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「中、美關係」 -- 開欄文
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2023/02/22 13:30 瀏覽5,013 ｜回應22｜推薦1 |
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中國大手筆購買美國小麥 ----- Johnny Rice
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2023/12/21 23:33 推薦1 |
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這是《坂金軋》財經新聞網站上的一篇報導；其內容不能說是中、美貿易的冰山一角，但它呈現了錯綜複雜中、美關係的一個小小面向。
A Month After Xi Jinping Meets With Iowan Farmers, China's Outsized Impact On US Commodity Markets Is Made Clear With Historic Buying Spree
Johnny Rice, 12/21/3
Big Purchase
Between October and mid-December 2023, China purchased a massive amount of wheat, totaling 60 million bushels. This included a record-breaking weekly total of 55 million bushels. This unexpected development occurred when U.S. wheat prices had recently hit multi-year lows. Despite initial indications of a record-low year for U.S. wheat exports in 2023/24, China’s sudden purchases are expected to improve prospects in the face of strong competition from other exporting nations.
Why Now?
China, dealing with issues of wheat quality due to untimely rains during harvest season, is projected to be the top global wheat importer in 2023/24. This has led to increased global demand for affordable wheat.
Price Action
Market players took a significant net short position on U.S. wheat contracts in late 2023, exacerbating downward price trends. The recent uptick in Chinese purchases may signal a reversal, potentially alleviating downward pressure on wheat prices. While not guaranteeing a rally, it suggests a shift in the U.S. wheat market.
Agricultural Diplomacy
China's impact on the US Agricultural market is clear. But international purchasing is always in flux and it’s critical to keep up relations. Last month, during APAC – the Asia-Pacific Advancement Conference – China's President Xi Jinping met with Soybean farmers representing their interests. The representatives came from the Iowa Soybean Association (ISA) and advocated for China to increase its imports from the US.
China plays a pivotal role as the leading global soybean market, importing 60% of all internationally traded soybeans and around 30% of the annual U.S. soybean production. The significance of maintaining this relationship is crucial for both nations.
Opportunities For Investors
Understanding the impact China has on US agriculture is critical for investors looking to get involved. Individual investors can get involved in the commodities markets by trading futures, but this can be a complicated practice out of reach of many investors. Even for seasoned traders, pitfalls abound.
(下略)
This article A Month After Xi Jinping Meets With Iowan Farmers, China's Outsized Impact On US Commodity Markets Is Made Clear With Historic Buying Spree originally appeared on Benzinga.com
© 2023 Benzinga.com. Benzinga does not provide investment advice. All rights reserved.
本文於 2023/12/21 23:34 修改第 1 次
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《習拜會總結：美、中關係分析》評論
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2023/11/21 23:56 推薦1 |
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1. 全文要點及評論
哈斯博士這這篇文章內容平平(本欄上一篇)。但因為他來頭頗大(請參見本城市他的另一篇大作)，我花點時間對此文做個「解構批判」。
第一段簡述2023習拜會達成的共識(請見本欄《習、拜會要點》，11/17)。
此處提醒一下：在國際上「協議」都只不過「紙一張」。「共識」的價值大概只不過比口水高一級，比屁話高三級而已。
第二段強調美、中關係的本質是「競爭」；他指出：由於美國政府已經面臨兩面作戰，拜登的目的是「降低雙方緊張局勢」。第三段以美國國內政治為背景，其功能在「湊字數」」；可略過。
我認為：實力相當的雙方才有「競爭」；如果中、美兩國的確「實力相當」，成本效益最高的情境是：雙方達成「妥協」與「合作」。這是我曾說過的：「中、美合則兩利；鬥則俱傷」(《《中、美經貿脫鉤的虛實》評論》第2節)。
第四段聲稱習近平總理地位沒有以往那樣強勢；習總應該會擔心美國在「貿易戰」持續加碼。
我沒有充份的資訊評論這個意見。看官們可以根據本欄《習拜會：習總一手好牌》 – 11/14和《習拜會：拜登手中的牌更好》 – 11/18兩文的分析，自行判斷。
