare has the most eye-catching statistic:
“Electronic warfare remains a critical component of the Russian way of fighting. While there was an extremely high density of EW [Electronic Warfare] systems in Donbas in 2022, the AFRF now employ approximately one major EW system per 10 km of frontage, usually situated approximately 7 km from the frontline… These platforms are usually aimed at controlling and defeating UAVs [Uncrewed Air Vehicles – drones]… The Russian military is also continuing to make extensive use of navigational interference in the battle area as a form of electronic protection. This is contributing to a Ukrainian loss rate in UAVs of approximately 10,000 per month." (my emphasis)
The report is based on extensive interview with Ukrainian military personnel. The footnote for the claim of 10,000 losses a month is referenced interviews with three anonymous sources, T,O and B.
This aspect of the report predictably drew a lot of comment and one of the report’s authors, Dr. Jack Watling, responded with a detailed Twitter thread entitled ‘Numbers in War’ in which he noted that the war was being fought over a 1,200 kilometer front, that drones are now used by every Ukrainian platoon and that the vast majority are commercial quadcopters made by DJI .
“So how confident am I in the number 10,000 per month? As an exact number, I’m not. The actual total varies month by month and day by day and is not closely tracked. But consumption is definitely very high,” says Watling. “So if the figure isn’t exact - any neatly rounded figures are suspicious - why use it at all? Firstly because it is the number we got from the Ukrainian General Staff and from the part that has the best data. [Secondly] Putting a number to consumption is important in making the policy relevant point.”
The Ukrainians themselves may not have an accurate figure. Small drone procurement is not centralized, and a host of small and large volunteer groups, expat and foreign donors as well as governments donates drones,. Mark Hamill’s support for Ukraine’s Army of Drones fundraising initiative is a leading example. Sometimes they can send just a few drones at a time and sometimes hundreds, directly to frontline units who requested them
Arguably, the number is still on the high side. In March, a Ukrainian official put drone losses at 10- 15 per day or 300-450 per month.
On the other side, the official Ukrainian claim for Russian casualties –generally seen as wildly over-inflated – states that they destroyed ‘only’ 2,811 Russian drones in the 15 months to May 21st . At less than 200 a month, this would be about 2% of what Ukraine may be losing. Russia is likely fielding fewer drones than Ukraine due to chronic supply issues, and Ukrainian electronic warfare may not be as efficient. Even taking these into account, a 50:1 loss ratio still looks anomalous. This also suggests Ukrainian losses may be less than 10,000 a month.
However, even if the figure really is 10,000, this appears sustainable. A key feature of small drones, as I note in my book Swarm Troopers, is their supreme affordability compared to military hardware. 10,000 DJI quadcopters at an average cost of about $1,000 would be $10m. Last week, Russia lost an Su-34 bomber, with a sticker price of something over $40m. Ukraine appears to be acquire masses of DJI drones fairly easily, but Russia struggles to build even small numbers of military aircraft.
And yesterday Russia apparently lost an even more advanced Su-35, which goes for around $85m. Together these two aircraft alone represent a loss ten times as great as all Ukraine’s drones for the month put together. It is not the drone losses which are unsustainable.
In addition, drone losses are permanent. An aircraft shot out of the sky stays down, but jamming is different. When a DJI drone lose radio contact with its operator, due to interference or other causes, it will attempt to return to the last known location where it could communicate. If it cannot re-establish communication, the Failsafe Return-to-Home function activates and it automatically returns to the launch point. If GPS navigation is jammed – as is common across much of the front line – and the drone cannot navigate home, it makes a soft landing wherever it is.
Sometimes jammed drones can be easily retrieved, but most of the time they are likely to be over enemy territory. In January, Ukrainian border guards released a video – ‘saving Private Mavic’ — showing how they were able to send a second drone with a fishing line to retrieve a downed DJI Mavic. The missions is a success, and this tactic may have been repeated many time, but this is a dangerous business. Russian military blogger Russian Engineer warns that downed drones may be booby-trapped.
Russian troops share advice on how to survive constant drone attacks, and the stream of videos of quadcopter attacks on Russian positions suggest that jamming has so far failed to stop even DJI drones from operating at the front lines.
Meanwhile the drones are striking back. Some recent videos show Ukrainian drones hitting Russian counter-drone electronic warfare systems, somehow evading the jamming. There are also rumors that Ukraine is developing drones which are effectively miniature versions of the HARM missiles supplied by the U.S., which can home in on jamming signals so any jammer becomes a target.
In the second year of the war, Ukraine may rely more heavily on military-grade drones with jam-resistant communications, such as the tricopter AtlasPRO, or Golden Eagle quadcopters. But DJI drones are clearly still being acquired and lost in large numbers, even if we do not know the exact figures.
As Watling himself puts it: “Unhardened UAVs are disposable tools like munitions and get consumed very rapidly. You need them in your force and you need them to be cheap.”
For decades, Western armies have relied on a few expensive, 'exquisite' high-tech platforms, and that includes drones. This conflict of disposable drones may lead to a radical change in military procurement towards the many and the cheap.
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