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可能改變中國的四個事件 -- P. R. Gregory
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Four Shocks That Could Change China
Paul Roderick Gregory, 04/29/12
In the past four months, the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) has experienced four shocks that could materially affect, if not eventually end, its “leading role” in Chinese society.
First, on December 13 of last year, a mob of villagers forced out local party leaders and the police and took control of the town of Wukan. Enraged by illegal land grabs and police brutality, the villagers installed their own representatives after gaining concessions from national authorities. The Wukan uprising is symbolic of the two hundred thousand mass protests reported for 2010. (烏崁村事件)
Second, on February 27, a key government think tank issued its China 2030 report in conjunction with the World Bank. Rapid growth could only be sustained, the report argued, by giving free rein to the private sector and ending the preferential treatment of the state economy: The role of the government “needs to change fundamentally” from running the state sector to creating a rule of law and the other accoutrements of a market economy. A month later (on March 28), the state council approved a financial reform pilot experiment to legalize private financial institutions and allow private citizens to invest abroad. (中國政府智庫和世銀公佈中國2030展望 -- 本城市有相關報導)
China 2030 is an open warning that China’s vaunted state capitalism model cannot sustain growth and usher China to the next level. A faltering economy would pose an imminent threat to the CPC’s claim to its leading role.
Third, on April 10, charismatic regional party leader, Bo Xilai, was fired as party boss of Chongqing and expelled from the Politburo. Bo Xilai embodied the party faction favoring state-led economic development and Maoist ideology. Bo’s status as the son of one of China’s “Eight Immortals” did not save him from charges of political deviation and corruption. Bo’s influential wife was arrested under suspicion of murder of an English business associate. (薄熙來事件)
Fourth, on April 27, blind dissident and noted civil rights lawyer, Chen Guangcheng, evaded the security guards guarding his house in his home village and made it to Beijing, where he gained refuge in the U.S. embassy. Guangcheng’s escape shows the sophistication, dedication, and coordination abilities of the dissident community and is an embarrassment to the CPC and its security forces. (陳光誠事件)
From the relative safety of the U.S. Embassy, Guangcheng can inform the Chinese people of their constitutional rights and the world community of the beatings and torture he and his family suffered on orders from the CPC. The U.S. Embassy can express its concerns over his charges of human rights abuse without directly involving itself in internal Chinese politics.
These four shocks took place against the backdrop of the looming Eighteenth Party Congress. The Congress of 2270 delegates will elect the Central Committee and appoint the coveted standing committee of the Politburo and the party General Secretary, who also holds the title of President.
Party Congresses do not take place until their orchestration is complete. There is no exact date set for the Congress, other than late 2012. In the USSR, Stalin waited to hold party congresses until all his ducks were lined up in a row. The CPC apparently has some more finishing touches to complete.
USSR power struggles occurred when an aged leader died. Deng Xiaoping insisted on mandatory term limits to spare China geriatric and unstable leaders, bereft of new ideas and prone to irrationalities (such as Mao and his Cultural Revolution). Two of the four shocks show that regular turnover breeds regular power struggles. China 2030 and the Bo Xilai case are manifestations of the ongoing power struggle that is taking place amidst a background of civil unrest.
Public acceptance of the party’s leading role requires belief in the image of party harmony and unity. Why give all power to a monopoly party torn apart by competing factions? Perhaps Bo Xilai has the answers, not Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao? Stalin and his successors went to extraordinary lengths to conceal factional disputes. Bo Xilai’s public humiliation serves as a warning to his sympathizers but at the price of revealing the party’s confusion and disunity.
Bo Xilai’s demotion was not supposed to happen in this way. Bo Xilai’s assignment to the backwater Chongqing was intended to put him out to a quiet pasture. Term-limited leaders feared his ambition, his “leftist Chongqing model.” Bo Xilai’s enforcer’s spectacular flight to the U.S. Consulate and Bo’s wife’s arrest on murder charges lent drama, but other excuses would have been found to get rid of him.
Bo Xilai’s removal on the eve of a party congress is nothing new. The party boss of Shanghai was sentenced to eighteen years in prison on charges of financial fraud and corruption to clear the way for the current leadership prior to the Seventeenth Party Congress. A similar fate awaits Bo Xilai and many of his followers – a worse fate perhaps awaits his wife.
The CPC’s social compact calls for the party to orchestrate rapid growth and rising living standards in return for public acceptance of its political monopoly and repression of doubters and dissidents. China 2030 and the Bo Xilai case make clear that the party’s factions disagree on how to fulfill this compact. Bo Xilai’s sinking forces stand for the “state advance, private sector retreat” policy of a close alliance between state enterprises and banks and the party. China 2030 and its “liberal” supporters propose to privatize or otherwise rationalize state enterprise, break the state banking monopoly, and place the private sector on an equal footing.