第五段提到「台灣議題」，內容了無新意。哈斯博士用「維護 ”rules-based international order”」來替美國政府的「干涉內政」行為擦脂抹粉。且不提越戰和第二次伊拉克戰爭，就拿正在進行的以巴衝突下美國政府行為來看，哈斯博士的謊言和偽善可說不攻自破，路人皆知。美國官員/學者這種明知他人知道自己在忽悠，還恬不知恥的繼續胡說八道；實在是醜陋到不行。
第六段評論雙方重新建立軍方通話機制；內容還是老生常談，其功能也在「湊字數」；可略過。
第七段評論雙方就氣候改變與人工智慧可能引發的危機兩個議題達成共識。他指出，重點在於：雙方共識能否導致「具體行動」。
第八段討論當前兩大國際危機：俄烏戰爭和以巴衝突。他指出：美、中雙方雖然在兩個議題上有歧見，但因種種因素不會導致兩國間的直接衝突；可以參考。
第九段討論南海危機與北韓問題；沒什麼有營養的料。
第十段回顧1949後美、中關係的演變。指出現階段兩國間在方方面面的針鋒相對。
最後一段算是全文的「結論」吧。他認為：習拜會沒有「解決」雙方關係的難題，僅試圖「處理」這個緊張關係，讓兩國之間能夠選擇性的合作，以及不要惡化到兵戎相見。
2. 結論
1) 哈斯博士只有二流水準可以從以上我的評論看出。
2) 他的可惡則在於：他沒有(拒不？)宣揚美國領導人應該致力「化解」美、中雙方緊張關係。相對而言，前國務卿布瑞欣斯基博士、哈佛大學阿理森教授、和耶魯大學羅其教授都強調(1)：美國政府要認清現實，不要再貪戀全球一哥的寶座；對華政策應該以「和平共存」為原則。
附註：
1. 布瑞欣斯基博士和羅其教授兩位的大作，見於本城市《中美關係 - 和為貴》一欄下之：《中美關係：將合作機制「制度化」》 -- 2013/05/19，以及《迎接新世代中國》 -- 2013/07/06。
本文於 2023/12/05 22:57 修改第 3 次
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習拜會總結：美、中關係分析 -- Richard N. Haass
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2023/11/21 21:11 推薦1 |
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Summing up the Biden–Xi summit
Richard N. Haass, ASPI, 11/20/23
Summits are by definition occasions of high politics and drama, so it comes as little surprise that the 15 November meeting between US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping generated immense global interest. It was a useful meeting: Biden and Xi agreed to restart military-to-military communications, curb the deadly opioid fentanyl, fight climate change and discuss risks associated with artificial intelligence. But it was also something less than a reset of a relationship that has been deteriorating for several years and that will remain typified by competition more than anything else for the foreseeable future.
Both leaders came to San Francisco hoping the four-hour meeting (held alongside the APEC forum) would place a floor (to use Biden’s favourite image) under what is the defining bilateral relationship of this era. But it’s worth noting that their motives differed fundamentally. Biden wanted to reduce tensions, since the last thing he needs is another diplomatic or, worse, military crisis at a time when an overstretched United States is contending with Russian aggression against Ukraine in Europe and the after-effects of Hamas’s 7 October terrorist attack in Israel.
Biden, a year away from the 2024 presidential election, also needed to show he could be tough on China, both to parry Republican attacks and to show that he was focused on issues that are touching American lives. In this regard, he successfully pushed China to pledge to do more to rein in its exports of the chemical precursors that cartels in Mexico use to manufacture fentanyl.
Xi, for his part, came to California somewhat weakened, owing to the Chinese economy’s underperformance. Following years of excessive state intervention since Xi came to power a decade ago, youth unemployment is high, exports and foreign direct investment are down, and debt is a major issue. The last thing Xi and China’s economy need are more US export controls, sanctions and tariffs.
What did not change as a result of the conversation was the status of the most contentious issue dividing the US and China: Taiwan. For the past half-century the two governments have finessed the issue, essentially agreeing to disagree over the ultimate relationship between the island and the People’s Republic. Xi sees unification as central to his country’s future and to his own legacy; the US sees protecting Taiwan from coercion as central to America’s standing with its allies in the region and the fate of a rules-based international order. It’s likely that tensions stemming from these contrasting agendas will periodically spike in the future as in the past.
