以下摘錄一篇羅斯考福先生的分析。他是一位外交政策和國安議題專家，此文對國際間相互利用的實際運作分析得蠻透徹。我完全同意他的觀點；這當然很可能是我個人的一廂情願。

他的重點是：中、美兩國不但因為能源需求和油價攀升而可能(或應該？)再度「合作」；他認為把「中、美關係」定位在「美、蘇冷戰框架」根本就是一個錯誤的思考模式。他認為中、美兩國需要加強合作，解決兩國和全球所面臨的共同問題。

Russia and OPEC Are Driving U.S. and China Into an Unlikely Partnership

David Rothkopf, 10/08/22

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The risks of that have seemed especially urgent this week. Major developments on the world stage have evoked defining moments of the 20th century, but seeing them primarily in that light could lead us to make the wrong choices in response to them. Helpfully, an event next week should serve as a reminder that the international landscape of the 21st century is very different from the one with which so many of our leaders are most familiar, a reminder that -- if heeded -- can help guide us toward smarter decisions going forward.

In recent days, headlines have echoed the crises of the past 60 or 70 years, dominated as they have been by concerns about nuclear confrontation with Russia or tensions with the oil producing nations of the Middle East. But as the Chinese Party Congress convenes next week and that country commits to its course for the foreseeable future, it should serve to remind us that geopolitics in the years ahead will be increasingly heavily influenced by the presence, the needs, the ambitions, and the weaknesses of a new and very different rival. Weighed appropriately, these factors should lead us to see the world, the risks we face and the options before us in a new way.

For example, while many analysts were quick to note that the decision by OPEC to restrict production in the months ahead -- in the hope of pushing up oil prices -- was a blow to the United States and the West and an aid to Russia, they neglected to note that Beijing, heavily dependent on foreign energy, was also hard hit by the decision.

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The fact that OPEC was casting its lot with Russia in the midst of that country’s brutal war against Ukraine …  But in taking action that alienated not only the U.S. and allies from Europe to Japan, but also a China that is struggling with economic headwinds and can ill afford an oil price shock, the OPEC decision must be seen as short-sighted.

Perhaps most importantly, it serves as a vital reminder that the strongest responses the U.S. can muster toward OPEC are ones that are at least tacitly coordinated with the Chinese -- and therefore also as a reminder of the dangers of viewing the U.S. and Western relationship with its rising 21st-century rival in the same way we once viewed our 20th-century Cold War rival is a mistake….

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… Russia as a pariah state with clear and growing social, economic, and military weaknesses needs its partnership with China to remain relevant as a “major power.”

For these reasons, the U.S. and our allies have wisely sought to reach out to China to help constrain Russia’s behavior in Ukraine. The success of that effort to date -- which has included discouraging China from providing arms to Russia to assist with its invasion -- shows a recognition of that shifting power dynamic in this new era.

That dynamic is especially important in light of the other flashback to 20th-century threats this past week, President Biden’s comment on Thursday regarding the nuclear threat posed by Putin that “We have not faced the prospect of Armageddon since Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Biden also said that he did not feel Putin could use tactical nuclear weapons and “not end up with Armageddon.”

… but also because Russia is clearly the junior partner in its evolving relationship with China. And in respect to that relationship, for Russia to use nukes would be both anathema to China’s need to maintaining global stability so it can focus on the economic issues that are pivotal to its own cohesion as a nation. Further, of course, Russia using a nuclear weapon would undermine China’s security interests as the resulting response to Russia would undoubtedly profoundly weaken a security ally on which the Chinese had been hoping they could depend.

In other words, China no more wants Russia to go nuclear in Ukraine than we do.

And that is something that we and our allies can work within helping to manage this situation -- just as working with China will be essential to addressing many other central issues of the decades ahead. This includes the climate crisis (as cited above) response to pandemics, and from regional conflicts to regulating and securing the internet and next generation technologies.

Next Sunday, in Beijing, the 20th National Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party will convene. … It will also, however, give insights into both how he intends to hold onto that power, and who might be positioned to someday succeed him. You can also expect further expressions of China’s ascendant role on the world stage and Xi’s clear intention to use that role to assert Chinese influence and shore up its economic and political strength in the years ahead.

Almost certainly, reaction to Congress will trigger the significant faction among U.S. officials, analysts, and commentators who view the future of America’s relationship with China as a second Cold War. Again, such a 20th-century framing is a mistake.

For the reasons cited above, the U.S. and the West have far more shared interests with China -- and far more need of China to use its influence to support our goals -- than we ever did of or with the Soviet Union. Further, with 70,000 U.S. businesses in China and our economic fates deeply intertwined, zero-sum Cold War thinking is completely inappropriate here.

As the past week has shown, and the next one will underscore, the future demands we set aside the models and biases of the past. That future will not be less complex but it will be differently complex. Finding a way to manage a relationship with a new rival with whom we share many interdependencies is one complexity we must master. Understanding that rival’s needs and relationships with the rest of the world is another. Understanding how new technologies will reshape economic and geopolitical relationships and the nature of power itself is a third.

This past week has evoked echoes of Michael Corleone, as events seemed to be saying “just when we thought we were out of the 20th century, it seemed to pull us back in.”

But that was an illusion and a deeply misleading one at that. It is important that as we consider the big challenges of this moment and of the future, we do so keeping in mind the perspectives of the players with whom we will be forced to contend --and who will seek to lead alongside us or in our place on the global stage rather than being distracted by the Putins and the old school petrocrats who are fighting for a last moment of relevance before being consigned to history’s dustbin.

Putin Has Left the World No Other Option But Regime Change

Putin’s Headed Toward Defeat in Ukraine. The Only Question Is How Bad a Loser He’ll Be.

As Bad as the World Looks Right Now, It’s Actually Worse