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《石英》網誌上Hui女士這篇文章仍然人云亦云的跳不出「西方中心論」窠臼。她只看到或習於西方宣傳機構對「全球化」的正統或包裝論述；沒有去深究當時「全球化」做為「木馬」的陽謀和具有「雙面刃」作用性質。
在「貿易逆差」議題上，她引用Pettis教授「相對優勢」的觀點，卻忽略羅其教授：「美國政、經領袖需要承認『債務』有其危機；美國人民必須開始量入為出，節省和儲蓄」這個意見。此外，Pettis教授(和Hui女士)現在大聲抱怨中國具有「相對優勢」；卻忘記二、三十年前推動「全球化」時，「已開發國家」所具有的「相對優勢」。
我多次提到，中國「和平崛起」的確深拜「全球化」這把「雙面刃」之賜。但是美、歐當年推動「全球化」，其目的並非雪中送炭的「馬歇爾計畫 2.0」，而是另有其算計。我沒有能力做學術性討論；簡單分析可參看以下所附：《自由化 -- 帝國主義的木馬?》一文，和該欄中另外兩篇拙作《全球化 之 小檔案》和《全球化 之 The Pentagon’s New Map》(2003年)。
總之，美、歐學者從帝國主義時代傳承下來的「通吃心態」早就過氣了。中國現在憑飛彈、母艦、生產力硬是要求分一杯羹；披上「自由秩序」羊皮的「帝國主義餘孽」們，願意分得分，不樂意分也得分。GGYY是無濟於事的。
附錄：
1. 《自由化 -- 帝國主義的木馬?》
在討論自由化和全球化的議題時，我們必須了解這是一場起跑點不平等的競賽。也就是說，它不是一個雙向均勢的相互往來，而是「跨國企業」挾著排山倒海的能量和資源自由的在全球漫步，將開發中國家(你可以翻譯成：落後國家)化為經濟附庸的行動。例如：
所謂「加強與跨國大企業的策略聯盟與合作」中的「策略聯盟與合作」，你可以翻譯成：「跨國大企業的兼併(take-over)」；
所謂「(解除) ... (限制)」，你可以翻譯成：「將 ... 變成金融租界」。
原則上我並不反對自由化和全球化，但我們必須認清自己的實力和身份，在推動(或被迫接受)自由化和全球化的時候，
一定要明白別人為什麼要推動自由化和全球化。
2. 《全球化 之 小檔案》
1) 「全球化」的意義
在國家層次，經濟活動是國力的基礎。在國際層次，國力是經濟活動的前鋒。「全球化」的意思是：「我要到你家後院擺個攤子，促銷(強迫中獎？)給你不是生活必需的產品」。美國、歐盟(的大財團)推動全球化的原因，目的要擴張它們奇技淫巧的市場。第三世界反對全球化，就是怕辛辛苦苦賺來的血汗錢被吸光。換句話說，「全球化」是「帝國主義」財團對抗關稅政策的意識型態。WTO則是「帝國主義」財團消滅保護關稅的木馬。此地的政客在台灣政府沒有長期政策、產業/學術界沒有尖端技術、企業界沒有獨家產品的情況下，還要掛著「全球化」的羊頭侈言「發展經濟」，台灣很快就會淪為「消費殖民地」(或「後關稅殖民地」)這塊「狗肉」。(摘錄自:《評親民黨主席宋楚瑜先生的《建構台灣未來的願景》》)
2) 「全球化」的實際
加入 WTO後，「政府」官僚在保護國內企業和上述產業升級的職責功能，更形重要。談判不當，就造成「全球化」時代的「割地賠款」。這種「協商代表」及其主管政務官稱之為「賣台集團」決不為過。「智財權」的協商就是當前的例子。立法院也必須負擔把關的任務(相關法案的審議)。這是民主制度的好處。一個「賣台集團」還不一定能成交，要兩個「賣台集團」狼狽為奸才行。(摘錄自:《什麼是政策？》)
3. 《全球化 之 The Pentagon’s New Map》
大家看看Mr. Barnett的"The Pentagon's New Map"原文，才能了解什麼是"全球化"。Barnett的文章是杭廷頓理論的教戰手冊。
一些"買辦"型的學者，讀書不求甚解，搞不清楚狀況，成天談"自由化"或"全球化"。真的是被人賣了還在幫人數鈔票。
On "The Pentagon’s New Map"
This is a brief commentary on Mr. Barnett s troubling article - "The Pentagon’s New Map" (Barnett, 2003).
