America needs neocentrist foreign policy

Jonathan Schanzer, 09/19/13

Washington is paralyzed over what to do in Syria. By all accounts, the president’s choices range from bad to worse. But Syria is actually a symptom of a deeper intellectual malaise. America’s foreign policy establishment is suffering from an adjustment disorder.

After rejecting the neoconservative policies of George W. Bush following his ill-fated wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the foreign-policy herd rushed to embrace the Obama Doctrine. America would now choose not to wield its military power to influence world conflicts – particularly in the Middle East. In many ways, we chose not to have a foreign policy, choosing instead to focus on domestic considerations in the wake of a debilitating recession.

But that strategy is obviously not risk-free. The Syrian slaughter that the United States has chosen to largely ignore, currently tallied at 110,000, is rapidly reaching the estimated 125,000 civilians killed in the wake of America’s Iraq intervention. And the longer the United States has stayed on the sidelines, the stronger al Qaeda has grown, threatening not only Syria, but also its neighbors. The lesson here is that doing nothing can sometimes be just as dangerous as doing too much.

Even the president, who has given many Americans foreign-policy whiplash as he has vacillated on how to respond to that chemical weapons attack, appears to now understand the limits of the Obama Doctrine. Barack Obama spent the last five years decrying American military intervention in the Middle East (“I was elected to end wars, not start them”), and emphasizing the need to reach consensus with our international partners, only to deliver a national address pleading for public support to unilaterally bomb an Arab country that has not attacked the United States.

Obama’s problem is that he did too good of a job delegitimizing his newly discovered bellicosity. He has hemmed himself in, which explains why he continued to scrap and revise battle plans and while his senior advisors issue a cacophony of policy directives that have left the American public bitterly divided over plans to prevent mass slaughter. It also explains why he leapt at the chance Russian President Vladimir Putin offered, however slim, to get him out of his jam with a Congress that wasn’t likely to grant him the authorization he sought.

No matter what happens now in Syria, Obama appears to understand that he cannot ignore some simple realities that were previously derided as neoconservative issues. Al Qaeda, its affiliate groups, and the violent Islamist ideologies that drive them, are not dead and are not receding. The democracy deficit in the Middle East will continue to spawn instability. Autocrats and strongmen with weapons of mass destruction still pose a grave danger. Iran, an unflinching ally of the Syrian regime, has remained on a belligerent course, despite intermittent attempts at cosmetic change.

In Washington, as conversations with legislators, congressional staffers, civil servants, State Department officials, and other foreign-policy professionals over the last few weeks have made clear, there remains a deep and abiding desire to meet and overcome all of these challenges. Admittedly, many foreign-policy hands feel hamstrung by America’s financial burdens. And some feel that the volatility of the region in recent years, accelerated by the Arab Spring, has presented too many difficulties to tackle.

But it is nevertheless clear to a silent but growing group of practitioners that Washington sorely lacks a comfortable framework through which these and other policy challenges can be processed and understood. Few are brave enough to revisit neoconservatism in Obama’s Washington, yet it’s not hard to recognize that the Obama Doctrine has failed. Washington seeks a centrist approach to these challenges. Washington seeks a neocentrism.

What is neocentrism, exactly? It’s just starting to take form. It will embrace America’s power, but not abuse it. It might reject aspects of neoconservatism, but not the important moral commitments or valid views of global dangers that gave rise to that movement. It will reject aspects of the Obama Doctrine, but not the need for a somber accounting of the potential costs of putting boots on the ground or getting embroiled in expensive foreign conflicts. And above all, it will reject the growing isolationist wings of both parties, which seek to retreat from the world’s problems and renounce American exceptionalism in the process.

The notion of a more centrist foreign policy is not new to Americans, of course. Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clinton all conducted their foreign policies in ways that broadly appealed to the American center. But in a town that defers to the president on foreign policy, such a shift may be easier said than done. Real change will likely only come from a coalition of voices from across the political divide.

Whether Washington’s foreign-policy elite can come together on this is entirely unclear. But if ever there were a time to step forward, that time would be now.

Jonathan Schanzer, a former terrorism finance analyst at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, is vice president for research at Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/syria-america-neocentrist-foreign-policy-96983.html

Syria Civil War: Arming Syrian Rebels Is Machiavellian Genius

Joseph Sarkisian, World, 06/21/13

As was seemingly inevitable, the Obama administration recently decided to provide military support to Syrian rebels to level the playing field.

While “leveling” may sound like a vague descriptor for protracted conflict, this may be the point, even in the face of over 93,000 civilian deaths.

Marc Lynch, one of the most respected Middle East thinkers, stated in his blog at Foreign Policy that administration officials don’t believe supplying rebels is "likely to work;" it’s time to redefine “work.” 

The criticism of President Obama’s decision has been all too predictable, and all of the pundits, bloggers, professionals, analysts, think thank fellows, and ornery Congressmen have thrown around phrases like “slippery slope,” “too little too late,” and a host of other catchy little tag lines meant to induce emotional reaction in lieu of critical thought.

Regardless, in the face of 70% opposition from the American public, U.S. tax dollars will begin to arm and train Syria’s rebels. But what is interesting, and largely absent from the debate, is that arming Syria’s rebels is not the kind of single-barreled, half-cocked strategy that would have been commonplace in 2003, but rather a well planned foreign policy tactic that will help solve other related quagmires in the region.

For one, Iran is making critical mistakes in Syria. Thus far, they have spent over $10 billion to aid the Assad regime, while promising another $7 billion in the near future. Given that Iran’s revenues, the majority of which come from struggling oil sales, are down to only $40 billion, such spending is deeply destructive to the country. Further, Iran’s newly elected President Rowhani, a seeming reformist in a largely traditionalist Iranian bureaucracy, seems pliable to resetting the relationship between his country and the West.

The U.S. decision to arm Syria’s rebels keeps Iran mired in the conflict and bleeds it of crucial assets whilst weakening the regime in the face of its citizenry. This bloodletting along with the election of a more moderate Iranian president could very well force the regime to concede crucial points in nuclear negotiations, shut off a large portion of funding to its proxy fighting in Syria from the West, and be altogether more cooperative if the regime calculates that its citizens will not stand for such mismanagement in the face of a dying petroleum sector, rampant inflation, and a large youth population with little hope for a bright future. While critics will argue that Rowhani has no policy making power in face of the Ayatollah, his ability to foment hunger for reform cannot be understated, give the large margin with which he won election.

This has ramifications for other nefarious Syrian allies as well since the CIA – responsible for the clandestine dissemination of aid – will more than likely train and provide intelligence support to rebel fighters on not only how to fight against the Assad regime, but also Hezbollah, the Al-Qaeda aligned Al-Nusra Front, and whomever else has no place in the country, thus weakening other groups while propping up purist Syrian fighters in the face of Assad’s war machine.

Military aid to rebels has other benefits as well. Of the most obvious, it greatly pleases U.S. allies in the Middle East who wish to see Iran and the Assad regime suffer. It also clearly pleases Syrian rebels, thus potentially stripping some allegiance from dangerous groups within Syria who were providing support to rebels before, and may bring many fighters closer to center from more right wing leanings.

Some highly respectable voices, such as Paul Pillar and Michael Hanlon, have been commenting on this issue and acknowledging the idea of intentional Iranian bloodletting, but they don’t seem to take into account the grittier details of the strategy; instead summing it up to little more than President Obama breaking under international pressure to do more in Syria. While this is likely a motivator, it seems at odds with the Administration’s track record of Realist foreign policy leanings in Afghanistan (more or less), Iraq, Pakistan, the drone program, usage of JSOC, and a rigid commitment to keep U.S. forces out of conflicts that are of little national security or obvious foreign policy interest.

Detractors like Senator John McCain, who has been of the most vocal and bombastic critics of Obama’s Syria policy, maintain that a no-fly zone should be implemented over Syria’s skies. But this strategy, as Retired Army Lieutenant General David Barno points out beautifully in his latest piece on Foreign Policy, can easily lead to mission creep that involves U.S. forces being shot down over Syrian airspace, thus necessitating rescues and other more complicated methods of involvement in country. Further, providing air support decidedly enters the U.S. into war with Syria, since Syrian troops will inevitably die while being caught up in mid-air firefights and from bombing runs against Syrian air force installations and anti-aircraft batteries.

