|
「中、美關係」 -- 開欄文
|
瀏覽13,708 ｜回應39｜推薦1 |
|
中國以間諜罪扣留美籍學人 -- RFI
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
證實扣留一名“涉諜”美國公民 美媒稱係研究緬甸問題的學者
中國周五證實，因涉嫌從事間諜活動，扣留了一名美國公民。法新社說，該美國公民系某個緬甸問題研究機構的分析師吳敏辛(U Min Zin)，他於6月3日在雲南省昆明機場被捕。
RFI，06/12/26
中國外交部發言人林劍周五稱：“據我們了解，敏辛(Min Zin)因涉嫌從事危害中國國家安全的間諜活動，正由有關當局依法採取刑事強制措施。”此言證實了媒體此前關於他在中國被拘留的報道。
林劍表示：“中方已就此事通知了美國駐廣州總領事館。並說，敏辛的合法權利得到了充分保障”。
據法新社介紹，敏辛是緬甸戰略與政策研究所(ISP-M)的創始成員，該機構致力於研究緬甸的政治動態、資源及衝突。自2021年政變推翻昂山素季領導的民選政府以來，緬甸一直深陷內戰。
他在部分著作中詳細闡述了中國在緬甸邊境地區的影響力，北京方面被指控支持那些符合其國家利益的武裝派別。
一位與緬甸戰略與政策研究所有工作往來的人士匿名告訴法新社，敏辛於6月3日在雲南省昆明機場被捕，雲南省與緬甸接壤，邊界線綿長。
另一位與敏辛關係密切的人士匿名表示：“他去那裡是為了參加一個會議”。並說，“他的家人和同事正在與美國駐廣州領事館保持聯繫”。
美國國務院和緬甸戰略與政策研究所(ISP-M) 均未回應置評請求。
敏辛供職的研究所位於泰國北部清邁市，自2021年政變以來，清邁一直是緬甸政治流亡者的聚集地。
包括緬甸戰略與政策研究所在內的分析人士指出，在中國經濟和安全利益發生變化的情況下，中國在緬甸內戰中對軍方和反政府武裝都提供了不同程度的支持。
據紐約時報12日引述知情人士透露，敏辛曾為《紐約時報》、《外交政策》及其他新聞機構撰寫關於緬甸政治的評論文章。
據尼泊爾一個研究機構5月發的一則網帖介紹，敏辛原定於本月晚些時候在尼泊爾舉行的政策與地緣政治論壇上擔任發言人。
簡介還介紹稱，他是加利福尼亞大學伯克利分校的政治學博士候選人，其研究興趣包括軍政關係、民主化和民族衝突。他的領英頁面顯示，他擁有伯克利分校的政治學碩士學位，並於2010年至2016年在該校就讀。
本文於 修改第 1 次
|
|
中美能否化解蘇西迪底斯難局? -- Alexander Gale
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
下文轉載自《希臘報導》；雖然了無新意，立論還算持平。由於習總書記當著川普的面，半勸告、半警告的提出此詞(本欄2026/05/15)，它立馬又在媒體上火紅起來(該欄2026/05/16)。我也打算趕趕這班順風車，就此概念略抒己見。登錄於此，拿它做一個「解構」樣本。
Escape From the Thucydides Trap: Can China and the US Rewrite the History of Superpower Rivalry?
Alexander Gale, 05/14/26
China’s President Xi Jinping welcomed US President Donald Trump to Beijing on Wednesday with a somber reflection on the weight of history. Invoking the “Thucydides Trap,” the historical theory that a rising power and an established, leading one are frequently destined for war, Xi posed a fundamental question to his American counterpart, saying:
“The world has reached a new crossroads: can China and the United States overcome the Thucydides Trap and create a new model of relations? Can we face global challenges together and provide greater stability to the world? Can we, in the interest of our world, our two peoples, and the future of humanity, build a brighter future for our bilateral relations?”
The summit in China is widely viewed as a pivotal moment for the “negotiation of the century,” as the world’s two largest economies grapple with disputes ranging from trade and artificial intelligence to the conflicts in Iran and the Taiwan Strait.
Thucydides Trap in Ancient Greece
Xi Jinping reminded the world that the lessons of the Peloponnesian War, contested between ancient Athens and Sparta, still apply to the complex geopolitical landscape of the 21st century almost 2,500 years later. Fought between 431 BC and 404 BC, the Peloponnesian War plunged Greece into turmoil, as the two superpowers of the day—Athens and Sparta—fought for hegemony over the Greek world.
Greek historian Thucydides famously chronicled the war, seeking to explain why Athens and Sparta were destined for conflict. Today, some historians and International Relations scholars believe Thucydides can offer insights into the growing tensions between the two superpowers of our time, the United States and China. They worry that these two superpowers may fall into a “Thucydides’ Trap” and plummet headlong into a deadly confrontation.
The Thucydides’ Trap in the modern world
According to International Relations scholar Graham Allison, the Thucydides’ Trap is “a deadly pattern of structural stress that results when a rising power challenges a ruling one.” Allison quotes Thucydides, who explained, “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.” According to Allison, this pattern of behavior was not isolated to the Peloponnesian War. The scholar claims it has occurred no less than sixteen times over the past five hundred years.
Of the sixteen historical cases that Allison identifies, twelve resulted in a full-scale war, while only four avoided violent conflict. The pattern stems from a fundamental power dynamic: a rising power disrupts the established order, challenging the dominance of the ruling state. This creates a cycle of fear, miscalculation, and mutual suspicion, escalating tensions to the point where war often seems inevitable.
In the case of Ancient Greece, Sparta viewed Athens’ rapid expansion of power, particularly its maritime empire, as a direct threat to its dominance in the region, leading to a breakdown in diplomacy and eventual war.
The US and China
Allison and others applied the Thucydides’ Trap concept to analyze modern geopolitical tensions, particularly between the US and China. As the long-standing global hegemon, the US faces the rise of China as an economic, technological, and military power. This dynamic echoes the conditions Thucydides described: the fear within the ruling power (the US) and the ambition of the rising power (China) create a volatile environment.