The word "globalization" was used 26 times in Mr. Barnett s paper, "globalizing" twice just for the record, without in a single instance elucidating or explaining the concept. I am sure it is a household term in a globalizing era. However, if one is going to base his or her whole "theory" on a single word, it is an advantageous practice for that person to grasp the idea in a clear and distinct manner, let alone as a good will gesture toward the uninitiated and the to be damned.
After looking into his "dividing line" carefully, anyone will want to know how did Mr. Barnett apply his classification schemata. Was he using an "us-them" scheme, or was he using a "submissive-assertive" (relative to the U. S.) scheme？or if he had one at all？
Mr. Barnett lamented " too many experts treat it (globalization) as a binary outcome". Yet, right after that comment, Mr. Barnett himself presented his "theory" in a "binary" map, a "global" map to boot. May be I should call it a "tertiary" map counting the "seam states". But will one extra pole render Mr. Barnett’s a thicker "theory"?
Secondly, the phenomenon of 'globalization' was treated as a single, homogeneous, omni-benevolent concept. The purpose, function, and the obvious polarizing-characteristics of 'globalization' was never analyzed or even mentioned. As if he has never heard of the proverbial "one person's meat is another's poison."
Globalization is the ideology, with the WTO playing the role of the Trojan horse, used by the developed nations, the "Core" in Mr. Barnett's terminology, to battle and circumvent the theory and practice of using tariff to keep unwanted products out of the poor countries, the "Gap" in Mr. Barnett's terminology. The latter cannot afford these products in the first place, and worse, they are draining the capital crucially needed for gaining the entry into the globalization game, shall we call it the "globalizability"? In addition to capital, a state of course also needs technologies and products to play the game. Which means education, research and development, management skill, to name just a few.
With this understanding, we can state in binary fashion that there are two opposing teams in the globalization game: the globalizing one and the globalized one. By the way, I do not claim to have read all books on the big G theory. I have yet to see anyone to make the distinction in the way presented here.
Let us pause for a moment to consider, if globalization is such a glamorous and enchanting game as Mr. Barnett made it out to be, how did some states always get to be in the 'doing' team, and the other always get to be in the 'done' team for as long as we remember？ Historically, we all know how the West Europeans robbed and butchered their way to get qualified in the globalizing team. And Mr. Barnett is its self-appointed cheerleader chanting："We have not robbed and butchered enough. Go! Go! Go! It is our 'burden' and 'responsibility' to kill them all! Glo! Glo! Glo!" May be this is Darwinian, but in a civilized world, it sure sounds awfully like someone who has just lost his or her shingle somewhere.
To his credit, Mr. Barnett did use the word 'aid' once in the entire paper, the handout connotation not withstanding. The "Shrinking the Gap" mentality (it sounds like "Nuke the Gap" to me) is truly amazing and befuddling, not to say horrifying, in light of his awareness of the "historically" edifying Vietnam experience and familiarity with such smooth and state-of-the-art terms like "thin", "thick", "Darwinian", "paradigm", "disconnectedness", "historical process", etc. God bless America!