Dismantling or weakening China’s national “Chongqing model” is more easily said than done, as the expression goes. In an understated tone, China 2030 warns that it will “require strong leadership and commitment, steady implementation with a determined will… that will ensure public support…and oversight of the reform process.” In more direct language: Any attack on China’s state-party alliance will be met with the stiffest of resistance by vested-interest groups.
China 2030 requires a delicate balancing act by its “liberal” supporters. They, like their “conservative” opponents, have freely fed at the trough of China’s state capitalism. Even the most conscientious, such as the revered premier “Grandpa” Wen, have not restrained their children, friends, and relatives from amassing huge fortunes. Those less sensitive collect their tributes directly. Party connections have made poor China a land of 115 billionaires.
That the liberals are prepared to break with the state capitalism model so admired in the West suggests they know something we do not.
Few Western observers understand that China’s growth comes from the private sector, not from the national champions run by party-affiliated state capitalists. Starting from virtually zero in 1980, private enterprise has grown to at least half of GDP. The private sector has grown at least three times faster than the state sector. Studies show that private enterprises are at least twice as productive as state enterprises despite enormous handicaps from Chinese officialdom.
The Wukan uprising helps explain why CPC liberals, who themselves have financially benefited from state capitalism, embrace China 2030. They fear the backlash of ordinary people who experience the demands for bribes, arbitrary treatment, illegal land grabs, denials of licenses, and other demeaning harassment inflicted on them by indifferent officials, who appear to be immune from punishment.
Public outrage and a new inspiring voice speaking from the U.S. embassy create a tinderbox that a spark could ignite. For the CPC, dissident Guangcheng’s escape could not have come at a worse time.
The public revelations of the Bo Xilai case add fuel to China’s tinderbox. Earlier, ordinary Chinese believed that corruption was a local affair. Their mayor or police chief may be corrupt but at least the stalwart party leaders in Beijing want the best for the country. Just as the victims of Stalin’s Great Terror appealed to Stalin to save them, the villagers of Wukan placed their trust in higher party officials. Now they learn through the internet and even Politburo members are as crooked as the local officials who just shook them down.
The CPC leaders may simply be paying lip service to China 2030 to cement their power base. But if they are serious, how in the world can they implement this “radical” change in course?
Mikhail Gorbachev’s USSR of 1987 commends itself as a historical parallel with the same ingredients. Gorbachev had warnings that the planning system had failed. He was pestered by dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov. He was aware of official corruption, albeit at a much lower scale than today’s China. His KGB brutally suppressed the occasional riot, but Gorbachev knew that higher bread prices could bring people to the street. As a reformer, he was opposed by conservative party heavy weights who wanted the system continued. Gorbachev succeeded in destroying state planning and inadvertently the party, but his economic reform failed and the USSR collapsed.
Clearly CPC leaders are not fighting for power to preside over collapse. They intend to strengthen their power by elevating the more-productive private sector while somehow convincing the party elite to sacrifice wealth “for the good of the country.” Such appeals usually fall flat.
We are inept at foreseeing big changes, such as the Soviet collapse or the Arab Spring. Major changes often fail by narrow margins. China might be democratic today if Tiananmen Square had played out differently. Vladimir Putin might not be president of Russia today if the December weather had been warmer or if his police had killed demonstrators at Bolotnaya Square.
The leaders of the CPC are trying to avoid a constellation of events that increase the likelihood of dramatic change. The CPC leadership understands that it could happen, and they are afraid.
Paul Roderick Gregory’s latest book, ”Politics, Murder, and Love in Stalin’s Kremlin: The Story of Nikolai Bukharin and Anna Larina, ” can be found at amazon.com.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2012/04/29/four-shocks-that-could-change-china/
本文於 修改第 4 次
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陳光誠抵美 - K. Matthews
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Chinese activist who fled house arrest lands in US
KAREN MATTHEWS, 05/20/12
NEW YORK (AP) — A blind Chinese legal activist who was suddenly allowed to leave the country arrived in the United State on Saturday, ending a nearly monthlong diplomatic tussle that had tested U.S.-China relations.
Chen Guangcheng had been hurriedly taken from a hospital hours earlier and put on a plane for the U.S. after Chinese authorities suddenly told him to pack and prepare to leave. He arrived Saturday evening at Newark Liberty International Airport and was whisked to New York City, where he will be staying.
Dressed in a white shirt and khaki pants and using crutches, his right leg in a cast, Chen was greeted with cheers when he arrived at the apartment in Manhattan's Greenwich Village where he will live with his family. The complex houses faculty and graduate students of New York University, where Chen is expected to attend law school.