While the modern world includes nuclear deterrence, global interdependence, and international institutions, the structural stress of power transition remains a key driver of conflict risk. Indeed, recent tensions between the US and China have escalated across military, economic, and technological domains, underscoring a growing strategic rivalry.
Militarily, the Pentagon reported that China has expanded its nuclear arsenal to over 600 operational warheads, with projections to exceed 1,000 by 2030. This and increased Chinese military maneuvers near Taiwan raised regional security concerns and strained US-China relations.
Beijing announced a 2026 defense budget of $281 billion, marking a 7% increase from the previous year. While this official figure remains below 1.5% of China’s GDP, international observers note that actual spending is likely much higher when accounting for research and development, paramilitary forces, and regional contributions, reflecting a disciplined but steady pivot toward technology-intensive “intelligentized” warfare.
Economically, disputes persist in the global trade arena. Donald Trump’s second term trade war, which escalated rapidly in early 2025, has profoundly reshaped the Chinese economy by accelerating “de-risking” and forcing a shift in global supply chains. Following his return to office, the administration launched the “Liberation Day” tariffs, which saw average levies on Chinese goods surge by as much as 145 percentage points by April 2025.
This aggressive stance caused China’s share of U.S. imports to plummet to just 9% by the end of 2025—down from 22% prior to the original 2018 trade war. While a temporary truce in late 2025 capped reciprocal tariffs at 30%, the volatility has driven major manufacturers to diversify away from China, leading Beijing to implement strict retaliatory measures.
Technological competition remains another critical flashpoint. The US recently revised its science and technology agreement with China to narrow its scope to basic research, excluding sensitive areas such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing. This update reflects concerns over intellectual property theft and the strategic implications of technological advancements.
While China seeks to challenge US dominance in emerging technologies, the US aims to safeguard its innovation ecosystem. These developments illustrate the multifaceted nature of US-China tensions, driven by structural competition, mutual suspicion, and efforts by both nations to secure their global influence in an increasingly interconnected world.
Criticism of the Thucydides’ Trap Theory
Critics of the Thucydides’ Trap theory argue that it oversimplifies complex international relations and overstates the inevitability of conflict. They point out that historical examples vary widely in context, and that successful management of great power transitions depends on diplomacy, mutual accommodation, and restraint.
For instance, the peaceful transition of global leadership from the British Empire to the United States in the 20th century is often cited as evidence that war is not inevitable.
However, proponents counter that such cases are exceptions rather than the rule and that avoiding the Thucydides’ Trap requires extraordinary foresight and effort from the rising and ruling powers.
The relevance of Thucydides’ insights in the modern era highlights the enduring lessons of history. While the Peloponnesian War unfolded in a vastly different context, the underlying dynamics of power, fear, and rivalry resonate strongly today. Understanding these patterns can help policymakers navigate the precarious balance of great power competition, emphasizing the importance of dialogue, cooperation, and managing the structural tensions inherent in such rivalries.
See all the latest news from Greece and the world at Greekreporter.com. Contact our newsroom to report an update or send your story, photos and videos. Follow GR on Google News and subscribe here to our daily email!
本文於 修改第 3 次
|
|
面對蘇西迪底斯難局的習川會 - David Gardner
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
請參考：
* Xi Warned US Not to Fall Into ‘Thucydides Trap.’ What’s That Mean? (05/20)
* Xi warns Trump about the 'Thucydides Trap.' Here's what it means
How Two Words From China’s President Finally Silenced Trump
David Gardner, 05/15/26
Donald Trump will leave China a chastened man.
If he didn’t know what Xi Jinping meant by raising the specter of the Thucydides Trap when he arrived in Beijing, you can be sure that he does now.
Because it was a warning issued by a leader who is very much Trump’s equal in power and way more experienced at using it.
Amid the pomp of Trump’s arrival on Thursday, Xi invoked a classical Greek reference suggesting that war is often inevitable when a rising power challenges a hegemon.
The scene as U.S. President Donald Trump participates in events at the Great Hall of the People and does a greeting with the President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping May 14, 2026, in Beijing China during a trip focused on trade, regional security, and strengthening bilateral ties between the world’s two largest economies. Kenny HolstonPool via REUTERS / Kenny Holston/Poo/Reuters 照片
It’s a relatively modern concept based around the historian Thucydides’s quote about the second Peloponnesian War (431 B.C. to 404 B.C.): “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.”
The Western view has Sparta as the United States and China as the upstart Athens. Xi may see it differently.
While the People’s Republic of China was officially founded on October 1, 1949, its cultural roots extend 3,500 to 3,700 years back to the Shang Dynasty (ca. 1600 BCE). At 250 years old, the U.S. is just a baby.
Trump is consumed with manipulating the markets on Fox News. Xi sees power in terms of centuries rather than news cycles.
Up to now, China has treated Trump with kid gloves. But as a sophisticated anathema to the fast-talking, knee-jerk Trump, Xi has taken off the gloves this week, hinting at the power at his fingertips.
And Trump looks shaken.
He left Washington on Tuesday in a bombastic mood, insulting a female reporter on the way to his Marine One helicopter and insisting he doesn’t give a thought to Americans struggling with their finances.
Before that, for nights on end, he spewed Truth Social posts lambasting everyone from Barack Obama to his own appointed Supreme Court Justices, Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett.
But since that shaded welcome and two hours of talks behind closed doors with his “friend” Xi, Trump has been muted. He looks serious and thoughtful...and old.
Inside the Great Hall of the People, Xi told Trump that “the Taiwan question is the most important issue in China-U.S. relations.
“If it is handled properly, the bilateral relationship will enjoy overall stability. Otherwise, the two countries will have clashes and even conflicts, putting the entire relationship in great jeopardy,” he added, according to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning.
But it is the Thucydides Trap quandary that is haunting Trump.
Professor Graham Allison, the Director of Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, who coined the phrase for his 2014 book, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap, visited Xi in China recently. No doubt the trap concept seemed relevant to the Chinese leader, although he had used it before.
