Mencius on the Inborn Nature of Man

An excerpt from The Six Patriarchs of Chinese Humanism

Peter M.K. Chan, 04/23/2013, All rights reserved

Abstract

In traditional China, Mencius (c371-289 B.C.) was often haled as China’s “Sage No.2”, second only to Confucius himself. He was connected to Confucius through his study under the disciples of Tze-Zer, the grandson of Confucius. Among other things, he was famous for his view about the inborn nature of man. According to him, the inborn nature of man is good. In the following, I shall follow the main thrust of his argument and show where it has fallen short.

In the Analects, if readers recall, it is said that Confucius had not said anything about the inborn nature of man and the Way of Heaven. (夫子之言性與天道，不可得而聞也。 Analects, 5:13)

But he was also reported to have said that human beings are born inevitably upright regardless of circumstance. (人之生也直，罔之生也幸而免。Ibid, 6:19)

Did he mean to say that everyone is born morally upright? In view of his other usage of the word “upright” (直or straight) elsewhere in the Analects, it could be argued that it was so. For instance, he said that to elevate the upright can also influence the crooked to become upright; (舉直錯諸枉，能使枉者直。Ibid,  12:22 ) that one should repay injury with what is upright, but repay virtue with virtue; (以直報怨，以德報德。Ibid.  14:34) and that to relish uprightness without learning will be blinded by dishonesty. (好直不好學，其蔽也絞； Ibid,  17:8)

The trouble with this interpretation, I should like to point out, is that Confucius was also known to have said that concealment of wrong by father for son or son for father does contain what is upright. (父為子隱，子為父隱，直在其中矣。Ibid . 13:18)

How could concealment of wrong be considered morally upright? And when he said that those who are born knowing are the best, those who know by way of learning are second best, those who learn because of difficulties is less good, and those who do not learn even in the face of difficulties is the least equipped of them all (生而知之者，上也；學而知之者，次也；困而學之，又其次也。困而不學，民斯為下矣。Ibid. 16:9); is it not already rather clear that as far as Confucius was concerned, the inborn nature of men is not one and the same? Besides, he also said that riches and honors are what men desire… while poverty and low status are what men hate. (富與貴，是人之所欲也 ... 貧與賤惡也。Ibid. 4:5)

Under this light, could it not also be argued that what Confucius had in mind is that generally speaking, the nature of man is that of an inferior man? Well, according to Mencius, this is not so. The inborn nature of man is good. To be humane is (the nature of) man. (仁也者，人也。Book of Mencius, Chapter 3)

But some of his listeners did not agree. For instance, Kao-zi said: inborn nature is neither good nor evil. It is like water. If you let it flow east, it will go east. If you let it flow west, it will go west. (吿子曰： 性無善無不善也。Ibid. Chapter11；性，猶湍水也，決諸東方則東流，決諸西方則西流。Ibid.)

Further, according to Kongdu-zi, it could also be said that inborn nature is capable of both good and evil. This is why when King Wen and King Wu (good kings) were in power, people relished goodness, and when Yu and Li (wicked kings) were in power, they relished violence. (或曰：性可以爲善，可以爲不善。是故，文、武興，則民好善，幽、厲興，則民好暴。是故，文、武興，則民好善，幽、厲興，則民好暴。Ibid.)

And that is not all. There are still others who say that some inborn natures are good, while others evil.

That is why under a good ruler like Yao (a sage-king), there was such an evil man as Xiang; and for a bad father such as Ku-sou, there was such a good son like Shun (another sage-king). (或曰：有性善，有性不善。是故，以堯爲君而有象，以瞽瞍爲父而有舜。Ibid.)

Comment:

It is to be observed that three other contending positions were tabled for consideration. The first is that inborn nature is neither good nor evil (性無善無不善也。Ibid.) Another is that inborn nature is capable of both good and evil (性可以為善，可以為不善。Ibid.) And the third is that some inborn nature is good, while others evil (有性善，有性不善。Ibid.). What was not mentioned (or deemed absurd at the time) is the possibility that the inborn nature of man is evil.

History had to wait for Xun-zi (the third patriarch of Confucianism) before this last entered the fray. With respect to the first contending position, Mencius was prepared. It is true that water does not distinguish between east and west. But is water not predisposed to go down rather than up?

The goodness of man’s inborn nature is like the downward tendency of water. As it is the nature of water to go downward, it is also the nature of man to be good 

.

Further, water is able to splash when hit, flow violently through a creek, or forced to stay in the hills (by a dam). It is the nature of water to yield to external forces.

This is also true of man’s in born nature -- it could be pushed into doing wrong. (水信無分於東西，無分於上下乎？人性之善也，猶水之就下也; 人無有不善，水無有不下。今未水：搏而躍之，可使過顙激而行之，可使在山，是豈水之性哉，其勢則然也。人之可使爲不善，其性亦猶是也。Ibid.)