One piece of good news in this context was the agreement to re-establish military-to-military communications, which China cut off in the wake of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan in August 2022. This is welcome in principle because it reduces the chances of an incident involving US and Chinese aircraft or ships, which operate in close proximity to one another on a daily basis. But whether this channel could be relied upon if an incident occurred, and, if so, to what effect, remains an open question.
The summit appeared to produce the promise of enhanced US–China cooperation on climate change and on regulating the use of AI. What will matter, though, is whether the spirit of that promise ultimately translates into meaningful concrete action.
The summit didn’t appear to bridge Chinese and American differences over the world’s two major ongoing conflicts. China is very much in Russia’s corner, while the US is in Ukraine’s, and China (unlike the US) has distanced itself from Israel in the wake of the 7 October attack, refusing to condemn Hamas and calling for an unconditional ceasefire. Despite these differences, the two governments don’t appear to be on a collision course in either region. China has held off on arming Russia, and it has a stake in not seeing conflict in the Middle East escalate to a point that jeopardises its ability to import Iranian oil. Xi also wants to avoid a scenario where mounting geopolitical differences over either of these crises provide a pretext for the US to take additional steps that would add to China’s economic difficulties.
But it remains to be seen whether such calculations on Xi’s part will lead China to exercise restraint in the South China Sea, where it has been applying increasing pressure against the Philippines, a long-standing American ally. And the summit provided no reason to believe that China is prepared to use its influence to rein in the nuclear and missile programs of North Korea.
Over seven decades, the modern US–China relationship has evolved significantly. Early on, there was no relationship to speak of, and the US found itself in an armed confrontation with China during the Korean War. That was followed two decades later by a period of strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union, and then to boost trade and investment as a joint priority once the Cold War ended. But economic ties have become a source of friction in recent years, and as China became increasingly assertive, the two countries found themselves increasingly at odds over just about everything, from regional and global issues to human rights.
The San Francisco summit didn’t alter this reality. US–China relations remain an issue to be managed, not a problem to be solved. Expecting anything else from the summit was to expect too much. The world’s most important bilateral relationship continues to be a highly competitive one, and the challenge remains what it was prior to the summit: to ensure that competition doesn’t preclude selective cooperation or give way to conflict.