Of the 16 cases that fell under the Thucydides's Trap over the past 500 years, 12 resulted in war. / Thucydides's Trap Case File/Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 過去500年來的16個「蘇西迪底斯難局」案例 (請見文後之編者註)
Xi framed it as a warning, and further analysis shows that it is not inevitable under the model. Harvard Thucydides’s Trap Project identified 16 cases in the last 500 years in which a major rising power has threatened to displace a major ruling power. Four of those 16 cases did not result in war.
Taiwan worried before the state visit that Trump could sell them out in his haste to make nice with China. They will be even more concerned now that the U.S. president has been confronted with the possibility that America and China could be on the verge of becoming case number 17.
No wonder the teetotal Trump was raising a glass of wine at the state dinner.
The truth is that neither side needs a war right now, but history has shown that what nations need and what they get aren’t always the same.
For now, at least, it’s just a gentle warning from a leader demanding respect. He will do what is necessary to Make China Great Again.
On his flight home on Air Force One on Friday, Trump might want to read up on another trap he is in great danger of dropping his country into.
Charles Kindleberger, an architect of the Marshall Plan, argued that the U.S. failed to accept its superpower responsibilities after supplanting Great Britain in the 1930s. As a result, he claimed the global order collapsed into depression, genocide, and World War Two.
After decades at the head of the table, the U.S. under Trump has withdrawn from 66 international organizations and environmental treaties, including the World Health Organization, the Paris Climate Agreement, and major United Nations climate bodies.
Trump has effectively shut down the Strait of Hormuz to the world’s oil because of his ill-conceived war. The Kindleberger Trap would suggest that America’s abrogation of its global superpower responsibilities has left a vacuum that only China could fill.
America First could quickly become America Last.
Xi will know all the traps, as will Trump’s other “friend,” Vladimir Putin.
No wonder the American president looks so glum. The world is so much more real when you are not simply posting hatred from your bedroom.
編者註：過去500年來的16個「蘇西迪底斯難局」案例(「、」之前為既有強權；「、」之後為新興強權)
1. 葡、西之爭；15世紀後期；未發生戰爭
2. 法國、奧匈帝國之爭；16世紀前半期；發生戰爭
3. 奧匈帝國、奧圖曼帝國之爭；16 -17世紀；發生戰爭
4. 奧匈帝國、瑞典王國之爭；17世紀前半期；發生戰爭
5. 荷蘭共和國、英國之爭；17世紀中-後期；發生戰爭
6. 法國、大英帝國之爭；17世紀後期-18世紀；發生戰爭
7. 大英帝國、法國之爭；18世紀後期-19世紀初期；發生戰爭
8. 法國與大英帝國、俄國之爭；19世紀中期；發生戰爭
9. 法國、德國之爭；19世紀中期；發生戰爭
10. 中國與俄國、日本之爭；19世紀晚期-20世紀初期；發生戰爭
11. 大英帝國、美國之爭；20世紀初期；未發生戰爭
12. 大英帝國(法國和俄國為盟邦)、德國之爭；20世紀初期；發生戰爭
13. 蘇聯(法國和大英帝國為盟邦)、德國之爭；20世紀中期；發生戰爭
14. 美國、日本之爭；20世紀中期；發生戰爭
15. 美國、蘇聯之爭；1940-1980；未發生戰爭
16. 大英帝國和法國、德國之爭；1990-現在；未發生戰爭
本文於 修改第 5 次
|
|
習川會前夕之川普四面楚歌 -- Andrew Romano
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
請參考：
* How Trump Will Cave on the Biggest Stage: Political Guru (《川普向習近平曲膝的醜態》)
* Xi Is Poised to Press Trump on Arms Sales to Taiwan
* Stung by Iran war, Trump heads to China in need of wins
* Beijing Summit Preview Edition (該報導/評論第1段)
這種各懷鬼胎，彼此算計，互別苗頭，和虛與委蛇的高峰會，不可能產生什麼具體結果。其次，川痞說的話又響又臭，大概跟他放的屁類似。
Trump says his trip to China will be 'a wild one.' Why he's going now — and what to expect.
President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping are reportedly considering a deal that would let Beijing invest $1 trillion in the U.S.
Andrew Romano, Reporter, 05/12/26
President Trump is set to meet Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing on May 14 and 15 for talks about trade, Taiwan, and China's relationship with Iran as the war in the Middle East enters its third month.
It will be Trump’s second trip to China as president — and the first for any U.S. president since his initial visit in 2017.
Sixteen chief executives of major U.S. companies, including Elon Musk of Tesla and Tim Cook of Apple, will join Trump on the trip — presumably to discuss “the creation of a board of investment and a board of trade with China,” according to the New York Times.
Trump previewed the summit while speaking to other world leaders in February, saying it’s “going to be a wild one.”
“I said, ‘But we have to put on the biggest display you've ever had in the history of China.’ You know, last time I went to China, President Xi, he treated me so well, he gave me a display,” he continued, before marveling at the military spectacle that greeted him in 2017.
“I never saw so many soldiers all the same height, exactly the same height, within a quarter of an inch,” the president recalled. “I said, ‘If they put their helmets down, you could have played pool on the top of their heads.’ And it was pretty amazing, but I said, ‘You've got to top it.’ He said, ‘I'll top it; we're going to top it.’”
But aside from pageantry and pomp, why is Trump returning to Beijing now? Here’s what to expect — and what’s at stake.
Why now?
Trump was originally scheduled to visit Beijing from March 31 to April 2. But he decided to hit pause shortly after the start of the Iran war. Citing a source briefed on the summit, Reuters reported at the time that “the image of Trump on a lavish state visit was increasingly seen at odds with a struggling U.S. economy and the return of American service members killed in the Middle East.”
Months later, the war continues, yet the administration has ruled out any further delays. Experts see that as a signal of just how important China is to Trump — even as they question whether the U.S. currently has the leverage it needs to negotiate on a host of tense, tough issues: Taiwan, tariffs, computer chips, fentanyl, rare earths and agriculture.