Any further involvement besides small arms and military training risks a serious momentum change, precipitating dangerous levels of U.S. involvement in a civil war that it can use to its regional advantage if the Obama administration maintains discipline. What is clear in this debate, and what most experts will agree on across the board is that an end game in Syria has not been discussed; something that is deeply troubling and must be brought up sooner than later.

But more important to address than any other issue is that Syrians are dying at terrifying rates. While providing basic military support to rebels will unequivocally prolong such bloodshed, it must be realized that the Middle East, the U.S., Iran, and others are involved in a world-class game of chess in the region. Allowing Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah to win in Syria is a diplomatic blow the U.S. cannot afford to take given the issue of Iran’s nuclear program and regional allies who may lose faith in the American ability to provide them security. 

By providing calculated military support to Syrian rebels, the U.S. may be able to gain traction in its conflict with Iran, thus cutting Iranian support for Assad and possibly leading to his fall without the need for U.S. escalation beyond current involvement.

This strategy is not pretty and will cause further bloodshed while leaving many scratching their heads in disbelief. But it may also prove brilliant in solving a seemingly intractable conflict. The Obama administration is exercising Realist foreign policy at its best, and whether this policy stands up to the rigors of moral review, remember that Machiavelli was no prince…

http://www.policymic.com/articles/50085/syria-civil-war-arming-syrian-rebels-is-machiavellian-genius

U.S.: Syria used chemical weapons, crossing "red line"

Steve Chaggaris/Stephanie Condon, 06/13/13

The Obama administration has concluded that Syrian President Bashar Assad's government used chemical weapons against the rebels seeking to overthrow him and, in a major policy shift, President Obama has decided to supply military support to the rebels, the White House announced Thursday.

"The president has made a decision about providing more support to the opposition that will involve providing direct support to the [Supreme Military Council]. That includes military support," Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Communication Ben Rhodes told reporters.

President Obama has repeatedly said that the use of chemical weapons is a "red line" that, if crossed, would be a "game changer" for more U.S. involvement in the Syrian civil war. 

"The President has been clear that the use of chemical weapons - or the transfer of chemical weapons to terrorist groups - is a red line for the United States," said Rhodes in a separate written statement.

"The President has said that the use of chemical weapons would change his calculus, and it has," he continued.

In terms of further response, Rhodes said, "we will make decisions on our own timeline" and that Congress and the international community would be consulted.  Mr. Obama is heading to Northern Ireland Sunday for a meeting of the G8 group of nations; Rhodes indicated the president will consult with leaders of those countries.

"Any future action we take will be consistent with our national interest, and must advance our objectives, which include achieving a negotiated political settlement to establish an authority that can provide basic stability and administer state institutions; protecting the rights of all Syrians; securing unconventional and advanced conventional weapons; and countering terrorist activity," Rhodes said.

To date, the U.S. policy on Syria has primarily focused on offering the rebels nonlethal assistance and humanitarian aid.

Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., who met with the rebels last month and has been a vocal critic of the president's Syria policy said in a joint statement with Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C.: "We appreciate the President's finding that the Assad regime has used chemical weapons on several occasions. We also agree with the President that this fact must affect U.S. policy toward Syria. The President's red line has been crossed. U.S. credibility is on the line. Now is not the time to merely take the next incremental step. Now is the time for more decisive actions."

"A decision to provide lethal assistance, especially ammunition and heavy weapons, to opposition forces in Syria is long overdue, and we hope the President will take this urgently needed step" they added. Former President Bill Clinton this week, at a private event with McCain, also ratcheted up pressure for the White House to increase its support to the rebels.

However, Rhodes would not detail the type of military support the administration intends on providing. He said helping the opposition improve their effectiveness as a fighting force means helping with "nonlethal assistance" such as communications equipment and transportation. "These are things that allow them to cohere as a unit," he said.

He added, meanwhile, that no decision has been made about enforcing a no-fly zone over Syria. "A no-fly zone... would carry with it open-ended costs for the international community," Rhodes said. "Furthermore, there's not even a clear guarantee that it would dramatically improve the situation on the ground."

Rhodes laid out the intelligence assessment that led to the president's decision saying the U.S. intelligence community determined "that the Assad regime has used chemical weapons, including the nerve agent sarin, on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year."

Rhodes added that "the intelligence community estimates that 100 to 150 people have died from detected chemical weapons attacks in Syria to date; however, casualty data is likely incomplete."

Although that is a small fraction of the more than 90,000 who have died in the civil war, Rhodes said "the use of chemical weapons violates international norms and crosses clear red lines that have existed within the international community for decades."

"We believe that the Assad regime maintains control of these weapons," Rhodes continued. "We have no reliable, corroborated reporting to indicate that the opposition in Syria has acquired or used chemical weapons."

The conflict in Syria has raged on since March 2011 when Assad began cracking down on protesters inspired by the Arab Spring. The war has fallen along ethnic lines, between the Sunni rebels and Assad's Alawite-dominated regime. Rhodes said today that the use of chemical weapons adds an element of urgency to the situation, as does the influx of foreign pro-Assad fighters from Hezbollah and Iran.

While Mr. Obama has said unequivocally that Assad must go, the administration has said it's still aiming for his regime to engage with the opposition to reach a political settlement. In the absence of a political settlement, Rhodes said Syria would be left with "for all intents and purposes, a civil war" that Hezbollah and Iran would jump into. Syria's position in the heart of the Middle East makes the scenario particularly unpredictable.

Rhodes further added that the end of the Assad regime should not have to necessitate the disillusionment in all elements of the state. "There is a future for those in the Assad regime who are willing to accept the end of Bashar Assad's reign but are willing to work for a better future for Syria," he said.

http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57589252/u.s.-syria-used-chemical-weapons-crossing-obamas-red-line/

Obama: 'Global War on Terror' Is Over

White House unveils new rhetoric for defeating al-Qaida, lone-wolf terrorists, including closing Gitmo

Paul D. Shinkman, 05/23/13

The "Global War on Terror" is over, President Barack Obama announced Thursday, saying the military and intelligence agencies will not wage war against a tactic but will instead focus on a specific group of networks determined to destroy the U.S.

This shift in rhetoric accompanies new or updated efforts to defeat al-Qaida and its affiliates, the president said in a speech at the National Defense University within Washington, DC's Fort McNair. Al-Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan is on a "path to defeat," he said, so the U.S. must focus instead on al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula -- "the most active" in plotting against the U.S. -- homegrown violent extremism and unrest in the Arab world that leads to attacks like the assault on the Benghazi diplomatic post.

[RELATED: Obama: No Armed Drones in U.S.]

Allowing drone strikes, including those against American citizens, and closing the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay are chief among the first steps in accomplishing this goal, he said.

"We must define our effort not as a boundless 'Global War on Terror,' but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America," Obama said.

"Deranged or alienated individuals – often U.S. citizens or legal residents – can do enormous damage, particularly when inspired by larger notions of violent jihad. That pull towards extremism appears to have led to the shooting at Fort Hood, and the bombing of the Boston Marathon," he said. "So that's the current threat: Lethal yet less capable al-Qaida affiliates. Threats to diplomatic facilities and businesses abroad. Homegrown extremists. This is the future of terrorism. We must take these threats seriously, and do all that we can to confront them."

Part of this effort includes closing the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, which Obama says has "become a symbol around the world for an America that flouts the rule of law."

The president plans to reopen an office at the Department of State -- which he closed in January -- to act as a special envoy and work with the Department of Defense to find ways to return each detainee to their home country. Obama has also tasked the Department of Defense to designate a site within the U.S. to hold military commissions, two of which are currently underway in a special court at Guantanamo Bay.

He also announced Thursday he is lifting the moratorium on detainee transfers to Yemen to allow for a case-by-case analysis on each detainee.

[RELATED: Obama: Administration Saw Drones as 'Cure All' for Terrorism]

"To the greatest extent possible, we will transfer detainees who have been cleared to go to other countries," he said. "Where appropriate, we will bring terrorists to justice in our courts and military justice system. And we will insist that judicial review be available for every detainee."

Obama has consistently railed against the detention facility and how it is viewed throughout the world.