Richard N. Haass, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, is a senior counsellor at Centerview Partners and the author, most recently, of The bill of obligations: the ten habits of good citizens. This article is presented in partnership with Project Syndicate © 2023.
本文於 2023/11/21 23:12 修改第 2 次
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《中、美經貿脫鉤的虛實》 評論
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2023/11/21 20:00 推薦1 |
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楔子
本文以前已經與原文同時在今年02/23發表於本欄；現在將它分開再度登出，以便搜尋和引用。不便之處請見諒。
卡普瑞先生在《富比世》上的這篇文章分析「中、美經貿脫鉤」的現況和走勢(本欄第三篇文章)。摘譯和轉載如下；我在譯文後會略做評論。
1. 譯文
雖然華府在戰略科技領域加強了對中國這個地緣政治對頭的打擊，但過去兩年來美、中貿易與投資的金額都持續增加。從數字上看，「中、美經貿」並未「脫鉤」。
2022年中、美雙邊貿易總額為歷史新高的 $6,900億：中國對美進口較2021年增加$310億；美國對中出口則較同年增加 $24億。
以上數字顯示：主導美國企業界的當代總經理們，過去二、三十年來一直理所當然地把中國市場規模做為她/他們業績成長策略的基礎。
華爾街對中國金融業也是信心滿滿；2020年開始，高盛集團公司、摩根大通、花旗集團、摩根•史坦利、以及其它金融界龍頭投入了 $750億 到中國金融市場。貝萊德集團 則宣布將在中國設立 $10億的共同基金。
這些數字其實只是冰山一角。許多境外投資公司可能隱藏了$1.4兆投入中國的資金；導致實際投入中國金融業的外資金額可能是帳面上官方數字的三倍。
中國大弔詭
上述情況呈現出一個複雜的、難以捉摸的謎：做為美國主要敵對角色的中國，怎麼可能同時又是美國供應鏈不可或缺的夥伴；製造業重要的一環；以及不斷成長的市場？
不過，當今全球供應鏈存在著一個難以解決的「雙軌道」現象：在華盛頓和北京之間就國家本位高科技競爭和多線作戰(1)鬥爭進行得如火如荼的情況下，和中國相關的「戰略性貨物及業務」的確已經在「脫鉤」中；和上述相關的產業及理論研究，如半導體、高速電腦、生物科技、以及量子科技等將逐步「脫鉤」。
一個重要而棘手的難題是所謂的「灰色地區」：對一些所謂「雙重用途」產品 – 既可用在一般商品，又可用在軍事設備的高科技產業 – 的投資和貿易，有一天會發現公司和/或技術被列入禁運黑名單。
一個顯而易見的問題是：有多少這些「雙重用途」的產品會因為被列入管制而造成全面性的「中、美經貿脫鉤」？答案是：這個過程的加速程度超過一般人的預期。
高科技產業的「雙軌道」現象
美國政府的半導體禁運實際上已經切斷了美國此項產業和重要的各個中國高科技公司間的供應鏈；這些公司包括：華為和中興通訊(電信)；中芯國際和長江儲存(半導體)；大疆創新(無人機)；大華技術、曠視科技、商湯科技、和海康威視等等 – 這些公司分別屬於人工智慧以及監控領域的軟、硬體企業。
在美國實施禁運和外銷管制前，這些公司和美國以及其它(中國)境外跨國企業的貿易額高達數百億。例如：2018年華為和外國高科技產業的貿易額是$700億；其中包括來自英特爾、美光科技、和高通三家公司的$110億。這些貿易在2022年10月已經實質上終止。
中國所有跨國企業所面臨的問題是：還有多少產品會被列入禁運名單？這個趨勢無疑會加速各國對中國經貿的全面脫鉤。
灰色地區
(略去)。
2. 評論
我沒有花時間去搜尋其它報導來佐證這篇文章中所列舉數據和事實的可信度。不過，明年此時我們可以從2023年中、美雙邊貿易總額，來判斷拜登政府(對中國)「禁運政策」是玩真的還是玩假的。
如果拜登政府玩真的，我可以預見2024年民主黨總統候選人可能面臨的兩個問題：高失業率和低GDP成長率。如果「脫鉤」擴大到中國對美進口貨物，則她/他還要面臨居高不下的通膨率。我在第一篇文章的介紹中提到：「我一向認為『中、美關係』是：『合則兩利；鬥則俱傷』」就是指這三個問題而言。另一方面，對中國的傷害，自然是延遲了高科技產業的進展。
在《彼此傷害而又相互依賴的中美關係》一文中，羅其教授針對日趨緊張的「中、美關係」提出了分析；該文作者則根據羅其教授的分析，提出一個(我認為是)「治標」的方法。請參考。
附註：
1. 原文hybrid war是作者另一篇分析的標題(請使用超連結)；該標題借用軍事學術語的「多線戰爭」。
本文於 2025/01/19 17:53 修改第 2 次
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《習拜會：習總贏了舊金山牌局》讀後
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2023/11/18 19:46 推薦1 |
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平心而論，我不覺得考特金先生這篇文章很有料(本欄上一篇)。就標題來說，他應該針對「會談結果」分析/評論；而不是做些泛泛之談(請參看本欄《習、拜會要點》)。就內容而言，標題改為《習總近日春風得意》比較適合(“Xi is Sitting Pretty Nowadays”；請參看本欄《習拜會：拜登手中的牌更好》)。
以下三段話很有意思：
… Britain’s new Foreign Secretary, former prime minister David Cameron, who can be counted on to wear out conference carpets with his kowtowing.
這段話相當缺德。
But last year America’s net deficit in high-tech trade was $242 billion, with the country relying on factories in China for military goods.
這一段話資訊值飽滿。
He could also force Xi to pledge not to take over Taiwan, which many American industries count on for key components. Imagine what could happen if China seizes these assets before the West can replicate them. Then, Xi will truly be king of the world.