Iran is “a huge distraction,” Yun Sun, director of the Stimson Center’s China program, recently told the Washington Post. “The original date had to be postponed because Trump couldn’t handle two things at the same time, so the war obviously has already had an impact. But now, the question is, is the war going to critically affect the substance of the trip?”
What’s on the agenda?
Trump wants to return to Washington, D.C., with something he can tout as a foreign-policy win. His top goal is to reduce the U.S. trade deficit with China. To that end, “U.S. and Chinese officials have been working to broker a deal that experts say is likely to include Chinese agricultural purchases, investment agreements, a consensus statement on AI guardrails and orders of U.S. commercial aircraft,” according to the Post.
Meanwhile, Chinese analysts told the paper that Beijing wants to “extend [the current] trade truce, ease sanctions and technology restrictions, and potentially secure assurances the United States will pull back on arms sales to Taiwan.”
There’s also been talk of a grander bargain, with Trump and Xi reportedly considering a deal that would let China invest $1 trillion in the U.S., largely to build factories on American soil.
“If they want to come in and build the plant and hire you and hire your friends and your neighbors, that’s great,” Trump told the Detroit Economic Club in January, referring to Chinese automakers. “I love that. Let China come in.”
But a massive investment deal seems unlikely right now, experts say, in part because Iran has weakened Trump’s position. Yue Gang, a retired Chinese colonel, told the New York Times that Trump originally “intended to visit China with the air of a swift victor.” But the war, he argued, “has significantly diminished the U.S. military’s ability to project its combat power,” leaving Trump “unable to project the same arrogance” — or force any major concessions in return.
In contrast, Beijing has weathered the ongoing energy crisis better than expected and does not seem eager to help end the fighting in Iran. “The chance of anything of substance emerging from these talks is little more than zero,” Allen Carlson, a China expert at Cornell University, told Time magazine.
Where do U.S.-China relations stand?
That isn’t to say Trump’s visit will be pointless. “Given how rocky and fluctuant the U.S.-China relationship has been for the past decade since Trump’s first term, some real (and not ephemeral) stabilization would be welcomed,” David Shambaugh, director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University, recently explained.
Trump rose to political prominence — and first ascended to the Oval Office — as a China hawk who insisted that Beijing was ripping off the U.S. on trade. He spent much of his first term slapping new tariffs on Chinese imports, and his Democratic successor, Joe Biden, largely stayed the course, becoming the first U.S. president in decades not to visit China.
Trump’s second term began in a similar vein, with massive “Liberation Day” tariffs against Beijing. But ever since Trump and Xi struck a “trade truce” at their October summit in South Korea, Trump has seemed more determined to avoid antagonizing his Chinese counterpart. He’s argued in favor of Chinese student visas, pushed to allow China access to advanced AI chips, withheld arms packages for Taiwan, avoided the subject of human rights in China, forbid his Cabinet members from criticizing the communist regime and repeatedly touted his “excellent relationship” with his “good friend” Xi.
“President Xi will give me a big, fat, hug when I get there in a few weeks,” Trump recently predicted on social media.
Whether that happens or not — and whether Trump gets the military parade and mass rally he seems to want — remains to be seen. Same goes for the “grand bargain” the U.S. president appears to be angling for. “Trump sees the problem with China as simply a bad deal,” conservative economist Oren Cass recently argued in the Times. “And what’s the remedy for a bad deal? Why, a better deal, of course.”
Either way, presidential engagement is “currently the only guardrail in U.S.-China relations,” according to retired U.S. diplomat Susan Thornton.
本文於 修改第 1 次
|
|
習川會雙方底牌之會前分析 -- Steve H. Hanke
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
Trump thinks he’s flying to Beijing with leverage. China spent 6 years making sure he doesn’t have any
Steve H. Hanke, 05/10/26
Air Force One will land in Beijing on May 14. President Trump expects to land with leverage in his briefcase. He should think again.
On May 4, U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent appeared on Fox News to plead with China to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz and relieve pressure on the international oil markets. While Bessent was busying himself on Fox News, China was busy making friends by supplying those in distress with much-needed oil and other commodities.
This story goes back further than the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. In December 2018, the long arm of Washington reached into Vancouver International Airport to order the arrest of Meng Wanzhou — the CFO of China’s telecommunications giant Huawei and the daughter of its founder — over Iran-sanctions charges. Six months later, Washington put Huawei on its Entity List and cut China off from the U.S. semiconductor supply chain. Beijing snapped to attention. Fearing that Washington could one day choke off other critical resources, Chairman Xi quietly built one of the world’s largest commodity buffers. For example, Beijing amassed a 1.4-billion-barrel strategic crude reserve, roughly 115 days of seaborne imports.
Fast forward to today, China is deploying its stockpile to supply those in distress with much-needed commodities, including oil. Sinopec and Sinochem have been reselling West African crude to refiners across Asia. On the gas side, Chinese majors have resold a record 1.31 million tons of LNG so far this year to the likes of South Korea, Thailand, Japan, Indonesia, and India. Beijing has been lending a hand to its Asian neighbors while the U.S. has been doing the opposite with its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. The diplomatic dividend is exactly what one would expect: Seoul, Tokyo, and Jakarta have all sent Beijing a thank-you note and pivoted away from Uncle Sam.
When we move away from physical molecules to the realm of diplomacy, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi flew into Beijing on May 6, where he was warmly welcomed by Foreign Minister Wang Yi. That same week, China’s Foreign Ministry openly dismissed Secretary Rubio’s threat of secondary sanctions, calling the U.S. measures illegal unilateral actions that lacked U.N. authorization.
While Washington raises walls, Beijing is opening doors. On May 1, Chinese tariffs on imports from all 53 African countries with which China holds diplomatic relations plunged to zero. Europeans now enter China visa-free. India’s Modi government is fast-tracking minority Chinese investment in seven strategic sectors. China’s DeepSeek AI went open source, giving the world’s developers free access to a frontier Chinese AI model. While Washington is tightening export controls on America’s AI enterprise, China is open for business.