"It is critical for us to understand that Guantanamo is not necessary to keep America safe," he said in a speech at the end of April. "It is expensive, it is inefficient, it hurts us in terms of our international standing, it lessens cooperation with our allies on counterterrorism efforts, it is a recruitment tool for extremists."

Obama's attempts to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility during his first term were blocked by Congress. Of the hundreds of detainees brought to the remote base on the southeastern end of Cuba, only 166 remain. A handful are awaiting trial. The rest are either deemed too dangerous to release -- but are precluded from trial due to lack of evidence or evidence tainted by enhanced interrogation techniques -- or their home country will no longer accept them.

The U.S. government is prohibited from releasing detainees to a country where they will likely be killed.

"Once we commit to a process of closing Gitmo, I am confident that this legacy problem can be resolved, consistent with our commitment to the rule of law," he said.

The ongoing hunger strikes among a reported majority of the detainees contributed to Obama's decision to push again for the facility's closure. A woman in the audience at NDU interrupted Obama twice during this portion of his remarks Thursday to protest the treatment of the detainees.

"The president has always been committed to closing Gitmo," a White House senior administration official who spoke on the condition of anonymity told reporters. The timing coincides with the agenda Obama set forth in his second term, "but part of the context of that is people taking drastic steps of hunger strikes in Gitmo."

This new push to close the facility, which costs roughly $150 million per year to operate, comes days after the White House requested $200 million on behalf of the Department of Defense for maintenance, upgrades at Guantanamo Bay, and roughly $250 million for operations.

A Pentagon official who spoke on the condition of anonymity says these upgrades would take 2-3 years, not 8-10 as the AP originally reported, and would include amalgamating some of the facility's buildings into a single location. It will address "fair wear and tear" on some of the facilities and to upgrade others that were never designed to permanently house detainees for multiple years.

"A lot of this is about safety and security," for both guards and detainees, the official says. There is no anticipation of growing the facility to house more than 166 detainees.

More News:

·          Drone Attacks Accidentally Killed Several Americans

·          Armed Drones Could Be Protected by Second Amendment

·          Former Bush Adviser: Drone Strikes Are Obama's Guantanamo

Paul D. Shinkman is the national security reporter at U.S. News and World Report. You can reach him at pshinkman@usnews.com or on Twitter.

http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/05/23/obama-global-war-on-terror-is-over

Deleterious Neglect: Will the U.S. Navy Surrender Maritime Asia?

Having gone unchallenged for decades, and facing budget cuts, the U.S. Navy is in danger of losing its capability to challenge the PLA in its near seas.

Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, 05/17/13

The Chinese navy's surface forces are on the march. Destroyers, frigates, corvettes, fast-attack craft, and, most recently, the newly commissioned aircraft carrier comprise the surface fleet. Over the past two decades, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) has put to sea four Sovremenny-class guided-missile destroyers procured from Russia, along with ten new classes of indigenously built destroyers and frigates. Some of the latter ship types have entered serial production, adding mass to the fleet. This is an impressive feat by any standard.

The PLA Navy's metamorphosis from a coastal defense force into a modern naval service has riveted the attention of the U.S. defense community. In 2009 the Office of Naval Intelligence -- a body not known for hyperbole -- described the advances of China's surface fleet as "remarkable." Similarly, the Pentagon's most recent annual report on Chinese military power notes the "robust" buildup of PLA Navy major combatants since 2008.

The Liaoning carrier understandably captures the public imagination. But the true vanguard of the PLA Navy's prowess will be its surface combatants -- the workhorses of any navy -- that will make China's turn to the seas felt in maritime Asia and beyond. In the coming years, these warships will serve as pickets guarding the carrier, project power on their own in surface action groups, maintain a visible presence in disputed waters, defend good order at sea in distant theaters, and conduct naval diplomacy around the world. 

Yet debate persists over this metamorphosis. Skeptics doubt the PLA Navy will translate its growing material heft into real combat effectiveness. One sanguine view holds that the U.S. Navy surface fleet is more than a match for any rival in the contest for sea control -- the arbiter of any naval war -- and will remain so for the foreseeable future. The implication is that while Beijing may be able to exact a price from the U.S. Navy for attempting to use the seas and airspace in China's environs, the United States will still command the seas when the chips are down. 

At the tactical level, this comforting narrative holds that U.S. naval forces remain able to land a devastating blow before opposing warships get close enough to fire their first shot. In a fleet-on-fleet engagement, for example, carrier-based warplanes would unleash missiles at enemy surface combatants from standoff distances, meaning beyond the engagement range of the opponent's anti-ship arsenal. This scenario conforms to the longstanding American doctrinal preference for shooting the archer before the archer can let fly his arrow.

This tactical and technological margin of superiority will endure and perhaps even widen, so goes this storyline, letting the U.S. Navy retain its dominant position in maritime Asia.   

We're not so sure.

For one thing, China's surface fleet is quickly catching up. Mariners are cementing core competencies while closing the capability gap. For years, Chinese ships' lack of sophisticated area-wide air defenses exposed them to air and missile attacks. This shortcoming reaffirmed U.S. commanders' conviction that carrier aviators would handily defeat the PLA Navy in a fight. Now, however, near-state-of-the-art systems on board some Chinese combatants outrange the anti-ship weaponry sported by U.S. aircraft. The Luyang-class guided-missile destroyers are apparently equipped with phased-array radars similar in appearance -- and, according to Chinese pundits, in capability -- to the American Aegis combat system, a combination radar, computer, and fire-control system that can detect and target multiple aircraft simultaneously at long range.

At the same time, the PLA Navy has armed its warships to the teeth with a family of Russian- and Chinese-made anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) boasting ranges of 120-130 nautical miles. The only comparable weapon in the U.S. inventory is the nearly-four-decade-old Harpoon anti-ship missile, whose advertised striking range is less than 70 nautical miles. In other words, major Chinese combatants can not only keep U.S. aircraft at bay, but can also close in on the U.S. fleet to unleash volleys of ASCMs outside the weapons range of U.S. vessels. Not American but Chinese archers may now hold the initiative.

Thus both the defensive and offensive sides of sea combat are stacking up in China's favor -- progressively eroding the tactical advantages of U.S. naval power.

Furthermore, it is unclear whether the U.S. Navy's surface battle capacity has kept up with the times. Since the Cold War, the navy has grown accustomed to operating in uncontested waters. Indeed, directives from on high stated that no one was likely to dispute American command of the sea. Owing to such strong bureaucratic signals, the surface fleet has let the skills and hardware for striking at sea atrophy. Why practice fighting for something no one can dispute?

Other missions have preoccupied the service since the Cold War. Naval aviators have spent the past decade supporting ground forces rather than girding to duel enemy armadas. Dropping smart bombs on insurgents and terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan demands different skill sets from evading enemy defenses and pummeling enemy men-of-war. Meanwhile, guided-missile destroyers have been burdened with an ever wider array of missions, including ballistic-missile defense (BMD). Competing missions -- some of which, like BMD, command national-level scrutiny -- siphon finite resources, crews' attention, and, equally important, physical space aboard ship away from the combat function.

In effect, then, the service has demoted war at sea, the raison d'être for any navy, to secondary status. Both the hardware (weaponry, sensors, and hulls) and the software (training and exercises) for sea control have doubtless suffered as a result. In an era of tight budgetary constraints, reversing two decades of steady decline in surface warfare will be neither easy nor quick. In short, prevailing assumptions about American naval supremacy are coming under strain.

It would be a grievous mistake, nonetheless, to concentrate wholly on the operational progress the PLA Navy surface fleet has made or the tactical travails that could hold back the U.S. Navy surface fleet. Competition is about more than just gee-whiz weaponry or comparing entries in Jane's Fighting Ships. The only meaningful standard by which to gauge a seagoing force's adequacy is its ability to muster superior combat power at the decisive time, at the decisive point on the nautical chart, against the strongest probable adversary. As a great man once proclaimed, there is no substitute for victory.

It is far from clear that the United States retains its accustomed supremacy by that unforgiving standard, any more than it does in technological terms. For a variety of reasons -- distance from the theater, the consequent need for forward bases and logistics fleets, expensive weaponry, salaries, and pensions -- it costs the United States far more than China to stage a unit of combat power at a given place in maritime Asia. Whether the Pentagon can afford to mount superior strength in a rival great power's backyard, whether the sea services are investing in the right people and hardware to constitute that strength, and whether American seafarers have the requisite skills to prevail when battle is joined are the only questions worth asking.

