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對採取「(中、俄)無限友誼」萬歲或習大大是仁君或聖君這類立場的人來說，她/他們可能視《每日電訊報》上這篇報導為挑撥離間；對我這種「政治現實主義者」來說，會認為不妨姑妄聽之。以下對其內容略做摘要：
1. 03/22結束的習、普高峰會後，習近平並未簽署普丁在會前宣稱將在此次會議中「定案」的「 西伯利亞能源-2號」天然氣輸送系統。
2. 中華人民共和國政府的中程目標是在2049(建國百年)時成為「高度發展的富強中國」。
3. 習近平領導下中國政府的遠程目標是使中國成為「勇敢新世界」的領袖(霸主？--卜凱註)。
4. 在收回香港和台灣後，習近平的下一個目標(自然)是在沙俄時代被強佔的600,000平方公里中國領土(《璦琿條約》 -- 1858和《北京條約》 -- 1860)。它們的面積相當於三個英倫三島。
5. 上述土地包括部分的西伯利亞，也就是普丁想開發天然氣來賣給中國的區域。對中國政府來說，這無異於從強盜手中買回自己的傳家之寶。
請參考拙作《烏克蘭危機 -- 短評三則》第三篇《烏克蘭危機之數典忘史》的附錄：《沙俄、蘇俄、和普俄「進出」他國小抄》。我也借這個機會，再次強烈譴責那些以「中國」知識分子或政論家自居，但在2022俄烏戰爭期間替普丁吹喇叭的人。
Xi Jinping’s plan to annex Russian territory is there for all to see
Michael Henderson, 03/28/23
The long-debated agreement on “Power of Siberia 2” (POS2) – a massive pipeline project to pump gas from Western Siberia to China via Mongolia – has become emblematic of the one-sided and slightly abusive relationship between China and Russia since the start of the Ukraine war. It is not good news for Moscow.
Ahead of Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Russia, Putin boldly announced that the pipeline deal was ready to be signed off, prematurely labelling it “the deal of the century”. But Xi, unmoved by such excessive zeal, declined to sign anything. No mention whatsoever of POS2 appears in the official statements Xi made during the meetings. In the final joint communiqué, all a disappointed Putin could comment was that more work still had to be done “on study and approval”.
It is in this context that we should read Xi’s parting words to Putin – oracular and ominous – that referred to “changes coming, such as haven’t been seen for a century”, which “we can push forward together”. China watchers have been poring over these words for every last nuance, but it’s pretty clear that Xi was framing himself as leader, with Putin nominally by his side, of a revisionist assault on the liberal world order.
Beijing’s vision for the People’s Republic of China’s centenary in 2049 is the global triumph of a “fully developed, rich and powerful China”. This will not include sharing power with a chaotic Russian kleptocracy. The harder Xi focuses his efforts on realising the “China Dream”, the more implacably will his political and economic coercion be directed at Putin and Russia, and the weaker and more dependent both will become.
Xi’s revisionist goals entail wiping out the shame of historical territorial losses. He has imposed Communist authority on Hong Kong, seeks to do so in Taiwan, and undoubtedly has the same ambition for the 600,000 square kilometres – three times the area of Great Britain – which Tsarist Russia wrested from Opium War-weakened Manchu control in 1858-60 under the Treaties of Aigun and Peking. This area includes parts of Siberia, from which Putin’s much-vaunted pipeline deal would extract resources to sell to China.
Since the Chinese Communist Party regime derives much of what it parades as “legitimacy” from these revanchist campaigns, paying Putin for Siberian resources feels like buying family silver back from a robber. Beijing regards its loss of Mongolian lands in the same way, given the crucial Soviet role in breaking Mongolia away from the remnants of Chinese authority in the early 20th century.
Already, cross-border economic activity in Siberia by uncounted Chinese communities, including in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, tacitly revive historical Chinese claims to this resource-rich and highly strategic region. For decades, Chinese gangsters have been smuggling precious Siberian resources back to China through a porous frontier – often in collusion with Russian criminals. It’s a clear breach of Russian sovereignty.
Putin’s disastrous assault on Ukraine may have drawn his gaze far away from Russia’s 4,200 km border with China, along with many thousands of soldiers who should guard it, but the Chinese remain focused. Xi Jinping’s zero-sum ambition for the “great rejuvenation of China” is imposing itself step by step on Russian soil.
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