And then there is Beijing’s ace: rare earths. Beijing’s control of neodymium, praseodymium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, and yttrium oxides is virtually total. Every advanced weapons system, every electric drivetrain, every wind turbine, every smartphone in the United States runs through China’s critical materials. To replenish its weapons stockpiles that have been depleted due to America’s proxy war against Russia and its open warfare against Iran, the U.S. Department of Defense now needs Beijing’s permission to restock. The rules of the road are being rewritten, and they are being rewritten in Beijing.
The verdict is in. The Alliance of Democracies’ Democracy Perception Index, which was released on May 8, puts China’s net global perception at +7%. Meanwhile, the international perception of the U.S. has collapsed. Two years ago, it sat comfortably at +22%. Today, it has plunged to a dismal -16%. It is clear that Trump will be tiptoeing through the tulips with Xi and coming home empty-handed.
The opinions expressed in Fortune.com commentary pieces are solely the views of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Fortune.
This story was originally featured on Fortune.com
本文於 修改第 1 次
|
|
拒絕介入伊戰海運習川會延期 – Didi Tang
|
|
|
推薦0 |
|
|
|
下文第3節可參見：美軍一聲不響撤走韓國薩德！下一個輪到台灣？
China ignores Trump’s Hormuz request as the Iran war deepens and his Beijing trip slips
Didi Tang, 03/18/26
WASHINGTON (AP) — China won't help the United States reopen the Strait of Hormuz as requested by President Donald Trump, but it is probably welcoming the delay in Trump's highly anticipated trip to Beijing as the U.S. risks getting bogged down in the Middle East, analysts say.
The latest developments are unfolding as Trump's Iran war, in its third week, is faced with mounting pressure as oil has stopped moving through the strait and U.S. allies have refused to step up to secure the strait. That has produced concerns that China, the United States' biggest geopolitical rival, could stand to benefit from a war that some say was ill-considered.
“President Trump’s request to delay his long-awaited summit with President Xi Jinping underscores how significantly he underestimated the fallout from Operation Epic Fury,” said Ali Wyne, senior research and advocacy adviser for U.S.-China relations at the International Crisis Group. “A show of U.S. force that was meant to intimidate Beijing has instead served to puncture the illusion of U.S. omnipotence: Unable to reopen the Strait of Hormuz alone, Washington now needs its principal strategic competitor to help it manage a crisis of its own making.”
The Chinese Foreign Ministry gave a nonanswer when asked if it would help reopen the strait but repeated its call for “parties to immediately stop military operations, avoid further escalation of the tense situation and prevent regional turmoil from further impacting the global economy.”
Beijing, which had never officially confirmed Trump's state visit, originally scheduled for March 31, has signaled willingness to work with the U.S. to reschedule the visit by stating that the two sides “remain in communication." It even helped clarify that the postponement had nothing to do with Trump's request for China to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
On Tuesday, Trump said the Chinese “were fine" with the delay and claimed “a very good working relationship with China.”
Sun Yun, director of the China program at the Stimson Center, said, “I think the Iran request is now going to be less pressing for China to fulfill.” At the same time, Chinese diplomats have been engaging with countries in the Middle East, pledging a constructive role in easing tensions and restoring peace.
On Sunday, through the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, Beijing delivered to Iran an emergency humanitarian aid package of $200,000, earmarked for families of children and teachers killed in the bombing of the Shajarah Tayyebeh elementary school building in Minab, Iran, with the Chinese ambassador to Iran condemning the school attack.
State visit delayed
A delay in the state visit is welcome by both the Trump administration and China, said Brett Fetterly, a managing principal in the China practice at The Asia Group, a Washington-based consultancy.
“I think the political environment is difficult for the United States to have the commander in chief travel abroad while managing military operations,” Fetterly said. “On the Chinese side, it doesn't hurt to play for more time, to better understand what exactly President Trump might want.”
A recent trade talk in Paris between the two governments appears to have yielded little agreement and suggested difficulties remain in addressing structural differences in trade, technology and economic security, Fetterly said. “At the end of the day, both sides really needed some time to define what the range of deliverables are," he said.
The U.S. business community has also expressed concern that preparations for the summit might not have been sufficient to produce substantive agreements.
Pivot away from Asia
Transfers of military assets from the Indo-Pacific region to the Middle East, including a sizable portion of Marines deployed there as part of a rapid-response unit and an anti-missile defense system, have raised concerns that the U.S. could get distracted from its own stated priority to refocus on Asia.
“The longer this war continues, and the more forces that are shifted out of Asia, the more it will feed Asian allies’ concerns about U.S. distraction and resource constraints,” said Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he studies U.S. strategy in Asia.
A delay in the state visit could also mean a delay in any arms sales to the self-governing island of Taiwan to deter attacks from Beijing, he said. China has vowed to take Taiwan by force if necessary, but the United States is obligated by its own law to give the island sufficient hardware to defend itself. The issue remains the thorniest in U.S.-China relations.
“I believe that China is happy to delay the visit and reap the benefits as the United States once again gets bogged down in the Middle East,” Cooper said.
And Beijing probably doesn't need to do much, he added: “I think most Chinese experts and officials believe that the United States is undermining itself, so they just need to get out of the way.”
|
|
川、習北京會之會前電話溝通 - Megan Messerly
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
這次遠洋通話的主題應該是川瘋就伊朗局勢「投石問路」；台灣和俄、烏戰爭只是陪稱。想來習總不會給川瘋好臉色；從而，美、伊衝突降溫的機率大增。由於伊、以雙方都可能來個「玉石俱焚」(該欄2026/02/07)，希望習總這次別跟陰普丁一樣，又挖個坑給川瘋跳。
Trump and China’s Xi speak by phone ahead of Beijing trip
Trump said the two discussed the war between Russia and Ukraine, the ongoing situations in Iran and Taiwan, without providing further details.
Megan Messerly, 02/04/2026
President Donald Trump said that he and China’s leader Xi Jinping had a “long and thorough call” on Wednesday — ranging from trade issues to foreign conflicts — that appeared to set the table for Trump’s upcoming visit to Beijing in April.