That casts U.S.-China competition in a whole new light, doesn't it? A purely fleet-on-fleet engagement is improbable within the China seas or the western reaches of the Pacific Ocean. In those expanses, Beijing has the luxury of throwing the combined weight of Chinese sea power into a sea fight, dispatching not just its surface fleet but missile-toting submarines and swarms of patrol craft. Furthermore, land-based implements of sea power can strike a blow in any fleet action that takes place within their combat radii. PLA Air Force warplanes can join the fray, as can anti-ship missiles fielded by the PLA Second Artillery Corps. Lord Nelson, who knew a thing or two about operating fleets under the shadow of shore-based weaponry, sagely counseled that a ship's a fool to fight a fort. That's doubly true today, when Fortress China can reach scores or hundreds of miles out to sea.

One part of the U.S. Navy, then, could conceivably confront the whole of China's maritime might. The U.S. sea services are dispersed throughout Asia and the world. To estimate the outcome of a fleet action, we thus have to determine how the contingent the U.S. Navy is likely to commit to battle -- including its aerial and subsurface components, along with any assets supplied by allies like the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force or South Korean Navy -- stacks up to the massed power of the PLA Navy fleet, backed by the array of anti-access weaponry at PLA commanders' disposal. (This assumes Chinese commanders do the smart thing in wartime and mass their fleets for action.) If China's navy outmatches the U.S. or combined fleet contingent under such conditions, it is adequate to the tasks entrusted to it by the political leadership. If not, the advantage resides with the United States and its allies.

The unenviable task before Washington, then, is to preserve or extend the margin of superiority of part of its naval force over the whole maritime force, sea and land, that's available to Beijing. It's tough to pull off such a feat, especially under present circumstances. Finances are straitened. Overall numbers are under stress as a result, as is the military's capacity to innovate. To make ends meet, the U.S. Navy is substituting light combatants such as the new Littoral Combat Ship for multi-mission warships bristling with heavier firepower. To compound these problems, the fleet finds itself outranged by its most likely antagonist. It will be several years before a new anti-ship missile restores long-range hitting power to the fleet, or until exotic armaments such as electromagnetic rail guns or shipboard lasers augment the main battery.

From a grand-strategic standpoint, the lag in weapons development could open a danger zone in which Beijing is tempted to strike before its range advantage lapses. Imperial Japan made a similar now-or-never calculation in 1904, realizing that rival Russia was constructing new battlewagons for its Pacific squadron. It struck before St. Petersburg could amass insuperable strength in Far Eastern waters. In 1941, likewise, Tokyo hit the U.S. Pacific Fleet before the entirely new fleet being built under the Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940 could arrive in the theater and shift the naval balance against Japan. U.S. and allied leaders must remain watchful, lest Beijing too succumb to the temptation to settle disputes around its nautical periphery by force.

Are submarines the great equalizer, a U.S. Navy game-changer akin to the "assassin's mace" that so beguiles Chinese strategists? Many Westerners appear to think so. They consider undersea warfare a talisman, assuming that the U.S. Navy can simply dive beneath the waves and pummel the PLA Navy from below. Submariners voice confidence in the superiority of American and allied boats over anything China has put to sea. We see no reason to question the allies' qualitative superiority in this sphere, and indeed we have depicted the subsurface fleet as a core competitive advantage for the United States.

But while quality remains on the allied side, numbers are more problematic. Yes, under the pivot to Asia, sixty percent of the U.S. Navy’s 72-vessel submarine force now calls the Pacific Ocean home. But 18 of those 72 submarines are Ohio-class ballistic- or cruise-missile boats (14 SSBNs, 4 SSGNs) meant for shore bombardment. That leaves 54 attack submarines (SSNs) suitable for a tilt against the PLA Navy, sixty percent (32-33 submarines) of which will be in the Pacific. That may sound like a lot, but bear in mind that no unit is ready for service all of the time. Routine upkeep, extended overhauls and refueling, crew rest, and training all have claims on a vessel's schedule.

A hoary U.S. Navy axiom holds that it takes three ships to keep one on foreign station. One is in the shipyards and completely out of service, another is preparing for deployment, and the third is actually on cruise. If anything, the 3:1 ratio actually overstates the proportion of ships available for combat duty.  Even using this ratio, however, U.S. naval commanders can expect to have 11 fully combat-ready subs at their disposal at any time. Assuming the rhythm from overhaul to deployment holds up, another 11 may be available in varying states of readiness.

Twenty-two SSNs, no matter how good individually, is a slender force to cover the China seas and Western Pacific in wartime. Theorist Julian S. Corbett advises commanders to post vessels at the origin of an enemy fleet's voyage; at its destination, if known; or at focal points such as straits where shipping has to congregate as it passes from point A to point B. Otherwise it may be hard to make contact. Monitoring Chinese seaports, along with narrow seas such as the Luzon Strait and the passages through the Ryukyu Islands, will stretch the tactically proficient but lean U.S. submarine fleet. That in turn will leave broad operating grounds open to the PLA Navy.

Undersea warfare, then, remains an advantage, owing not just to American skill but to the PLA Navy's neglect of antisubmarine warfare. But the U.S. Navy needs more mass -- meaning more boats -- if it is to vanquish China's navy from the depths. Practitioners and pundits err if they view the silent service as it currently stands as a panacea. Doubling the submarine force would be a prudent move for Washington in its strategic competition with Beijing.

Where does all of this leave us? It's commonplace among China-watchers to make the U.S. Navy the benchmark by which to judge the PLA Navy's size and composition. This misleads. As noted here, the proper yardstick is the navy's capacity to fulfill the goals assigned to it by political leaders, in the expanses that matter, against the strongest likely opponent. Beijing's immediate goals and its likely opponents fall within reach of the abundant shore-based armaments festooning Fortress China. Combining land- with sea-based implements of marine combat yields a force far more formidable than side-by-side comparisons of surface fleets would indicate. The PLA Navy, then, may not need a surface fleet symmetrical with the U.S. Navy's -- in terms of flattops, air wings, destroyers, etc. -- to get its job done.

Observers must apply standards unique to China to determine whether China's Navy has struck the right balance of capabilities. Comparing it to a globe-spanning navy like America's reveals little.

Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes are professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, where Yoshihara occupies the John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies. The views voiced here are theirs alone.

http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/17/deleterious-neglect-will-the-u-s-navy-surrender-maritime-asia/?all=true

Would Machiavelli Have Drawn a Red Line?

The case for subtle diplomacy.

Rosa Brooks, 05/02/13

In days of yore, diplomats were diplomatic. Or so, at least, I am led to believe by fiction and film: Fictional diplomats are erudite, conniving, and suave, treating allies and enemies alike with the same elegant courtesy, even while arranging the most sophisticated betrayals.

Consider the urbane Chauvelin in The Scarlet Pimpernel, a manipulative flatterer who "strove to read the very souls of those with whom he came in contact." Or take the character of Mr. Dryden in Lawrence of Arabia, who defends diplomatic duplicity by asserting, "A man who tells lies, like me, merely hides the truth. But a man who tells half-lies has forgotten where he's put it." Above all, consider that most infamous of real-life diplomats, Niccolò Machiavelli. Dishonest? Certainly. Amoral? Possibly. But rude and obnoxious? Never.

Somewhere along the line, this seems to have changed. Today, many of our senior-most diplomats (and I include the president in that general category) seem to substitute shrillness for suavity, hectoring intransigence for erudition, and prissy pomposity for persuasion.

The examples are too numerous to cite, but take that peculiarly popular word "unacceptable" (as in, "That is unacceptable to the United States"). The number of things the United States finds "unacceptable" is equaled only by the number of things it "will not tolerate." And that is to say nothing of the multitude of "red lines" and "lines in the sand" that U.S. officials draw on a regular basis.