這一段話近於揶揄；因為，他明明知道自己所描述的情境在三、五年內難以實現。
本文於 2023/11/18 19:47 修改第 1 次
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習拜會：習總贏了舊金山牌局 - Joel Kotkin
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2023/11/18 18:07 推薦1 |
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Xi Jinping emerges as the winner from San Francisco
The Chinese premier has the West right where he wants it
JOEL KOTKIN, 11/16/23
Xi Jinping should have entered San Francisco’s Apec conference with his tail between his legs, but instead has emerged as something closer to the king of the world. China may be experiencing tepid growth, a bloated real estate market, low industrial production, and an increasingly alienated youth yet, in spite of these factors, he appears to be wearing the crown.
To reach for this kind of power, being a dictator is helpful. One can force an agenda on one’s nation and the world without worrying too much about domestic critics. It certainly works with foreigners: after all, Xi’s mere presence has led San Francisco to clean itself up, something it has not managed for the last decade.
It’s also worth comparing Xi to his counterparts. Besides him, Western leaders are doing little to impress — not least his host, the doddering Joe Biden, whose own party does not even want him to run. There’s not a Churchill, Roosevelt or even a Reagan in the bunch. Biden was even prevented from unveiling a proposed new trade deal in San Francisco with Asia’s other economies due to opposition from his own party.
Strategically, Xi has the West exactly where he wants it. China agreed to US climate proposals in San Francisco this week. The demands for more wind and solar energy, as well as electric vehicles, assure an industrial supremacy for the country that produces more greenhouse gases than the entire developed world put together. China already boasts a huge lead in solar battery production, and increasingly dominates the production of rare-earth elements, which are critical to wind turbines, solar panels and electric vehicles.
As American EV firms struggle with production and supply chain issues, China’s Warren Buffett-backed BYD has emerged as the world’s top electric vehicle manufacturer, with big export ambitions, while Tesla focuses much of its future growth at its Chinese factories. Meanwhile, the Net Zero policies of the West are already unravelling Germany’s industrial economy, which is losing much of its industrial base, notably in chemicals and vehicles.
Like the former Soviet Union, China has found many “useful idiots” in the American establishment, including on Wall Street, Silicon Valley and, it appears, within the Biden family. China has also found ways to influence politicians in Australia and Canada. And we certainly can’t expect a stiff upper lip from Britain’s new Foreign Secretary, former prime minister David Cameron, who can be counted on to wear out conference carpets with his kowtowing.
Some in the West insist that China will never conquer the “commanding heights” of the world’s technology-driven economy. But last year America’s net deficit in high-tech trade was $242 billion, with the country relying on factories in China for military goods.
What’s more, China now has a freer hand militarily. Tied down in Ukraine and the Middle East, the Institute for Strategic and International Studies has warned that the West now lacks “sufficient residual inventories for training and to execute war plans”. Chong Ja Ian, a political science professor at the National University of Singapore, added that Xi is following the pattern which Mao referred to as “talk and fight, fight and talk […] That is, to talk while building up forces.”
If Biden still had leverage, or the will to use it, he might insist that China pledge to not aid Russia or Iran. He could also force Xi to pledge not to take over Taiwan, which many American industries count on for key components. Imagine what could happen if China seizes these assets before the West can replicate them. Then, Xi will truly be king of the world.
本文於 2023/11/18 18:14 修改第 3 次
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習拜會：拜登手中的牌更好 -- David E. Sanger
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2023/11/18 16:23 推薦1 |
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請參看本欄《習、拜會要點》和《習拜會：習總一手好牌》兩文。
For Biden, a Subtle Shift in the Power Balance With China’s Xi Jinping
For the first time in years, a Chinese leader desperately needed a few things from the United States.
David E. Sanger, 11/17/23
SAN FRANCISCO — When President Joe Biden met President Xi Jinping on Wednesday on the edges of Silicon Valley, there was a subtle but noticeable shift in the power dynamic between two countries that have spent most of the past few years denouncing, undercutting and imposing sanctions on each other.
For the first time in years, a Chinese leader desperately needed a few things from the United States. Xi’s list at the summit started with a revival of American financial investments in China and a break in the series of technology export controls that have, at least temporarily, crimped Beijing’s ability to make the most advanced semiconductors and the artificial intelligence breakthroughs they enable.
All this may explain why Biden’s aides were able to negotiate, fairly quickly by Chinese diplomatic standards, a potentially major agreement on stopping the flow of the chemical precursors for fentanyl to the United States and a resumption of military-to-military communications, critical for two superpowers whose forces bump up against each other every day.
