|
馬夏維里的睿智 - R. Kaplan
|
瀏覽720 |回應1 |推薦1 |
|
|
|
What Machiavelli Can Teach Us Today
Robert Kaplan, Stratfor, 03/21/13
What is modernity? Is it skyscrapers, smart phones, wonder drugs, atomic bombs? You're not even close. Modernity, at least in the West, is the journey away from religious virtue toward secular self-interest. Religious virtue is fine for one's family and the world of private morality. But the state -- that defining political structure of modern times -- requires something colder, more chilling. For the state must organize the lives of millions of strangers and protect their need to selfishly acquire material possessions. If everyone stole from everyone else there would be anarchy. So the state monopolizes the use of force, taking it away from criminals. The state appeals not to God, but to individual selfishness. Thus, it clears the path for progress.
Thomas Hobbes conceived of the modern state in his Leviathan, published in 1651. Hobbes is known wrongly as a gloomy philosopher because of his emphasis on anarchy. Hobbes was actually a liberal optimist, who saw the state as the solution to anarchy, allowing people to procure possessions and build a community. Hobbes knew that in the path toward a better world, order first has to be established. Only later can humankind set about making such order non-tyrannical.
But what did Hobbes' philosophy ultimately build on? It built on the first of the moderns, the early 16th century Florentine Niccolo Machiavelli, whose masterpiece, The Prince, was written 500 years ago in 1513. Here is an anniversary as important as the 500th anniversary of Columbus discovering America, celebrated in 1992.
By taking politics away from the narrowing fatalism of the medieval Roman Catholic Church, Machiavelli created the very secular politics from which Hobbes could conceive of the idea of the state. The Prince may be less a work of cynicism than an instructional guide to overcome fate -- the fatalism of the Roman Catholic Church at that time. Thus, Machiavelli, more than Michelangelo perhaps, was the true inventor of the Renaissance. The founders of the American Republic, who conceived of a polity in which church and state were separate and in which government existed to lay the rules for individuals to compete freely in the struggle to acquire wealth, owed much to Machiavelli and Hobbes.
But it is with Machiavelli, more than with Hobbes, where the principles of Western modernity truly begin. Indeed, we are fortunate to have still among us one of the great interpreters of Machiavelli, Harvard Professor Harvey C. Mansfield Jr. Mansfield knows that it is more important to tell hard truths than it is to be liked and to get good reviews. That is why I have always had such deep respect for him, even though I have never met him. I know Mansfield the way one should know a great scholar: only through his writings.
Mansfield's book, Machiavelli's Virtue (1996), though drawing on the ideas of an earlier interpreter of Machiavelli, University of Chicago political scientist Leo Strauss, is an academic classic in its own right. Mansfield himself may not necessarily agree with Machiavelli, but he fearlessly shows why this towering figure of the Renaissance is still so relevant. For by setting the terms for political reality, Machiavelli helps lay the foundation for geopolitics.
Mansfield, interpreting Machiavelli's original Italian, explains to us that necessity frees people from religious faith. People may pray to God and go to church or synagogue or the mosque, but they must also acquire food and possessions for the sake of their loved ones, and thus they must enter into competition with their fellow human beings; just as nations must enter into competition with other nations. This is not something to lament, however. For in the last analysis, self-interest can lead to peace while rigid moral principles can lead to war. Self-interest informs compromise with other human beings, and thus a state governed by self-interest is likely to compromise with other states: whereas a person or state governed solely by religious or moral virtue will tend to delegitimize as immoral those with whom he or it disagrees -- and therein lies conflict. Virtue, in other words, is fine. But outstanding virtue -- because it tempts sanctimoniousness -- is dangerous. It is ultimately with this maxim that we find philosophical justification for moderation in contemporary politics and statecraft.
Those who find such thinking dark or cynical may be under the illusion that politics can bring respite from primitive necessity. Machiavelli, as Mansfield explains, is doubtful of this. Yes, politicians may announce their intention to strive for truth and justice, but their unspoken concerns and desires, even in a democracy -- especially in a democracy -- are really about satisfying the selfish needs of their constituents. Face it, primitive necessity is a fixture of the human condition. And, therefore, the only way to reduce conflict and suffering is through anxious foresight: the ability to foresee danger and necessities ahead. Thus are intelligence agencies more likely to prevent atrocities than humanitarians.