Here are some of the numerous things that have recently been asserted to be "unacceptable" and "intolerable" to the United States:

l   A nuclear-armed Iran. "Unacceptable to the United States." (Hillary Clinton) "We're not going to tolerate a nuclear weapon in the hands of [Iran]." (President Obama)

l   A nuclear-armed North Korea. "We will not tolerate it. We will not settle for anything less than the complete, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program." (George W. Bush) A decade later? "The rhetoric that we're hearing from North Korea is simply unacceptable." A nuclear North Korea "will not be accepted." (John Kerry)

l   Bad behavior by Pakistan. Pakistani safe havens for the Haqqani Network? "That's unacceptable." (Leon Panetta) Also, corruption in Pakistan: "We will not tolerate corruption." (Former State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley)

l   Eritrean meddling in Somalia. "It is unacceptable, and we will not tolerate it." (Susan Rice)

l   Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia. "Unacceptable in the 21st century." (George W. Bush)

l   Libyan attacks on civilians. "Completely unacceptable." (Hillary Clinton)

l   Chinese unfair trade practices. "Unacceptable." (Former Commerce Secretary John Bryson)

l   The U.N. Security Council, which, due to a dispute between the United States and Russia over the wording of a resolution condemning terrorist attacks in Damascus, ended up passing nothing at all. "It is unacceptable to the United States that the U.N. Security Council not...express its outrage at the heinous, sustained attacks on innocent civilians that the Syrian regime continues to launch." (Eric Pelton, spokesman for the U.S. Mission to the United Nations)

l   Aggression across borders in the Middle East. We "will not tolerate" it. (President Obama)

l   The use of chemical weapons by Syria. Unacceptable. Also, intolerable. Also, it would cross a red line, at least if "a whole bunch" of chemical weapons were used or transferred. (President Obama) A "clear red line." (Joe Biden) Also, this is not a bluff.

Uh-huh.

That's just a partial list. Believe me, we find plenty of other things "unacceptable" as well.

There are two problems with this kind of rhetoric.

First, as everyone and their cousins have been lately observing, it's not at all clear how U.S. interests are advanced by declaring behavior to be "unacceptable" when we have no intention of doing anything about it. (There are notable exceptions -- ask Muammar Qaddafi -- but in general, most activities condemned by the United States as unacceptable continue to this day, or, to the extent that they have stopped, they stopped with no credit due to us.) Iran routinely kicks sand on U.S. red lines, as does North Korea. Then, of course, there are all those "red lines" with Syria.

If we aren't willing to take decisive action to stop the Syrian government's appalling activities, what can it possibly mean to thump our chests and claim to have a red line? "Men," wrote Machiavelli, "must either be caressed or annihilated." Teddy Roosevelt proffered similar advice: "Speak softly and carry a big stick." We speak loudly, and though we undeniably carry a big stick, we mostly seem to flail about with it at random.

This isn't an argument for using military force in Syria, or Iran, or anywhere else -- maybe the use of force is justified and useful and maybe it's not. But if we in fact intend to accept the "unacceptable" and tolerate the "intolerable," we would be wise to develop a different and more nuanced vocabulary.

There's a second and less frequently noted problem with our absolutist rhetoric. It's just obnoxious -- and its sheer obnoxiousness makes it dangerous. The rhetoric of "unacceptable" and "intolerable" risks generating and reinforcing the very bad behavior we're trying to stop -- not just because each empty threat further reduces our credibility, but because our general stance toward the world has become so hectoring and schoolmarmish.

In general, U.S. diplomats treat foreign states and leaders like badly behaved toddlers. True, they often deserve it -- but as Machiavelli would surely have observed, that's not the point. The point is to advance our interests, defuse potentially dangerous conflicts, and dissuade others from engaging in brinksmanship. By using "my way or the highway" language, we frequently make things worse, by eliminating the possibility of face-saving compromise.

This is fine if we're not interested in compromise, of course: If our goal is to force our adversaries into corners and then crush them, we should hector and insult to our hearts' content. But if we're actually trying to modify the behavior of foreign states, we might consider being a little more...diplomatic.

Traditional realist theories of international relations posit that states are self-interested rational actors. But "states" are governed by human beings (even vicious dictators are human). And these individuals, like all individuals, are products of their cultures, and influenced as much by ego and the expectations of those who surround them as by strictly rational cost-benefit calculations. A state can't feel insulted or humiliated, but an individual certainly can -- and at the end of the day, it's individuals, not abstractions, who determine Iranian nuclear policy and Syrian military strategy.

Summarizing recent research on negotiations and conflict resolution, psychologists Michele Gelfand, Ashley Fulmer, and Laura Severance observe that, "not surprisingly, negative emotions have generally been shown to hinder negotiations, [generating] more critical reactions and less compliance." As they suggest, this is something most of us intuitively understand (though we may find it difficult to act on). From couples counseling to corporate negotiations, it's something every good mediator knows: Compromise is far more likely when negotiators -- even those with profound disagreements over values -- treat each other with at least surface respect.

Apparently, senior U.S. diplomats neither read Machiavelli nor study negotiation theory (although there are plenty of excellent resources available should they feel inclined to remedy this lack). If they did, they might be a little less prone to declaring the behavior of foreign states "unacceptable" and "intolerable." For once senior U.S. diplomats publicly declare something "unacceptable" or "intolerable," how can any foreign leader back down without humiliation?

In the United States -- which is about as far from an honor culture as it is possible to get -- multiple about-faces are an accepted part of politics. This is far less true in many Asian, South Asian, and Middle Eastern contexts, in which "loss of face" may be considered far more devastating than loss of allies, loss of economic benefits, or even loss of life. Nonetheless, we continue to use rhetoric that backs our interlocutors into corners, instead of leaving open face-saving routes to compromise.

To be fair, this failing is not unique to U.S. diplomats. The Russians, for instance, seem similarly prone to declaring everything they don't like "unacceptable." And in the United States, it's a failing that afflicts Democratic and Republican administrations alike. Almost a decade ago, Fred Kaplan penned a devastating critique of the Bush administration's North Korea policy, which was, he argued, characterized by

"a pattern of wishful thinking, blinding moral outrage, willful ignorance of foreign cultures, a naive faith in American triumphalism [and] a contempt for the messy compromises of diplomacy."

Shrill American rhetoric continued even as crossed "red lines" were ignored and multiple opportunities for real diplomatic progress were overlooked. If this sounds familiar, it should; we're currently locked into similar destructive patterns with Iran, North Korea, and Syria.

This is not an argument for pussyfooting around. "Wisdom," observed Machiavelli, "consists of knowing how to distinguish the nature of trouble, and in choosing the lesser evil." There are plenty of acts that deserve harsh condemnation and may ultimately require a coercive response. Sometimes, conflicts are too intractable to be peacefully resolved, even by the most skillful and subtle diplomatic negotiations. Syria may well be a case in point. But the fact that some conflicts are intractable is no justification for diplomatic stupidity in all the rest.

Where's Machiavelli when you need him?

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/02/would_machiavelli_have_drawn_a_red_line_diplomacy?page=full

Don’t Break the China

We need Beijing as an ally against anarchy.

William S. Lind, 03/28/13

Much is made of the analogy between the relationship of the U.S. to China today and that of Great Britain to Imperial Germany before World War I. Just as Germany had risen quickly to become a world economic power, so has China. Germany, driven by nationalism, sought commensurate military, naval, and diplomatic power, as does China. As young powers, both Germany then and China now were sometimes brash in ways that were not in their own interest. Both challenged the dominant power at sea, though they had no pressing need to do so.

But there is another side to the analogy, one that cautions Washington. Britain handled Germany’s rise poorly. She waged aggressive war on the Boers, a people the Germans regarded as close kin, and alienated German public opinion. The Kaiser was left in the awkward position of being more pro-British than his people. In the Entente Cordiale, Britain entered into an extra-constitutional and strategically unnecessary alliance aimed at containing Germany. In 1914, while Kaiser Wilhelm II did not want war, some important Britons did, including Churchill and, disastrously, Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey.

As Washington “rebalances” its military toward Asia, we too are handling a rising power poorly. The Obama administration’s resolve to build up American air and naval forces in the Pacific can be aimed at only one country, China. Our recent offhand guarantee to Japan over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands has a chilling echo of 1914. Like Britain before World War I, we appear unwilling to countenance the natural rise of a new power; we act as if foreign policy were merely a child’s game of king of the hill. Elements in the Pentagon see a sea and air war with China as a way to recoup their failures in recent land wars, as well as justify their budgets.