That is why in years of good harvest, young kids are lazy and dependent. It is only in years of bad harvest that many of them have become violent. Such changes in behavior are not dictated by the Son of Heaven (or emperor). It is due rather to the influence (of environment) brooding in their minds (富歲子弟多賴，凶歲子弟多暴: 非天子降才爾殊也，其所以陷溺其心者然也。Ibid .) 

What this shows is that when a person does evil, it is not because of his natural endowment. (若夫為不善，非才之罪也。Ibid.)

 If he follows his natural temperament, he is able to do what is good. This is why I say that the inborn nature of man is good. (乃若其情，則可以為善矣，乃所謂善也。Ibid.)

As to how he knew that this is really so, Mencius’ reply is that all human beings do have a mind that cannot bear to see the suffering of others. (人皆有不忍人之心。Ibid. Chapter 3)

One case in point is that no one is able to bear and see that a child is about to fall into a well. (今人乍見孺子將入於井，皆有怵惕惻隱之心；Ibid.). Such a concern for the helpless, according to him, is not due to the fact that one has any dealing with the child’s parents. Neither is one driven by the desire of wanting to enhance one’s reputation in the community, or for fear of criticisms by one’s friends. (非所以 交於孺子之父母也，非所以要譽內於鄉黨朋友也，非惡其聲而然也。Ibid.)

It is due rather to his inability to bear seeing the suffering of his fellow-beings. Further, according to Mencius, the having of this un-bearing mind (不忍之心) is also attested by the fact that when it comes to slaughtering animals for food, many would rather see them alive than stand to watch how they die. And if one hears their screams, one is not able to bear eating their meat. This is why a cultivated person would rather stay away from the kitchen. (見其生，不忍見其死；聞其聲，不忍食其肉：是以君子遠庖廚也。Ibid. Chapter 1)

For the above reasons, I say that all humans have a mind that cannot bear to see the suffering of others. (所以謂人皆有不忍人之心者： Ibid. Chapter 3)

What must also be made clear, said Mencius, is that this feeling of commiseration is found in all men; the feeling of shame and disgust (about what is wrong) is also found in all men. So is the feeling of respect and reverence, as well as the feeling for what is right and wrong. (惻隱之心，人皆有之；羞惡之心，人皆有之；恭敬之心，人皆有之；是非之心，人皆有之。Ibid.Chapter 11)

As a matter of fact, or so he further pointed out, the feeling of commiseration is the ground of humaneness. The feeling of disgust and shame is the ground of righteousness. The feeling of humility and deference is the ground of propriety, and the feeling of right and wrong is the ground of wisdom. (惻隱之心，仁之端也；羞惡之心，義之端也；辭讓之心，禮之端也；是非之心，智之端也。Ibid. Chapter 3)

What this means, according to Mencius, is that humaneness, righteousness, propriety and wisdom are not  forced upon us from the outside. They pertain rather to what Is already in our possession, even though they have not been thought of in this way. (惻隱之心，仁也；羞惡之心，義也；恭敬之心禮也；是非之心，智也。仁、義、禮、智，非由外鑠我也，我固有之也，弟思耳矣！ Ibid. 11)

In short, to have these four basic feelings is like having four limbs. He who claims not to have them is cheating himself. (人之有是四端也，猶其有四體也。有是四端而自謂不能者，自賊者也。Ibid. Chapter 3)

As to how he knew that all human minds are able to feel in the same way, Mencius’ reply is that if our mouths are able to taste the same flavors, our ears are able to hear the same sounds, and our eyes are able to see the beauty of the same colors, it would be most unreasonable to think that only human minds are not able to feel in the same way. (故曰：口之於味也，有同耆焉；耳之於聲也，有同聽焉；目之於色也，有同美焉。至於心，獨無所同然乎？ Ibid. Chapter 11)

Further, as to what exactly is common to the human mind, his answer is that it is called rationality also known as righteousness. This commonality shared by human minds was discovered by the sages before we do. This is also the reason why we all relish rationality and righteousness, as our mouths have relished the meat of grain-eating animals. (心之所同然者，何也？謂理也，義也；聖人先得我心之所同然耳！故理義之悅我心，猶芻豢之悅我口。 Ibid.)