In politics, explains Machiavelli (through Mansfield), one who does good often cannot be good. One must even learn how to be bad, or at least devious, for the sake of the common good. This is not necessarily the end justifies the means, for Machiavelli is careful to stipulate that only the minimum amount of cruelty should be applied for the sake of the greatest amount of good.
Machiavelli is all about results. He believes that you define something in politics not by its inherent excellence, but by its outcome. For political virtue is separate from individual perfection. A leader may be honest, unselfish and moral, but if he starts a war that later proved unnecessary and killed many people, he lacks virtue -- despite being on a personal level very sympathetic. Conversely, a leader may be cynical, selfish and excessively ambitious, but if he keeps his countrymen away from danger he can still be said to have virtue -- despite being personally unappealing. Likeability has nothing to do with virtue, it turns out. For politics -- and especially geopolitics -- is concerned, according to Machiavelli, with knowing about the world rather than knowing about heaven. Indeed, precisely because Machiavelli was concerned with men and not with God, he was a humanist.
Machiavelli has his limits. For example, he could not have foreseen 20th century totalitarianism that mirrored the self-righteousness of the medieval Church with which he was in conflict, but on a much larger scale. He imagined the never-ending struggle between Italian city-states; not the titanic conflicts between gargantuan nuclear powers. Because the stakes are arguably higher now because of weapons of mass destruction, there is a danger of taking Machiavelli too far and using his philosophy to justify all sorts of risky subterfuges.
But there is a greater danger in simply dismissing his philosophy as unworthy of our so-called enlightened age. For our age is determined less by globalization than by the battle of space and power, both between states and between groups within states themselves -- as witnessed most recently by the ethnic and sectarian turmoil throughout the Greater Middle East. An American leader who is forced to grapple with such anarchy, even as he must take care to adopt the right tone with a militarily ascendant China and with an economically rising Latin America, could do worse than act "Machiavellian." And thanks to Professor Mansfield, we now know the true meaning of that adjective.
Robert D. Kaplan is Chief Geopolitical Analyst at Stratfor, a geopolitical analysis firm, and author of the bestselling new book The Revenge of Geography. Reprinted with permission.
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/03/21/what_machiavelli_can_teach_us_today_105016.html
本文於 修改第 1 次
|
我們當下需要馬夏維里式領袖 - Hartmut Behr
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
We need Machiavellian leaders What Machiavellianism really means Hartmut Behr, 04/23/26 Editor’s Notes:When we call a leader “Machiavellian” we mean they are ruthless, cunning, and amoral. But Machiavelli himself meant something close to the opposite. Political theorist Hartmut Behr argues that Machiavelli was describing the pathologies of princely power, not endorsing them—and that his real commitments, to republicanism, institutional checks, and peaceful diplomacy between small states, amount to a vision of leadership we have buried under centuries of misreading and which is needed now more than ever. The normative and the analytical The term “Machiavellianism” is used time and again by journalists, politicians, public intellectuals, and scholars. Their use is mirrored in the Cambridge Dictionary, where “Machiavellianism” is defined as the use of cunning, dishonest methods to deceive and win power and control. This reading of Machiavelli has a long history: thinkers from William Shakespeare to the Prussian King Frederick II have perceived Niccolo Machiavelli as advocating dishonest and expedient power politics. But this popular interpretation has always been contrasted with another movement, which praises Machiavelli as a republican writer who warned against the perils of power politics and dictatorial leadership in the legacy of Aristotle and Cicero. This interpretation has been supported by James Harrington, Francis Bacon, David Hume, Baruch Spinoza, Charles de Montesquieu, and Jean Jacques Rousseau, who described Machiavelli’s Prince as “the book of Republicans.” In the present day, J.G.A. Pocock’s The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition emphasizes that Machiavelli’s The Prince would have been an analytic study of how power relations operate in principalities. This interpretation—for which we would in contemporary language use the term “sociology of power”—is supported by the title of Machiavelli’s piece. It should not in fact be translated as The Prince, but as “On Principalities,” which would be a fair representation of its actual title De Principatibus. So why have all these thinkers been drawn to alternative interpretations? To be fair, there are some ostensible contradictions in Machiavelli’s writings that we can either accept as contradictions or attempt to explain. I am inclined to do the latter. Quentin Skinner warns us not to read our own preconceptions into old texts, and if we follow this line of enquiry there is much to discover in Machiavelli: first, we learn from an early attempt in the political sociology of power; second, we receive ideas about the advantage