What would a conservative policy toward China look like, one that proceeded from Russell Kirk’s politics of prudence? It would arise from recognition of a paradigm shift of rare historic dimensions in the grand-strategic environment. The rise of Fourth Generation war -- war waged by non-state entities -- has made conflict between states obsolete.

As this kind of war spreads across the globe, defeating one national military after another, it puts at risk the state system itself. It also defines the 21st century as one in which the decisive conflict will be between order and disorder. The state represents order, and order is conservatism’s first objective. Conservatives are on the side of the state, and a conservative foreign policy seeks above all maintenance of the state system. That in turn requires an alliance of all states, including China, against non-state forces.

It is difficult to imagine a conflict with greater potential to damage the state system than one between America and China. We are currently witnessing the consequences of the disintegration of one small state, Libya. A defeated China, its central government delegitimized by military failure, could fall into a new period of warring states. What would be the fate of order in a world in which disorder ruled more than a billion Chinese?

Avoiding this nightmare scenario and creating an effective alliance with China requires that America accept, and indeed welcome, China’s rise. A stronger China can and should assume primary responsibility for maintaining order in a growing portion of the world. Such a relief of America’s burden -- one increasingly beyond our financial strength to bear -- is in our interest. Similarly, the maintenance of order is in China’s interest, as well as congruent with fast-recovering traditional Chinese culture and Confucian values.

Conservatives’ old friend realism offers a device for bringing harmony to Chinese-American relations: spheres of influence. As China’s expands, ours can contract, within the shared framework of upholding order. One Chinese admiral jokingly proposed drawing a north-south line through the Pacific, demarcating our respective spheres of influence. We should take him up on it, and add that as China continues its rise, the line will shift.

If this proposal seems radical, it in fact reflects the way Britain accommodated a rising United States. The possibility of war between America and Britain was taken seriously by both sides well up into the 20th century. But instead of clashing, as British power weakened after World War I and, more dramatically, after World War II, London incrementally passed the task of maintaining order to the United States. Britain eventually did this even in areas she had long regarded as vital to her interests, including the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.

Just as a return to spheres of influence can replace conflict with alliance between the United States and China, so it can harmonize relations elsewhere, again with the goal of allying all states against the forces of the Fourth Generation. We should recognize Russia’s “near abroad” as her sphere of influence. We should work actively to bring Afghanistan into Pakistan’s sphere of influence. While contested spheres of influence can exacerbate conflicts, agreed spheres reduce them. By acting as an honest broker to facilitate such agreement -- including between China and Japan -- rather than joining either side, the U.S. can do more for her real interests, including her vital interest in maintaining the state system.

As the abominable snowman of foreign-policy idealism, made up of Wilsonians, globalists, and moon-gazers melts in the sun of serial failure, realism awakens from hibernation. The destruction of states in the name of “democracy” and “human rights” may not be an unmixed blessing. Results matter -- not merely intentions.

Results have not been quite this important for a bit over 350 years, since the Peace of Westphalia. The state system established by Westphalia is under assault and may fall to non-state forces, ushering in Old Night around the globe. Realism, spheres of influence, and an alliance of all states against the Fourth Generation comprise the policy prudence recommends.

William S. Lind is author of the Maneuver Warfare Handbook and director of the American Conservative Center for Public Transportation.

http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/dont-break-the-china/

Will the US Be Aced Out of A New Asian Alliance?

PATRICK SMITH, The Fiscal Times, 01/07/13

America’s closest allies in Asia are wasting no time establishing new economic and political alliances that can diminish the role of the U.S. in that region. Both Japan and South Korea are setting their own courses to an extent long considered beyond their reach. If you accept the popular premise of a “post–American era,” this is what it looks like when it arrives.

Leadership changes in Japan and South Korea prompting new economic policies focused on deficit spending and demand stimulus -- straight-ahead Keynesian economics. We are also likely to see foreign policies that ease tensions in the region. Not least, Seoul wants to revive something resembling the “sunshine policy” toward North Korea that Kim Dae-jung, the late South Korean president, first articulated 15 years ago.

The surprise of the week: North Korea’s young new leader, Kim Jong-un, has just gone on national television and called for an end to long-running hostilities toward the South along with a new, energetic focus on economic reform. If the North optsfor Chinese-style reform, it would transform the Northeast Asian region.

Washington should welcome these developments. But it is not clear how well the U.S. will manage a change in its long-dominant position in the region. As an economic bloc, Northeast Asia would be the world’s most powerful based on combined gross domestic product; competing with it will be more difficult because its trade networks will grow ever denser. On the foreign policy side, a region that can resolve its own problems will have less need for U.S. security protection.

On the face of it, Korea and Japan have just swerved rather dramatically rightward. Last month Japanese voters brought back Shinzo Abe, a mainstay in the conservative Liberal Democratic Party, for a second turn as prime minister. In Korea, the president-elect is Park Geun-hye, the nation’s first female leader and long a member of the right-wing Grand National Party, which she has refashioned the New Frontier Party.

Both of these figures have interesting bloodlines. Abe is the grandson of Nobusuke Kishi, a wartime cabinet minister, an accused war criminal, prime minister during the late–1950s, and a corrupt backroom power among Liberal Democrats for the remainder of his life. Park is the daughter of Park Chung-hee, who led a military coup in 1961 and ruled Korea until his intelligence chief assassinated him at the dinner table 18 years later.

You would think leaders of this stripe -- ardently nationalist, favorable to big business and heavy industry -- would stand for a tough line toward China, an even tougher line toward North Korea, and economic policies that reflect the neoliberal orthodoxies Americans still consider fashionable.

Between Seoul and Tokyo, Park and Abe seem unlikely candidates to resolve conflicting claims over a pile of rocks in the Sea of Japan -- the Dokdo Islands to Koreans, Takeshima to the Japanese -- and longstanding differences as to the record of Japan’s colonization of Korea from 1910 until 1945.

These are perfectly plausible assumptions, except that they are already proving wrong.

Even before his election Abe had announced a $118 billion stimulus package intended to finance public works, create jobs, and spur investment. The Bank of Japan, which has suffered a rough wrestling match with Abe in recent days, will finance the plan with its printing presses. The Bank of Japan will also (and reluctantly) raise its inflation target to 2 percent.

The early results are encouraging. The yen is weakening (and exports will thus rise). The dollar has already hit a two and a half year high against the Japanese currency. This could prove a burden to American exporters contributing to the U.S. recovery.

But “Abenomics,” as some call the prime minister’s strategy, is dicey. Japan already carries a gross debt equivalent to 200 percent of gross domestic product -- the world’s highest ratio. Abe is unfazed. “It has to be different from the traditional methods,” he said of his economic policy on Japanese television. “Different” is too mild a term. Heretically enough, Abe has effectively signaled his low regard for the neoliberal fiction of central-bank independence, and one could not applaud more vigorously.

It has been interesting to watch Abe pre– and post-election as he addressed foreign policy questions. He leaned on his rigorously nationalist reputation during the campaign, laying strong claim to a group of islands Tokyo and Beijing dispute, criticizing South Korea for a similar maritime claim, and denouncing North Korea’s launch of a long-range ballistic missile last month.

Instantly after the election he shifted ground, stressing the prospects for cooperation with both of Japan’s neighbors. He did the same thing when he was first elected in 2006. He breathed fire on the China question back then; three weeks after taking office he was in Beijing making nice. Abe, plainly, is a master of the Nixon-in-China strategy: Cultivate strong conservative credentials and innovate on difficult diplomatic and security questions.

You find a variation on the theme in Seoul. Park has promised to reduce the influence of the very industrial combines -- the famous chaebol -- that her father relied on to produce Korea’s “miracle” years. She wants to make more room in the economy for small businesses and spend from the public treasury to bring along those Koreans the miracle left behind. Park also proposes to restart long-moribund talks North Korea.

As interesting as these events are for the Japanese and the Koreans, they are important for Americans, too.

The Asian financial crisis back in the late–1990s saw the heavy sway of American-style neoliberalism in countries (including Korea and Japan) that were suddenly in trouble. The ideological brawls proliferated among Asian bureaucrats, visiting Treasury officials, and the multilateral organizations. In many cases “market fundamentalism,” as a Japanese official termed Western policy prescriptions, won the day.