“Restoring these military-to-military contacts, and not just at the secretary of defense level, but also at the regional command level and the operational level, is really critical to helping to avoid miscalculations and mistakes,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in an interview Thursday.
The lurking question now is whether Xi’s charm offensive — on full display Wednesday night as he entertained CEOs — marks a lasting shift or a tactical maneuver.
While Biden’s aides said they were pleased by the concrete outcomes of the summit, they readily conceded that those may be short-lived. China’s record of steady compliance and enforcement with similar agreements in recent years has been spotty. And it is possible Xi was simply looking for a way to get through China’s roughest era of bankruptcies, property-value collapses and loss of consumer confidence in four decades.
Nonetheless, Biden seems happy to take advantage of the breathing space, hoping that he will have more time before the presidential election to rebuild manufacturing competitiveness and hem in China’s gains in the Pacific.
Few American officials doubt that when he can, Xi will reignite his effort to displace the United States as the most skilled military, technological and economic power in the world.
While Xi turned down the temperature on Taiwan a few degrees, telling Biden he would not move precipitously against the island, American national security officials emerged from the meeting believing that he is still intent on eventually bringing the island under the mainland’s control. And they see no evidence that Xi’s appetite for more territory in the South China Sea or more nuclear weapons will abate.
Still, the change in tone, even if temporary, was welcome. It began over the summer, when Blinken made a trip to Beijing that had been delayed by the Chinese spy-balloon incident. With the depths of the economic crisis in China becoming apparent, Blinken reported back that he was struck by an eagerness there for visits by Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo. There were quiet meetings in Vienna, and then Washington, between Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, and his counterpart, Wang Yi.
It was all intended to culminate in the meeting between Biden and Xi, which lasted for four hours Wednesday at the Filoli mansion and gardens, a popular hiking, dining and wedding destination that suddenly became the playing field for the greatest geopolitical competition on Earth.
During the meeting, Xi complained about the damage done to China by its portrayal as a villain in the United States, according to administration officials who would not speak on the record about the discussions. Xi voiced his longest and loudest protests about the cutoff of the fastest computer chips, which Biden responded would help the Chinese military. The two leaders were at fundamental odds on that issue: What Xi sees as economic strangulation, Biden sees as an issue of national security.
But the tone was always measured, sometimes friendly, leavened with Biden’s recollections of past trips with Xi in China, the United States and at summits around the world. Xi then fine-tuned his speech for the CEOs to recall happier moments in the U.S.-China relationship.
“It did strike me that it was a speech that could be given seven or 10 years ago in the era of engagement,” said Michael Froman, the former U.S. trade representative and Citigroup executive, who recently became president of the Council on Foreign Relations and attended the dinner. “It was as if the era of ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’ had never happened, and some of the events of the past few years had not occurred.”
In fact, the most striking element of the visit was Xi’s seeming abandonment of the “wolf warrior” tone — one the Chinese leader himself had encouraged.
The phrase came to embrace a Chinese diplomatic style, aimed especially but hardly exclusively at the United States, in which Chinese envoys described the end of an era of American dominance. China was rising, the wolf warriors declared, and America was in unstoppable decline. The arguments tracked closely with some that Xi himself made in speeches to party leaders and military officials in Beijing.
Xi dispatched one of his favorite wolf warriors, Qin Gang, to Washington as his hand-picked ambassador. During Biden’s first year, the emissary spoke about “lies, disinformation” about China that were “spreading every day.” He complained, “China is being treated like a kid, being scolded by his or her parents every day. ‘You are wrong. You need to do this. You shouldn’t do that.’”
So when Qin was recalled from Washington to become foreign minister, there was an assumption in Washington that his approach had been a success — and he was being rewarded for the blunt, in-your-face diplomacy that once led Sullivan to ask aloud: “Who calls their diplomats wolf warriors?”
Xi appears to have rethought the wisdom of doing so. Qin disappeared over the summer, not long after meeting Blinken in Beijing. The conversations underway since have been largely practical, not polemical.
Blinken was able to negotiate outlines of the crackdown on the precursor chemicals for fentanyl during his summer trip, and the Chinese quickly made it illegal to trade in those chemicals — and in the past week or so began arresting violators, most identified by the United States.