In a post on Truth Social, Trump said the two discussed the war between Russia and Ukraine and the ongoing situations in Iran, without providing further details. He also said they discussed Taiwan, a subject the two leaders did not broach during a meeting in South Korea late last year, according to public readouts. That suggests the country may come up during talks between the two leaders this spring.
China, in its own readout from its foreign ministry, confirmed the Taiwan discussion.
“President Xi emphasized that the Taiwan question is the most important issue in China-U.S. relations,” the ministry said. “Taiwan is China’s territory. China must safeguard its own sovereignty and territorial integrity, and will never allow Taiwan to be separated. The U.S. must handle the issue of arms sales to Taiwan with prudence.”
In the statement, China made clear that it remains open to talks with the U.S., saying that 2026 should be “a year where our two major countries advance toward mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation.” But it also included a threat: “Just as the U.S.has its concerns, China for its part also has concerns. China always means what it says and matches its words with actions and results.”
Trump, meanwhile, reiterated China’s commitment to purchase soybeans from the U.S., an agreement the two countries reached in October after a meeting between the two leaders in South Korea. The leaders last spoke in late November.
“The relationship with China, and my personal relationship with President Xi, is an extremely good one, and we both realize how important it is to keep it that way,” Trump wrote. “I believe that there will be many positive results achieved over the next three years of my Presidency having to do with President Xi, and the People’s Republic of China!”
The call comes as the two countries navigate a fragile truce following a trade war earlier this year that set markets on edge and businesses scrambling to figure out supply chain issues. It also comes hours after a video call between Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Phelim Kine contributed to this report.
相關報導
West Wing Playbook: Remaking Government
Your guide to Donald Trump’s unprecedented overhaul of the federal government.
María Corina Machado and Brian Tyler Cohen | The Conversation (視頻)
登錄此網誌新聞簡訊(請至原網頁執行)
By signing up, you acknowledge and agree to our Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. You may unsubscribe at any time by following the directions at the bottom of the email or by contacting us here. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
本文於 修改第 4 次
|
|
「人工智能」推演印、太衝突 - Virginia Allen
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
下文過於簡短，只能當新聞報導看；談不上「分析」或「評論」。雅倫女士所描述的「人工智能」沙盤推演，雖然不能以「狼來了」視之；但其目的很可能是挾「人工智能」的唬人聲勢，來支撐它做為「增加國防預算」說帖的份量。
AI Wargame Points to Catastrophe for US
Virginia Allen, 01/20/26
Heritage Foundation researchers harnessed the power of artificial intelligence to argue in a new report that the U.S. is not prepared for a war with China.
“We believe a war is coming,” says Rob Greenway, director of the Allison Center for National Security at the D.C. think tank. “We believe we are not prepared for it. We have proven we’re not prepared for it.”
This weakness actually “incentivizes the Chinese,” Greenway told The Daily Signal.
Greenway and his team at Heritage used artificial intelligence to simulate an extended conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific, in order to identify vulnerabilities for both the U.S. and China. The report also provides recommendations to the U.S. government.
Data collection and analysis for the 375-page report, titled “TIDALWAVE,” took about a year.
“No one has done this before because it’s such a heavy lift,” said Greenway, who also served on President Donald Trump’s National Security Council in the president’s first administration. “Without leveraging technology and figuring out how best to make it work for our purposes, it would have been impossible.”
The exercise uncovered previously unidentified vulnerabilities for both U.S. and China, he noted, and thus parts of the report were redacted for national security purposes.
The Heritage researchers who led the project have briefed government officials and members of Congress on the report.
“The People’s Republic of China poses the most significant threat that the U.S. has faced in decades, yet despite such a broadly accepted fact, we remain dangerously unprepared to counter this adversary,” Heritage Foundation President Kevin Roberts said.
“Heritage is committed to applying the latest technology to undertake unprecedented challenges and provide solutions to the most pressing national security threats we face,” Roberts added.
Findings and Vulnerabilities
Through the research process, Greenway says he was surprised to uncover the extent to which the U.S. has not corrected “deficiencies.”
For example, in a conflict with China, critical U.S. munitions would begin to be unavailable after about a week and would be completely exhausted after 35-40 days in most cases, the exercise found.
But Greenway says he was also surprised to learn “the extent that China is vulnerable—far more so than I would have expected.”
It is also clear from the research that U.S. partners and allies need to play a larger role in preparing to guard against Chinese aggression, he said.
The “cost” of a U.S. conflict with China would be “massive enough to push the entire planet into a global recession,” Greenway said, adding that disincentivizing China from starting a war is critical.
Addressing Vulnerabilities
Shortly before the report’s release, Trump announced plans to ask for a $500 billion increase to the U.S. defense budget for 2027. If Congress approves that increase, Greenway expressed hope that the new Heritage report is “going to inform” decisions related to future defense spending.
The money needed to fix the U.S. vulnerabilities is “a fraction” of the sum Trump is calling on Congress to approve for defense spending, according to Anna Gustafson, a research assistant in the Allison Center for National Security at The Heritage Foundation.
Solving the deficiencies would take an estimated three to five years and cost about $300 billion, Gustafson noted.
Greenway stated that the current goals are for Congress to approve the required defense spending, and for the Trump administration, more specifically the intelligence community and the departments of War, Commerce, and Treasury, “to exploit the Chinese vulnerabilities that we identified.”
In short, the aim is for the U.S. to have “sufficient resources to engage in protracted conflict and win,” and for China to “have insufficient resources,” he said.
“We are confident that, as a result of doing this work,” Greenway says, “departments and agencies for our government and Congress are going to act.”
Virginia Allen is a senior news producer for The Daily Signal and host of "The Daily Signal Podcast" and "Problematic Women." Send an email to Virginia.