It is one of those inherent abilities that need not be learned and know without having to think. It is the conscience of our minds. This is what enables infants that still have to be carried to know how to love their parents; and when they grow older, to know how to respect their elder brothers. To be affectionate to one’s parent is humaneness. To be respectful to one’s elder brother is righteousness. This is the same with people all over of the world. (人之所不學而能者，其良能也 所不慮而知者，其良知也。孩提之童，無不知愛其親也 及其長

也，無不知敬其兄也。Ibid.；親親，仁也 敬長，義也。無他，達之天下也。Ibid. Chapter 13)

What this shows, or so he further argued, is that humaneness is the mind of man, and righteousness is his path. Anyone who abandons this path rather than follows it, or to let go of this (un-bearing) mind and does not know how to find it, is pitiful indeed! (仁，人心也；義，人路也。舍其路而弗由，放其心而不知求：哀哉！ Ibid. Chapter 11)

This is so because not to have a mind that feels for the suffering of others is not a human being; not to have a mind that feels ashamed and disgusted (with what is wrong) is not a human being; not to have a mind that knows humility and deference is not a human being; and not having a mind that knows right and wrong is also not ahuman being. (由是觀之，無惻隱之心，非人也；無羞惡之心，非人也；無辭讓之心，非人也；無是非之心，非人也。Ibid. Chapter 3)

So, it is on the basis of the above line of reasoning that Mencius was to conclude that the inborn nature of man is good. It is external pressures and circumstances that have lured and notched people into evil. It further follows that to be humane is indeed (the inborn nature of) man

.

That is also to say, humaneness is the Way (of man). (仁也者，人也。合而言之，道也 。Ibid.)

Comment:

What should not be allowed to escape notice is that despite the insight and eloquence of Mencius, the three contending positions posted earlier were actually sidestepped rather than refuted. In the first instance, before a child comes into its own, i.e., with memory and the sense of self that it entails, it is not at all silly for Kao-zi to have characterized it as neither good nor evil.

Secondly, the facts to which Mencius alluded are rather one-sided. If the more undesirable of childish tendencies (such as anger, greed, jealousy, selfishness, and the like) are also taken into account, it could also be argued that the inborn nature of man is both good and evil.

Thirdly, what Mencius had not really answered is why under a good ruler like Yao, there was such an evil man as Xiang; and for a bad father such as Ku-sou, it is possible to have a good son like Shun. (以堯爲君而有象，以瞽瞍爲父而有舜。Ibid. Chapter 11)

That is to say, if the inborn nature of man is good, and that it is environmental factors that have pushed people into evil, how are such counter evidences to be explained? In view of all these difficulties, it must be said that the evidence to which Mencius referred were in fact less than circumspect. When all relevant facts are taken into account, it is perhaps more reasonable to think that the inborn nature of man is neither good nor evil, and that it is also capable of becoming both good and evil.

This is also a good place to return to Confucius’ saying that man is born inevitably upright (or straight).

It may not be too late to suggest that what he had in mind was perhaps the idea that the inborn nature of man is kind of like an upright bamboo tree. It is bound to sway one way or the other depending on the wind. That is to say, whether a person is inclined toward good or evil is indeed contingent upon a host of environmental factors, the most important of which is the kind of moral nurture one is given. As readers can see, this way of diagnosing the word “upright” is also consistent with Confucius’ overriding message. It is that the only way for anyone to become humane and do what is right must necessarily come by way of learning how to behave properly in accordance with the rules of propriety. The question is therefore this. Why had Mencius opted to ignore the reasonableness of the first two contending positions as well as what is implicit in the Analects?

One possible reason, if I may so surmise, is that it is more at home with him to think that what Heaven confers has got to be humane and good. As such, it is out of the question that Heaven would also impregnate the humankind with tendencies that are detestable. In this connection, it is perhaps not too late to note that in the opening paragraph of the Doctrine of the Mean, it is clearly stated that what Heaven decrees is called inborn nature. To follow this nature is called the Way (of Humanity). Cultivating the Way is called education. That which is called the Way is not separable from man for an instant. What is separable is not the Way. (天命之謂性；率性之謂道；修道之謂教。道也者，不可須臾離也；可離，非道也。 Doctrine of the Mean, Section 1)

The author of this passage, if readers recall, was Tze-Ser, the teacher of Mencius’ teachers.

Conclusion:

This is not to say the Mencius had not done anything valuable. Even though his idea that everyone is inherently endowed with moral sensitivity is not necessary something that Confucius would have endorsed, the fact remains that he was the first to have argued that the Confucian imperative of humaneness and righteousness is actually grounded in the inborn sensitivities of man. As such, there is no excuse for anyone not to try and become moral. Ought implies can, so to speak. Let me also add that it was this romantic view of human nature (and its political implications) that had ignited fervor and interest in the Confucianism of Mencius for generations to come.

Peter M.K. Chan is the author of The Mystery of Mind (published 2003), and Soul, God, and Morality (published 2004). Recently, he has completed another work titled The Six Patriarchs of Chinese Humanism (available in e-books but not yet in print).

http://zh.scribd.com/doc/18008757/Mencius-on-the-Inborn-Nature-of-Man

* With minor editing. If I misunderstood the original, the fault is mine. – James

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