“This is concrete stuff, and it goes to the single common denominator across our country that has been devastating communities,” Blinken said Thursday.
The actions were reminiscent of a previous era when China would crack down on arms and technology companies selling parts to North Korea, or Iran. Still, American officials caution that they fully expect some of the makers of the chemicals will figure out how to avoid the sanctions, and they will come back on the market.
When the conversation Wednesday turned to military-to-military communications, Xi repeatedly urged Biden to just pick up the phone and call him if there was a problem. Of course, calls between the leaders of the two countries are never that easy. (China in particular insists on orchestrating every word that will be uttered well ahead of time.)
But the real test will come in the negotiations ahead. While U.S. officials said little about it, the Chinese side heralded a new “working group” that will examine the risks of artificial intelligence in weapons systems, including nuclear weapons. China has never entered talks about the size and purpose of its nuclear arsenal, saying it had so many fewer than Russia and the United States do that it wanted to reach parity before making any commitments.
c.2023 The New York Times Company
本文於 2023/11/18 16:24 修改第 1 次
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習、拜會要點 – 路透社
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2023/11/17 16:06 推薦1 |
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Biden and Xi meeting: Taiwan, Iran, fentanyl and AI
Trevor Hunnicutt and Jeff Mason, 11/16/23
Trevor Hunnicutt and Jeff Mason
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. President Joe Biden and China's Xi Jinping met for about four hours on Wednesday to discuss issues ranging from military conflicts to drug-trafficking.
Biden welcomed the Chinese leader at the Filoli estate, a country house and gardens about 30 miles (48 km) south of San Francisco, ahead of a summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.
Here's the key issues discussed.
TAIWAN
The two leaders had a "substantial" discussion on Taiwan, with Xi telling Biden that Taiwan was the biggest, most dangerous issue facing the two superpowers, a senior U.S. official told reporters.
The Chinese leader said that China had no plans for military action against Taiwan in coming years, but also discussed conditions under which force could be used, the official said.
Biden said he "stressed the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait." He also asked Xi to respect Taiwan's electoral process, the U.S. official said.
Xi responded: "Look, peace is ... all well and good but at some point we need to move towards resolution more generally," the U.S. official said.
MILITARY TALKS
Beijing said the two leaders agreed to resume military contacts that China severed after then-House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022.
Biden made a "very clear request" that both countries institutionalize the military-to-military dialogues, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin will meet his Chinese counterpart when that person is named, a senior U.S. official said.
LEADER TO LEADER TALKS
Biden said he and Xi agreed to high-level communications.
"He and I agreed that each one of us can pick up the phone call directly and we'll be heard immediately," Biden told reporters after the meeting.
COOPERATION AND CONCILIATION
Beijing's report of the meeting, via the Communist Party-controlled Chinese state media, emphasized the need for more cooperation, dialogue and respect. China and the United States should set an example for other countries, Xi told Biden, according to Chinese media, and promote cooperation on trade, agriculture, climate change and artificial intelligence.
An official briefed on the talks said Beijing was also seeking a show of respect from the trip.
FENTANYL
Biden and Xi agreed to cooperate on addressing the source of the opioid fentanyl, a leading cause of drug overdoses in the United States, the U.S. official said.
Under the agreement, China will go directly after specific chemical companies that make fentanyl precursors.
IRAN
The two leaders also discussed the unfolding crisis in the Middle East, with Biden asking China to weigh in with Iran and urge it to avoid steps that could be seen as provocative, the senior U.S. official told reporters.
Chinese officials told the U.S. side that they had engaged in discussions with Iran on regional risks.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
The two leaders also discussed artificial intelligence (AI)and agreed that AI was used in military or nuclear operations, it created real risks.
The senior U.S. official said both sides were "very much focused" on practices regarding AI that could be dangerous or destabilizing, but not ready for any mutual declaration.