of republics over principalities and of small republics over large ones; an argument that, third, feeds into Machiavelli’s advocacy for a republican international order, an idea that is usually allocated to Immanuel Kant and his writing On Perpetual Peace while ignoring its much earlier presentation in Machiavelli. Thus, we receive very different—normative and analytical—statements from Machiavelli on the wisdom of a ruler, on ethics, on keeping or breaking promises, and on forms of government and their advantages and disadvantages. Taking all those ambivalent statements together rules out any legitimate use of “Machiavellianism” that rests upon a superficial reading of one of Machiavelli’s writings, only, namely The Prince. We read in Chapter XVIII of The Prince that “A wise ruler (...) cannot and should not keep his word when such an observance would be to his disadvantage, and when the reasons that caused him to make a promise are removed”; or in Chapter XIV: “A Prince (...) must not have any other object nor any other thought, nor must he adopt anything as his art but war, its institutions, and its discipline.” But we also read in Chapter IX of the same writing: “But let us come to the second instance, when a private citizen becomes prince of his native city not through wickedness or any other intolerable violence, but with the favor of his fellow citizens.” This is a clear normative statement about intolerable forms of political violence. And we read in Chapter XV of The Prince, clearly pointing to the distinction between the normative and the analytical: “For there is such a distance between how one lives and how one ought to live, that anyone who abandons what is done for what ought to be done achieves his downfall rather than his preservation.” And also, in Chapter XVIII of The Prince, we read about values such as keeping promises and integrity: “How praiseworthy it is for a prince to keep his word and to live with integrity (...) everybody knows.” And in the “Dedicatory Letter” and Chapter II of the same writing, he notes: I have neither decorated nor filled this work with elaborate sentences, with rich and magnificent words, or with any other form of rhetorical or unnecessary ornamentation that many writers normally use in describing and enriching their subject-matter, for I wished that nothing should set my work apart or make it pleasing except the variety of its material and the gravity of its contents (...) I shall aside any discussions of republics, because I have treated them elsewhere. I shall consider solely the principality ... and I shall discuss how these principalities can be [not ought to be; H.B.] governed and maintained. How can we explain these ambivalences? We cannot incorporate them into a mainstream understanding of “Machiavellianism” unless we declare Machiavelli schizophrenic. If we declared Machiavelli an advocate of cunning and dishonest politics because he is describing, as he says himself, in plain sentences, dishonesty and violence in a particular type of government, namely in principalities, then we could also declare George Orwell a fascist for what he describes in Animal Farm. No one would make such absurd claims In conclusion, we witness here in Machiavelli an early attempt to analyze the mechanisms of power in a form of government that develops into oligarchy, despotism, or tyranny, without ethical standards that would provide normative guidance on good forms of commonwealth such as republics. In modern language, we call this a political sociology of power (à la C. Wright Mills, Robert Dahl, or Steven Lukes), and we can conceive of Machiavelli as the founder of this discipline, but by no means as the advocate of cunning, dishonest, and violent power politics. Machiavelli’s republican approach to diplomacy and his invention of the permanent embassy, based on the argument of confidence-building and acculturation (適應他國/異地文化), exemplifies this position in practical terms. Understanding Machiavelli as an early sociologist of power allows us to see what his ideas can offer to modern leaders—receiving ideas about the advantage of republican values, republics over principalities, and of small republics over large ones, as well as Machiavelli’s advocacy for a republican international order of such small republics. Machiavelli’s advocacy for small republics and a republican international order It might be surprising that we find in Machiavelli’s writings the idea of a regional republican order. This idea relates to the normative, not to the analytical, side of his writings. The wide neglect of this aspect in receptions of Machiavelli is astonishing because, as early as in Book I, Chapter 1 of The Discourses, Machiavelli talks about the reason for the foundation of cities, and he refers to international politics to explain this reason. What Machiavelli describes here is the creation of, in modern language, a security community and international society in which cities unite together for the better realization of their commonly shared interests (The Discourses, Book I, Chapter 1). Machiavelli understands this as a form of a good international order. When further inquiring into the meaning of good order, we have to consider two aspects. One of these aspects concerns Machiavelli’s preference for small republics. He writes: I am firmly convinced (…) that to set up a republic which is to last a long time, the way to set about it is to constitute it as Sparta and Venice were constituted: (…) to make it