Related posts:
Experts Warn of Tool China Is Using To Play ‘Long Game’ in New Cold War
Another University Considers Cutting Ties With Chinese Institution as National Security Concerns Mount
Why Shrinking the US Army Undermines Peace Through Strength
The Daily Signal depends on the support of readers like you. Donate now
本文於 修改第 2 次
|
|
《中美爭霸烽火後的文化意識》小評
|
|
|
推薦2 |
|
|
|
0. 前言
由於我是個「唯物論」者，我把汪沛教授大作標題中所用的心理學概念「原型」(請見本欄上一篇)，改為我習慣的社會學概念「文化意識」。
汪教授的主要研究範圍是心理學和儒家哲學，談論政治議題難免近於「表層分析」；例如，如果她把川普二次入主白宮的重要原因之一歸於「英雄崇拜」，則見識未免欠深入；其思考過程更難稱周全。
其次，汪教授第四段更有些論述牽強之譏；因為，實行民主制度的眾多國家中，那一個沒有「選舉週期」？又有誰的文宣不求「割喉割到斷」？
以下對汪教授其它觀點略表淺見；還請看官們不吝賜較。
1. 分析與評論
1.1 中國的家庭倫理
我曾經評論過：中國過去的「禮教之防」或「敬老尊賢」等等，都需要從家庭結構或社會組織整層面來理解；否則，中國社會就有偽善或人格分裂之嫌。例如，中國畫有「爬灰」一詞；李世民兵非第一個，也不是最後一個以謀殺手段上位的皇帝；後世史家對他或朱棣用了「春秋之筆」來撻伐嗎？
換句話說，道德固然是「弱者限制強者的工具」，但它是把雙面刃；更多的時候，道德也是「強者限制弱者的工具」。「禮教之防」或「敬老尊賢」並不能完全從「道德價值」層面來理解，它們最大的「功能」在維持社會的穩定運作。它們在中國的突出「地位」，則必須從中國「大家庭」和「眾多人口」這些社會結構的角度來理解。
以歐洲社會來說，「初夜權」和「貞操鎖」兩者並存，也必須從社會結構角度，而不是道德價值角度才能「理解」。
1.2 美國的政治亂象
1) 這一方面我也曾表達過一些看法；例如，美國過去能在全世界巧取豪奪，以及其科技的遙遙領先，是美國社會中、低層老百姓能被大財團餵熟的重要因素。當這兩項優勢消失或減弱後，美國大財團餵不熟的美國社會中、低層老百姓時，溫順良民也就變成反撲的白眼狼了。
2) 其他文化和社會層面的因素，以下兩篇文章雖然不夠完備深入，也都各有所見與講出個道理；對此議題有興趣的朋友可以參考看看：「萬能政府」概念是個神話(該欄2025/12/03)，以及維護自由主義的歧路(該欄2023/12/25)。
2. 結論
汪教授從心理或文化層面談討中、美政治的差異，是一個有趣的課題，應該也是一個值得努力的方向。不過，討論政治議題還是得使用政治學、經濟學、和社會學三個領域的理論做為基本分析工具；否則，多少會有「霧裏看花」甚至於「削足適履」的遺憾。
本文於 修改第 3 次
|
|
中美爭霸烽火後的文化意識 -- Bella Pei Wang
|
|
|
推薦2 |
|
|
|
Beneath the US-China rivalry lies a battle of outdated archetypes
The American Hero vs The Chinese Father
Bella Pei Wang, 11/24/25
Editor’s Notes：The US-China rivalry runs deeper than trade wars and military posturing—it’s a clash of archetypes. America worships the Hero: the lone warrior chasing glory, battling rivals, and turning politics into spectacle. China, by contrast, venerates the Father: the steady ruler who prizes order, care and stability. Chinese philosopher Bella Pei Wang argues that these ancient archetypes still shape power in both societies—and that their excesses drive both nations’ dysfunction. To escape the cycle of conquest and control, she says, the world’s superpowers must rediscover a neglected force in politics: the feminine values of intuition and cooperation.
The rivalry between the United States and China is not only about economic and military strength. It is also rooted in contrasting leadership styles. This contrast can be seen as a confrontation between two archetypes, described by the psychologist Carl Jung: the Hero and the Father. The United States tends to generate Hero-type leaders, while China leans toward Father-type leadership.
Ancient Greek culture offers a vivid source narrative: in the Iliad, Achilles represents the Hero archetype—seeking glory through war—while Hector represents the Father archetype—centered on family, city, and duty. The tension between kleos (everlasting fame) and nostos (return to home and family) is embedded in the epic tradition, giving priority to the Hero paradigm in the West. By contrast, shaped by Confucian tradition, China elevates the “ruler-father” ideal, built around humaneness, order, and care.
These archetypes are not all-or-nothing. American political culture has sometimes produced father-like features, such as Franklin D. Roosevelt’s fireside chats, and President Obama manifested eloquence and intellectual brilliance above all else (though perhaps his most popular achievement was the killing of Bin Laden). In the Chinese case, the self-proclaimed First Emperor Qin Shihuang (259–210 BCE) embodied the Hero archetype by virtue of success in war. Chairman Mao did the same, but his power was subsequently legitimized by such popular sayings as “My father and my mother are not as dear to me as Chairman Mao,” which better fit the Father archetype. In short, such counter-archetypes to the mainstream political cultures of China and the US are rarely sufficient for long-lasting legitimacy in the eyes of their respective populations.
The US electoral system—its four-year cycles and midterms—pushes leaders to emphasize personal excellence, seek attention, and chase accomplishments, reinforcing a structural preference for the Hero archetype. Intense two-party conflict and online mutual defamation revive the mythic script of the “hero-versus-dragon” battle: when leaders over-identify with the Hero archetype, they may project rivals as “dragons” that must be defeated to prove their heroic identity, thereby justifying hardline actions. Policymaking can drift toward extremes to mark clear differences from opponents, as in the aggressive tariffs and immigration measures brought in by President Trump. Psychologically, arrogant blindness may appear, with leaders denying limits and dismissing reasonable advice. Relatedly, there is the puer aeternus (eternal boy) tendency: those who over-identify with the heroic journey often resist ending their moment of glory and struggle to face departure and mortality, which can delay leadership transitions.