Abe and Park, two credentialed conservatives, change that paradigm. Their policies, so far as they are realized, respond to the conditions that surround them, not someone else’s imported ideological axe.

The same is true with regard to the region’s security. A decade ago, Bush administration officials such as John Bolton, Washington’s obstreperous U.N. ambassador, called for aggressive action against North Korea. When the Chinese intercepted a U.S. spy plane in April 2001, mistrust and suspicion prevailed, although the incident was handled so that neither country lost face.

We can see now that Asia’s problems are Asian and require Asian solutions. Washington is simply not equipped to intervene indisputes that involve centuries of history, pride, and tradition. It is not what Asia needs or wants. If talks with North Korea recommence, Beijing and Seoul will lead them, not Washington.

The Obama administration appears to understand the moment better than one would have thought. After Pyongyang’s missile test, Washington’s population of hawks on North Korea began their familiar drone: Isolate Pyongyang, more and tougher sanctions. The White House’s formal response was so muted as to be nearly nonexistent. “I think we still have to assess just exactly what happened here,” Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said on CNN.

What could be truer as Americans look across the Pacific?

http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2013/01/07/Will-the-US-Be-Aced-Out-of-a-New-Asian-Alliance.aspx#page1

Obama faces familiar world of problems in 2nd term

BRADLEY KLAPPER and MATTHEW LEE | Associated Press, 11/08/12

WASHINGTON (AP) — Now that his re-election is secured, President Barack Obama has a freer hand to deal with a world of familiar problems in fresh ways, from toughening America's approach to Iran and Syria while potentially engaging other repressive countries such as Cuba and North Korea and refocusing on moribund Middle East peace efforts.

The first tweaks in his Iran policy could come within weeks, officials said.

But a pressing task for Obama will be to assign a new team to carry out his national security agenda. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has announced her plans to retire but could stay a few weeks past January to help the administration as it reshuffles personnel. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta is likely to depart shortly after her. CIA Director Gen. David Petraeus is expected to stay on.

The favorite to succeed Clinton, U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice, would face a difficult Senate confirmation process after her much-maligned explanations of the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, meaning she could land instead as Obama's national security adviser. That job that doesn't require the Senate's approval. Tom Donilon, who currently holds that position, and Chuck Hagel, a former Republican senator, are among the other contenders.

The chances of another early favorite, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry, are hampered by Democrats' fear that Republican Scott Brown, who lost his Massachusetts Senate seat Tuesday, could win Kerry's seat in a race to replace him.

Officials, however, are pointing to Jon Huntsman, the former Utah governor, Obama's ambassador to China and Republican presidential candidate, and the State Department's current No. 2, William Burns.

Huntsman is still widely respected by the administration even if he'd hoped to unseat Obama. Choosing Huntsman would allow the president to claim bipartisanship while putting an Asia expert in the job at a time when the U.S. is focusing more attention on the world's most populous continent. Burns would be an option as caretaker secretary until postelection passions in Congress subside and a permanent replacement might face smoother confirmation. He is a career diplomat who has no political baggage and would be unlikely to stir significant opposition among lawmakers.

At the Pentagon, speculation about successors has been limited. Panetta's deputy, Ashton Carter, is seen as a possibility, along with Michele Flournoy, who served as Defense Department policy chief from 2009-12 and would be the first woman in the top job.

New Cabinet members will enter at a time of various global security challenges, from the Arab Spring to China's rapid economic and military expansion in Asia. But the president's escape from any future campaigning also offers unique diplomatic opportunities, which Obama himself hinted at in March when he told then-Russian president and current prime minister Dmitry Medvedev that he'd have "more flexibility" on thorny issues after the election.

Obama's immediate predecessors, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, used their second terms to launch major, though ultimately unsuccessful initiatives for an Israeli-Palestinian accord, an elusive goal that Obama also deeply desires. This summer he listed the lack of progress toward peace among the biggest disappointments of his presidency so far, suggesting another U.S. attempt in the offing.

Clinton's Camp David negotiations and Bush's Annapolis process became signature foreign policy priorities in 2000 and 2007. But the Israelis and the Palestinians remain as far apart as ever on the contours of an agreement, from the borders of their two separate states to issues related to refugees and resources.

Any Obama-led plan for the Middle East will be complicated by Israel's fears about the Iranian nuclear program, civil war in nearby Syria and the new reality of an Islamist-led Egypt having replaced America's most faithful Arab ally. Obama's difficult relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could also complicate the process.

With Iran, the president is holding out hope that crippling economic sanctions will force the Islamic republic's leaders to scale back its uranium enrichment activity. Iran insists its program is designed for energy and medical research purposes, even as many in the West fear the ultimate goal is to produce nuclear weapons. Obama has stressed the narrowing time frame for Tehran to negotiate a peaceful solution to the standoff, while pressing Israel to hold off on any plans for a pre-emptive strike.

Officials say the administration is likely to adjust its two-track approach to Iran — which offers Tehran rewards for coming clean on its nuclear program and harsher penalties for continued defiance — in the coming weeks. Details are still being debated. In the end, however, Obama may have to resort to a military strategy if Iran continues to enrich uranium at higher levels and nears production of weapons-grade material — a possible scenario he acknowledges.

"The clock is ticking. We're not going to allow Iran to perpetually engage in negotiations that lead nowhere," Obama said in his last foreign policy debate with Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney. "We have a sense of when they would get breakout capacity, which means that we would not be able to intervene in time to stop their nuclear program."

Syria's widening conflict is another concern. More than 36,000 people have died in the last 20 months, as a brutal crackdown on dissent by President Bashar Assad's regime has descended into a full-scale civil war. Obama has demanded Assad's departure, yet has ruled out military assistance to the rebels or American military actions such as airstrikes or enforcing a no-fly zone over Syria.

Last week, in a significant shift in policy, the secretary of state demanded a major shakeup in the opposition's ranks in the hopes of rallying Syrians behind the rebellion. However, Clinton's spokeswoman, Victoria Nuland, reiterated Wednesday the administration still rejects the notion of providing weapons to anti-Assad fighters or any talk of armed intervention.

In other places, Obama's engagement efforts may get another look. After some success with a rapidly liberalizing Myanmar, there are hopes for democratic reforms and human rights advances in Cuba and North Korea, among others.

But short of a rapid change in attitude from these governments, Obama's options for a landmark breakthrough in U.S. diplomacy are limited. He won't be able to reach out to Havana until it frees the jailed U.S. contractor Alan Gross, while Pyongyang will have to denuclearize if it wants better relations with America — steps neither regime has shown a willingness to entertain. The recent re-election of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has halted chances for now of any rapprochement between Washington and Caracas.

In Afghanistan, the president will seek to stick to NATO's 2014 withdrawal date for most international troops, a central campaign promise. His administration has been trying unsuccessfully to jump-start peace negotiations between President Hamid Karzai's Western-backed government and the Taliban. The so-called reconciliation effort relies heavily on America's frustrating and unreliable ally Pakistan, where extremist groups such as al-Qaida and the Haqqani network will continue to face U.S. drone attacks.

Behind all the diplomatic efforts are larger questions of American geopolitical strategy. Obama had initial success improving U.S. relations with Russia, getting a nuclear arms-reduction pact in 2011, but has since seen America's former Cold War foe frustrate U.S. missile defense plans and hopes of an international consensus on Syria. The president has continued to trumpet the benefits of his Russia "reset" policy but may take a firmer stance against Moscow if it refuses to show compromise.

For economic reasons, China policy is less likely to change. The world's two biggest economies are deeply interdependent and, despite lingering disagreements over Beijing's currency exchange rates and intellectual property infringement, neither side will want to do anything that threatens a trade war and jeopardizes China's booming growth or America's still-fragile jobs recovery.

Associated Press writers Donna Cassata, Robert Burns and Kimberly Dozier contributed to this report.

The All-Powerful President：And four other lies we tell ourselves about foreign policy.

MICAH ZENKO, 10/23/12

Throughout the U.S. presidential campaign, Republican and Democratic political operatives have strived to articulate major foreign-policy distinctions between President Barack Obama and former Gov. Mitt Romney. Several close foreign-policy watchers, however, have struggled to identify any such differences.