so large as to appear formidable to its neighbors (…) if it be content with its own territory, and it becomes clear by experience that it has no ambitions, it will never occur that someone may make war through fear (…), especially if by its constitution or by its laws expansion is prohibited. Nor have I the least doubt, if this balance could be maintained, there would be a genuine political life and real tranquillity in such a city. (The Discourses, Book I, Chapter 6) A small city has a pacifying effect on the international order. No other state, Machiavelli argues, has to fear a small city. If the peaceful conduct of its foreign politics was additionally determined by its constitution and laws, this would produce an even better situation. Machiavelli realizes analytically that states may be driven by ambitions to increase their influence, power, and glory; however, normatively he envisions a different, and more peaceful, international order, one which is made up of small republics unified by their common interest in increasing the quality of life. Towards the end of the previous quotation, we notice that Machiavelli talks about “genuine political life” and “real tranquillity,” drawing a link between domestic order and international politics. In Book I, Chapter 59 of The Discourses under the topic “What Confederations or Leagues can be trusted most; those made with a Republic or those made with a Prince?” Machiavelli argues clearly that confederations made of republics are much more reliable because they would abide by their agreements far better than princes. Again, the “normative Machiavelli” not only highly values associations of republics (what he calls “confederations” or “leagues”) based on their common republican values and security, but he also emphasizes their far better fulfilment of treaty obligations than principalities, thus safeguarding “genuine political life” and “real tranquillity.’ His preference for republics is very much due to (what we could call today) a system of checks and balances, which would operate in republics but not in principalities. Republics are slower to act and take more time than princes in arriving at decisions. This argument is also well known from the Federalist Papers: a slower pace in the decision-making process guarantees a more reflective, moderate, and thus less emotional and sounder political outcome. The mechanism for preventing decisions being made too promptly is the system of checks and balances between the executive, the legislative, and the judicial, as a system of negotiation, vetoes, co-operation, and votes. Machiavelli devotes a whole book, The Discourses (Book II), to project a regional order of free republics, based on his normative outlook as well as on historical examples of peaceful and flourishing state relations. What, then, is a Machiavellian leader? A Machiavellian leader is not what, e.g., The Guardian, The Conversation, or CNN describe. For instance, Peter Mandelson, the former UK ambassador to the US and apparent grand strategist of the Labour party, is described as a “Machiavellian Prince of Darkness.” But there is no “darkness,” no cunning strategy, power-seeking, and hidden political maneuverings in Machiavelli other than in descriptive terms. A Machiavellian leader is the total opposite: they are republican-minded, share and promote the values of trust, honesty, and justice, and appreciate transparency and checks and balances in domestic politics. They support the professional conduct of diplomatic relations internationally, seeking a peaceful order of small republics. Such an order would be ideally built on international institutions, trust, and faithfulness (for example, to treaty obligations). Bernard Crick, in his introduction to Machiavelli’s Discourses, argues that there is no doubt that Machiavelli has a clear preference for republics over all other forms of governance, but with the caveat of “if you can get them.” Crick points here rightfully to the challenges of establishing a republican order. There might be all kinds of obstacles—personal, moral, ideological, institutional. One obstacle to this goal might be the reification of our perceptions and beliefs as political reality. The one-sided, reductionist, and ideologically driven reading of Machiavelli might cause “Machiavellian” politics to come about. It reinforces our negative image of politics as normal, even “supporting” it with a great author’s (ostensible) voice, and thus standing in the way of morally rightful, decent, and republican-minded politics. Next to the philosophical problem of reification and the political challenges to establish and maintain republican orders, this highlights the pedagogical significance of political theory and the history of political ideas. Understanding the reality of Machiavelli’s ideas might be crucial to bringing them about. The darker the times, the more important it is that the normative goals of republicanism, its institutions, and its ethical outlook are represented by a truly Machiavellian leader. Hartmut Behr is the Professor of International Politics at Newcastle University. 相關閱讀 The real reason the US attacked Iran There is no such thing as a country Why reason must destroy society Our economic system is designed to make us unhappy Trump, tariffs, and the lessons to learn from MachiavelliBy Andy Owen 相關視頻 The rise of technofeudalism Russia, Ukraine, and the failures of the West The end of ideology Lies, damned lies, and economics
本文於 修改第 1 次
|
|
|