China’s Father archetype grows out of a deep Confucian longing for the benevolent father. The legend of Emperor Shun shows that true filial piety can serve as political qualification: despite an abusive father, Shun remained filial and was chosen by Emperor Yao as successor. The early loss of fathers in the lives of Confucius and Mencius also helped turn the longing for “father” into a political ideal of “ruler-father,” with the Han dynasty’s Classic of Family Reverence extending filial piety toward parents into loyalty toward the ruler. In contemporary political discourse, family metaphors permeate public language: leaders are affectionately called “Grandpa Mao,” “Grandpa Wen,” “Grandpa Jiang,” and “Xi Dada.” The media speaks of “one family under heaven” and says that “both sides of the Taiwan Strait are as close as one family.” For legitimacy, the Chinese Communist Party increasingly draws on ancient traditions to deepen its resonance, translating the family-nation emotional structure into modern political narratives.
The negative sides of the Father archetype are also clear: excessive control suppresses individual freedom and diversity; worship of authority sustains unjust hierarchies; dogmatism turns “traditional wisdom” into ideology that blocks innovation; protectionism, justified by security, produces exclusionary policies that hinder international exchange; and formalism uses ritualized meetings to stabilize positions in the system while wasting time that could solve problems. Unlike the US logic of the hero who refuses to step down, China’s “father does not retire” logic comes from the long-term, irreplaceable role of the father in the family: governance is seen as a continuous household task, so leaders tend to extend their terms or continue to exert influence after formal retirement to guard stability and long-term plans.
At the geopolitical level, the difference between Hero and Father archetypes spills over into both nations’ behavior on the international stage. Hero-type leadership often uses the narrative of external “dragons” to unify domestic politics, create a sense of threat, and justify hard foreign and economic policies. Such discourse serves internal mobilization but can also tilt external policy toward risk and “achievement addiction,” rushing toward bold moves for quick glory. The structure of the two-party electoral system also turns foreign policy into a tool of political differentiation, increasing polarization and confrontational tendencies, often wrapped in the grand language of justice and mission.
By contrast, Father-type leadership tends to value order, stability, and long-term planning. The Confucian tradition does not glorify war and sees it as a necessary evil, emphasizing humane rule as the way to care for the “children of the family-state.” At the same time, the negative sides of the Father archetype can project themselves into international relations: exclusionary policies in the name of protection can produce institutional closure and weaken cross-border exchange and cooperation; hierarchical order and a culture of obedience may reduce flexibility and innovation in external interactions. The “elder brother” metaphor that once described the Soviet Union reflects a tendency to locate countries in family roles, and to treat smaller countries as little brothers in need of care, offering psychological support in the context of patronage-style relations.
These two archetypes interact and amplify each other in the twenty-first century. When leaders over-identify with them, the Jungian process of archetypal inflation sets in: the ego is overwhelmed by archetypal energy, producing grandiosity, paranoia, and messianic fantasies. This not only deepens domestic polarization but also magnifies misreading and miscalculation abroad, risking spirals of hostility, confrontation, and decoupling.
To move beyond the double excess of the Hero and Father archetypes, it is vital to integrate the feminine principle—emotion, intuition, care, cooperation, and nurturing—into leadership. Simply increasing the number of female leaders may not suffice, because in the context of male-dominated norms, women can feel compelled to adopt a harder style. Even so, a higher share of women and broader cultural change can help in reducing corruption, fostering peace-oriented movements, and strengthening community welfare.
More importantly, regardless of gender, leaders need to resist archetypal inflation and recast geopolitical narratives: they ought to shift international relations from a patriarchal frame of “conquest and order” to a communal frame of “connection and care.” Only then can the United States temper its over-Heroization and China moderate its over-Fathering, creating space to de-escalate competition and expand cooperation.
This essay distills ideas discussed in Bella Pei Wang’s paper, “Hero and Father: Contrasting Leadership Styles in the USA-China Rivalry,” published in Society.
Bella Pei Wang is the Assistant Professor, School of Chinese, University of Hong Kong, and co-author of Just Hierarchy: Why Social Hierarchies Matter in China and the Rest of the World (Princeton University Press).
Related Post:
Africa must create a bloc like the EU to have real global power
Why they killed Gaddafi
Francis Fukuyama warns Trump is not a realist
Progress is humanity's worst idea
Related Videos:
The rise of technofeudalism
After the West
The West versus the Islamic World, with Ali Allawi
Yanis Varoufakis on the end of capitalism
Make China great again: Steve Tsang on Xi Jinping With Steve Tsang
Join the conversation
Sign in to post comments or join now (only takes a moment).
Brian Balke26 November 2025
What is it about the two cultures that encourage the manifestations of these archetypes?
China was a peasant-dominated culture until just recently. Landholdings were small and innovation limited. The imperial center created monuments, but daily life was unchanged. As in Russia, then, modernization was imposed from above by leaders that had access to Western models of industrial activity. In the formerly communist states, the resulting power imbalance centralized decision-making and facilitated totalitarian rule. Even so, however, recognize that Xi cannot displace FoxConn, the Taiwanese conglomerate that dominates Chinese high-tech manufacturing, with its barracks-style living conditions that leave grandmothers to raise the next generation in the hinterland.
The United States, conversely, was built and financed with slaves as human capital. Large-scale commercial agriculture is part of our cultural heritage. The concentration of agriculture means that 98% of us need never engage with the land. We have the opportunity to invest in the creation of our identity. What Trump epitomizes is actually a refusal of self-regulation. We do not choose heroes so much as we choose self-indulgence.
What is common in both systems, of course, is misogyny. Trump won not because he offered a coherent policy vision, but because the alternatives were women.
The author is absolutely right in her conclusion. No stable social order can be sustained without feminine participation.
Want to continue reading?
Get unlimited access to insights from the world's leading thinkers.
Browse our subscription plans and subscribe to read more.
Start Free Trial. Already a subscriber? Log in
本文於 修改第 3 次
|
|
|
本城市首頁
看回應文章
等級：8