(Reporting by Jeff Mason, Trevor Hunnicutt; writing by Andrea Shalal; Editing by Heather Timmons and Stephen Coates)
本文於 2023/11/17 16:07 修改第 1 次
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習拜會：習總一手好牌-David P. Goldman
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2023/11/14 20:59 推薦1 |
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Xi holds four aces as he meets Biden
Ukraine stalemate, tech war flop, China’s enhanced stance with Global South & US military’s caution bind Biden
DAVID P. GOLDMAN, 11/11/23
China’s leader Xi Jinping will meet President Biden Nov. 15 in San Francisco with four high cards in his hand. Policy advisers close to Xi express an unprecedented kind of confidence in China’s strategic position.
First, the collapse of Ukraine’s offensive against Russian forces and its commander’s admission that the war is a “stalemate” is a setback for America’s strategic position and a gain for China, which has doubled its exports to Russia since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Second, the US tech war on China has flopped, as Chinese AI firms buy fast Huawei processers in place of chips from Nvidia and other US producers.
Third, the Gaza war provoked by Hamas on October 7 gives China a free option to act as the de facto leader of the Global South in opposition to Israel, an American ally. China now exports more to the Muslim world than it does to the United States.
And fourth, the US military wants to avoid confrontation with China in the Northwest Pacific region as well as its home waters in the South China Sea, where the PLA’s thousands of surface-to-ship missiles and nearly 1,000 fourth- and fifth-generation warplanes give China an overwhelming home-theater advantage in firepower.
Mutual fear of war
In the background of the Biden-Xi summit is a fear – shared by both sides – that a US-China confrontation could lead to war.
Henry Kissinger told the Economist last May: “We’re in the classic pre-World War 1 situation where neither side has much margin of political concession and in which any disturbance of the equilibrium can lead to catastrophic consequences.”
A prominent advisor to China’s Communist Party, Renmin University Professor Jin Canrong, told “The Observer” on November 9, “The world today has entered an era of great struggle: the old order dominated by the West. It is disintegrating, but the new order has not yet been established.” Jin compared the world situation to China’s bloody Warring States period (475 BCE to 221 BCE).
A major concern on the American side is the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal to a projected 1,000 warheads by 2030, from just 220 in 2020. A November 10 commentary in Foreign Affairs warns, “Chinese analysts are worried that the United States has lowered its threshold for nuclear use – including allowing for limited first use in a Taiwan conflict – and that the US military is acquiring new capabilities that could be used to destroy or significantly degrade China’s nuclear forces.”
Newsom shows how to pull back
A foretaste of the Biden-Xi discussions came from the October 25 Beijing visit of California Governor Gavin Newsom, the likeliest 2024 Democratic presidential candidate should Biden withdraw for health reasons or in response to Congressional investigations of his personal and family finances. A widely-circulated scenario for the upcoming presidential race foresees Newsom replacing an ailing Biden at the top of the Democratic ticket.
Significantly, Newsom has been quoted as saying that he had “expressed my support for the One-China policy … as well as our desire not to see independence” of Taiwan. Newsome spoke of “renewing our friendship and re-engaging [on] foundational and fundamental issues that will determine our collective faith in the future.”
(請見上一篇的短評)
本文於 2023/11/14 21:00 修改第 2 次
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《習拜會：習總一手好牌》小評
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2023/11/14 17:48 推薦1 |
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郭德曼先生這篇評論分析習拜會前習總所佔據的優勢(本欄下一篇文章)：
1) 俄烏戰爭膠著；
2) 科技戰翻盤；
3) 全球南方各國向心；
4) 美國軍方謹慎。
以上四點中，除了第1點是新近發展，這個部落格還沒有深入討論外，其它三點此處至少有一篇相關的分析/報導，請參閱：科技戰(共兩篇)、南方各國1(共兩篇)、南方各國2(共兩篇)、美國軍力1、美國軍力2(共四篇)。
「美國軍方謹慎」有其背景：
a. 自越戰以後，除了幾個小國外，北越、伊拉克、阿富汗、和敘利亞等已經把「美國軍方『打怕了』」。
b. 中國軍隊雖然三、四十年沒有實戰經驗，但在裝備和火力上與美軍不相上下；在中、短程飛彈上可能還略勝一籌。美國軍方不願，也不敢對他們的最高統帥拍胸脯，打包票自在意料之中。
第二點跟兩岸關係息息相關。這就不必我再著墨了(共三篇)。
本文於 2023/11/15 02:00 修改第 3 次
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