* 20年前我讀到The Pentagon’s New Map時，它是美國海軍戰略學院刊物上的一篇論文；2004年擴充為書本形式刊行。如果我沒有記錯，巴奈特教授在文章中將全球地圖分為兩部分：「藍區」和「紅區」(拙作中提到的 "dividing line")。「藍區」是自己人；「紅區」是五角大廈應該準備隨時用兵的目標(拙作中提到的 "to be damned" 和 "Nuke the Gap ")。
To compete with China, Europe has to question the orthodoxy of globalization
The West's idealized view of free and open trade is at odds with China's priorities: security and control
Mary Hui, 04/03/23
The rose-tinted view of globalization holds that free trade maximizes profits, efficiency, and economic growth by leveraging the power of comparative advantage. In this idealized trade system, countries specialize in products that they can make more easily or cheaply than others, and rely on the free flow of goods to import the rest. The iPhone is often cited as an example: the design, engineering, and marketing of the device is done in the US, while assembly is outsourced to China, and key components are sourced from Samsung of South Korea. Supply chains criss-cross the globe. Everyone gains. Wall Street is happy with bumper quarterly reports.
But what if a large economy engages in policies and behaviors that create significant distortions to this global trade system?
China is a prime contemporary example. As economics and finance experts Michael Pettis and Matthew Klein argue in their book Trade Wars are Class Wars, China’s high-savings economic development model, which favors government and business investment at the expense of ordinary people’s spending, juices the country’s exports, and causes trade imbalances on a global scale. And on the level of specific industries, China uses tools like discriminatory tax policies to give domestic manufacturers significant cost advantages over foreign competitors.
In short, participating in a game where another major player follows an entirely different set of rules makes for a very uneven playing field. Critical dependencies on this player -- which also happens to be authoritarian and harbors ambitions to remake the global order -- only heighten the risks.
That’s the threat that the US, Europe, and their allies face as they contend with an increasingly aggressive China. Of course, this is a problem in part of their own creation: for decades, they’ve been content to outsource production to China in exchange for higher profit margins. Now, though, it is stated Chinese policy to become a “manufacturing superpower,” dominating a number of key industries, and to parlay that influence into painful points of leverage over other countries (link in Chinese).
Is the Western ideal of free and open trade evaporating?
Europe has slowly come to the realization that it must confront China’s unfair economic practices head-on. In a speech on Mar. 30, Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, offered one of the clearest distillations yet of the bloc’s reckoning with China’s approach to global industry. “China is changing … and is moving into a new era of security and control,” she said. For Beijing, “the imperative for security and control now trumps the logic of free markets and open trade.”
Decades of Chinese industrial policies bear this out. These policies prioritize not profit margins or even optimum efficiency, but industrial security and influence. That means reducing dependence on foreign imports and ensuring that other countries rely more and more on Chinese exports and industrial capacity.
That approach is, by design, at odds with the orthodoxy of globalization, which states that efficiency and profits can be optimised by offshoring low value-add segments of the manufacturing process based the theory of comparative advantage.
In the US and Europe, industrial policy is back with a contentious bang
Until now, the US and Europe have regarded explicit mention of industrial policy as anathema to their free market convictions. But in the face of a diminished domestic industrial base and national security risks stemming from overwhelming dependence on a geopolitical rival, governments are realizing they have to more directly shape industrial strategy and plug vulnerabilities.
The resurgence of industrial policies, like the CHIPS and Inflation Reduction Act bills in the US and the Critical Raw Materials Act in Europe, is in large part a direct response to China. They’re also controversial.
In a recent essay, Adam Posen of the Petersen Institute of International Economics calls the Trump and Biden administrations’ Buy American approach to industrial policy a form of “zero-sum economics” that erodes US competitiveness by raising costs and stifling innovation.
Yet Posen’s critique ignores the reality of how deeply China is imbalancing the global economy. As Pettis points out, “comparative advantage only benefits both parties (and the world) when both parties are able to take full advantage of comparative advantage.” That isn’t the case now. China deliberately runs large and persistent trade surpluses, and restricts imports as “a way of increasing total domestic production at the expense of trade partners,” Pettis says.
The West’s industrial policies now have to play a tricky balancing act, targeting distortions caused by Chinese policies, while still reinforcing the dynamism of a market economy. (Katherine Tai, the US trade representative, said as much in a recent interview with Foreign Policy.) It’s a fine needle to thread, but not an impossible one.
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