The final presidential debate on Oct. 22 finally cemented what has been apparent to many over the course of the campaign: Neither Romney nor Obama wants to discuss foreign-policy issues because they don't matter to prospective voters, and there are no substantive distinctions about how either candidate would deal with prominent issues such as Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, and targeted killings via drones. The only potential variation is that Romney has promised massive defense budget increases, but his advisors admitthat they would "very much depend on the state of the economy."

On a deeper level than specific countries or issues, there are five core principles of U.S. foreign policy that are widely held on both sides of the aisle. These principles underscore how presidents -- Republican and Democrat alike -- conceive of the U.S. foreign-policymaking apparatus, their role as the chief executive officer, and the responsibility of the United States in the world. However, these principles also rest on shaky ground and often undermine U.S. national interests because they reflect a profound misunderstanding of policymaking and how the rest of the world views the United States.

Regardless of who resides in the White House on Jan. 21, 2013, you can assume that he, his senior advisors, and his partisan commentariat allies will believe the following five precepts.

First, the U.S. intelligence community (IC) should have total omniscience over global events, including the precognitive ability to perfectly forecast any malicious behavior by potential adversaries. The IC is a sprawling network of roughly 210,000 civilian and military employees, 30,000 private contractors, and 17 agencies. With a budget of $75 billion for the national and military intelligence programs, the IC is expected to provide warning of national security threats and challenges to policymakers that is timely, accurate, and easily condensed into a one-page memo.

For policymakers who expect the impossible from the IC, intelligence doesn't merely "fail," but fails spectacularly in ways that are routinely described as "catastrophic," "colossal," or "massive." To be repeatedly shocked by the IC's inability to flawlessly warn about the behavior of malicious actors is to misunderstand how such information is generated. As the director of national intelligence, James Clapper, statedthis month about the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya:

“The challenge is always a tactical warning, the exact insights ahead of time that such an attack is going to take place.… If people don't behave and emit a behavior or talk or do something else ahead of time, and if you don't detect it, then it's going to be very hard to predict and come up with an exact tactical warning that you need.”

But blaming the IC allows policymakers to hide behind such allegedly predictable failures. As John Maynard Keynes remarked:

"There is nothing a Government hates more than to be well-informed; for it makes the process of arriving at decisions much more complicated and difficult."

The IC is tasked to provide specific information and analytical judgments in order for the executive and congressional branches to construct informed policies.

Second, policymakers have the ability to fully understand the beliefs and motivations of U.S. friends and enemies. During the vice-presidential debate, for example, Rep. Paul Ryan and Vice President Joe Biden arrived at the bipartisan consensus that they could read the mind of the Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Ryan:

"Let's look at this from the view of the ayatollahs. What do they see?… They see President Obama in New York City the same day Bibi Netanyahu is, and instead of meeting with him goes on a daily talk show."

Biden:

"Let me tell you what the ayatollah sees. The ayatollah sees his economy being crippled. The ayatollah sees that there are 50 percent fewer exports of oil."

Likewise, in the final presidential debate, Romney and Obama both described how China, Israel, participants in Iran's Green Revolution, and the "42 allies" perceive the United States.

It is, of course, delusional to believe that policymakers sitting in Washington know how foreign leaders or protesters marching through Tehran perceive the United States. Moreover, policymakers do not even believe they possess clairvoyance: You can tell this by the fact that no policymaker ever claims to see through the eyes of friends or adversaries when that perspective runs counter to whatever argument the policymaker is trying to make.

Third, the president is directly responsible and should be held fully accountable for whatever successes or failures occur during his term in office. After Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told several journalists on Oct. 15, "I take responsibility" for the Benghazi attack, moderator Candy Crowley asked Obama during the second presidential debate,

"Does the buck stop with your secretary of state?"

Obama replied: "[Clinton] works for me. I'm the president. And I'm always responsible."

Of course, 2.8 million executive branch federal employees also work for Obama.

In part, the mindset articulated by Crowley stems from a small sign that President Harry Truman kept on his desk in the Oval Office that read, "The BUCK STOPS here!" As historians point out, Truman was referring only to decisions that reached his desk, rather than everything that happened within his administration. (Interesting historical fact: The reverse side of his sign read "I'm from MISSOURI." What would we think about presidential accountability if Truman had simply turned it around?)

In practice, presidents have only one significant power that they can exercise unilaterally -- albeit with less and less oversight from a disinterested Congress -- the use of military force. That the U.S. military's capabilities are an awesome resource for one person to behold assuredly explains why presidents increasingly seek tactical military solutions to enduring foreign-policy challenges (see drones, targeted killings, and al Qaeda). In fact, though Congress has not declared war since June 1942 against Bulgaria, over 100,000 U.S. service members have died in wars since World War II.

However, when you consider the major foreign-policy objectives of recent presidents -- such as the serial promise to make America energy independent -- almost none can be solved by the president alone. In reality, the president can use force, provide strategic guidance, and make executive decisions that are implemented by those who serve in his administration, but he is not an action officer with a 6,000-mile-long screwdriver.

Fourth, the ultimate currency in world affairs is the ill-defined concepts of strength and credibility. Last weekend, Romney's foreign-policy spokesperson stated,

"Romney's foreign-policy doctrine is he will do whatever it takes to make America stronger."

The following day, Ryan vowed:

"Peace through strength is not just a slogan. It's not just something we say; it's what we do. It's our doctrine."

Set aside the image of Uncle Sam building muscle through one of Ryan's P90X workouts; what is left unsaid is what grand strategy such strength would be marshaled to achieve or how Romney's foreign-policy objectives ultimately differ from Obama's.

Likewise, the president boasted during the final debate about

"how we've restored American credibility and strength around the world"

and how his administration's

"credibility is precisely why we've been able to show leadership on a wide range of issues facing the world right now."

The Obama administration has played a leadership role in coordinating more effective multilateral approaches to things like the Nuclear Security Summit and the sanctions regime on Iran. The willing participation of other countries, however, is not due to the size of the U.S. military or the Obama administration's credibility -- which has only diminished throughout the world in the past three years --but because it was in their own self-interest to do so.

We know from recent history that America's "strength" -- crudely defined by politicians and the media as defense spending -- and threats do not compel others to do what Washington wants. Most countries balance against threats, form coalitions to mitigate threatening behavior, or remain neutral nonparticipants whenever Washington demands they do something, rather than jump on the U.S. bandwagon. Moreover, as international relations scholar Daryl Press demonstrated, credibility is not determined by reputations that are earned through past behavior, but by the power and national interests associated with a current challenge.

Finally, the world is wet clay and America is its eager sculptor. From Republicans, this belief was best captured by an off-the-cuff comment by a senior Bush administration official to reporter Ron Suskind in the summer of 2002:

“[Some people] believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.… That's not the way the world really works anymore. We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality -- judiciously, as you will -- we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors.”

Romney often repeats his conviction that it is a duty, honor, privilege, and responsibility of the United States to shape and lead the world because of a "longing for American leadership." This week, Romney advisor Eliot A. Cohen claimed:

"If you don't even try to shape events, then for sure you are going to get a bad outcome."

Democrats conceive of America's shaping role for slightly different outcomes, but the eagerness to take on this global chore is the same. Before the Democratic National Convention, Sen. John Kerry declared,

"Global leadership is a strategic imperative for America, not a favor we do for other countries."

Or, as Obama told a private audience in May:

“The truth is, as we travel everywhere, we continue to be the agenda setters. Folks continue to look to us.… We continue to be the one indispensable nation. And because we project it with our values and our ideals, and restored a sense of rule of law, people are paying attention, people are listening, and people are hungry for our leadership.”

This is not the world I see. When I travel and speak to admittedly lower-level officials, I do not hear a global craving for U.S. involvement and influence. What I hear constantly is a desire for clarity over U.S. policies toward a specific country or issue, such as climate change, the Middle East peace process, or the Arab Spring. Furthermore, when not seeking clarity, foreign officials expound on the vast hypocrisy in how the United States treats some countries versus others. When foreign governments and their citizens publicly express a desire for U.S. leadership, and when it is in the U.S. national interest to act on that desire, the United States should play a central role. Yet, more often than not, American policymakers would be better off doing nothing

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/23/the_all_powerful_president