"For the past seven years, I have never had a day's rest," he said through a translator, "so I have come here for a bit of recuperation for body and in spirit."
Chen urged the crowd to fight against injustice, and thanked the U.S. and Chinese governments, along with the embassies of Switzerland, Canada and France.
"After much turbulence, I have come out of Shandong," he said, referring to the Chinese province where he was under house arrest. The U.S. has granted him partial citizenship rights, he said.
Chen gave a short statement, which was greeted by cheers in Mandarin and English, but did not take questions from reporters.
The departure of Chen, his wife and two children to the United States marked the conclusion of nearly a month of uncertainty and years of mistreatment by local authorities for the self-taught activist.
After seven years of prison and house arrest, Chen made a daring escape from his rural village in April and was given sanctuary inside the U.S. Embassy, triggering a diplomatic standoff over his fate. With Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in Beijing for annual high-level discussions, officials struck a deal that let Chen walk free, only to see him have second thoughts. That forced new negotiations that led to an agreement to send him to the U.S. to study law, a goal of his, at New York University.
"Thousands of thoughts are surging to my mind," Chen said before he left China. His concerns, he said, included whether authorities would retaliate for his negotiated departure by punishing his relatives left behind. It also was unclear whether the government will allow him to return.
In New York, he said China had promised him protection of his rights as a citizen there.
"I am very gratified to see that the Chinese government has been dealing with the situation with restraint and calm, and I hope to see that they continue to open discourse and earn the respect and trust of the people."
Chen's expected attendance at New York University comes from his association with Jerome Cohen, a law professor there who advised Chen while he was in the U.S. Embassy. The two met when Chen came to the United States on a State Department program in 2003, and Cohen has been staunch advocate for him since.
"I'm very happy at the news that he's on his way and I look forward to welcoming him and his family tonight and to working with him on his course of study," Cohen said.
Before he left China, Chen asked his supporters and others in the activist community for their understanding of his desire to leave the front lines of the rights struggle in China.
"I am requesting a leave of absence, and I hope that they will understand," he said.
State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland praised the quiet negotiations that freed him.
"We also express our appreciation for the manner in which we were able to resolve this matter and to support Mr. Chen's desire to study in the U.S. and pursue his goals," Nuland said in a statement.
The White House also said it was pleased with the outcome of negotiations.
China's Foreign Ministry said it had no comment. The government's news agency, Xinhua, issued a brief report saying that Chen "has applied for study in the United States via normal channels in line with the law."
Chen's supporters welcomed his departure. "This is great progress," said U.S.-based rights activist Bob Fu. "It's a victory for freedom fighters."
The 40-year-old Chen is emblematic of a new breed of activists that the Communist Party finds threatening. Often from rural and working-class families, these "rights defenders," as they are called, are unlike the students and intellectuals from the elite academies and major cities of previous democracy movements and thus could potentially appeal to ordinary Chinese.
Chen gained recognition for crusading for the disabled and for farmers' rights and fighting against forced abortions in his rural community. That angered local officials, who seemed to wage a personal vendetta against him, convicting him in 2006 on what his supporters say were fabricated charges and then holding him for the past 20 months in illegal house arrest.
Even with the backstage negotiations, Chen's departure came hastily. Chen spent the last 2 1/2 weeks in a hospital for the foot he broke escaping house arrest. Only on Wednesday did Chinese authorities help him complete the paperwork needed for his passport.
Chen said by telephone Saturday that he was informed at the hospital just before noon to pack his bags to leave. Officials did not give him and his family passports or inform them of their flight details until after they got to the airport.
Seeming ambivalent, Chen said that he was "not happy" about leaving and that he had a lot on his mind, including worries about retaliation against his extended family back home. His nephew, Chen Kegui, is accused of attempted murder after he allegedly used a kitchen knife to attack officials who stormed his house after discovering Chen Guangcheng was missing.
"I hope that the government will fulfill the promises it made to me, all of its promises," Chen said. Such promises included launching an investigation into abuses against him and his family in Shandong province, he said before the phone call was cut off.
Much as Chen has said he wants return to China, it remains uncertain whether the Chinese government would bar him, as they have done with many exiled activists.
"Chen's departure for the U.S. does not and should not in any way mark a 'mission accomplished' moment for the U.S. government," said Phelim Kine, a senior Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch. "The harder, longer-term part is ensuring his right under international law to return to China when he sees fit."
Associated Press Writers Didi Tang, Gillian Wong and Charles Hutzler in Beijing, Andrew Duffelmeyer in Newark, N.J., and Matthew Lee in Washington, and videojournalist Annie Ho in Beijing contributed to this report.
http://news.yahoo.com/chinese-activist-fled-house-arrest-lands-us-223627497.html
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陳光誠赴美途中 - R. Saiget
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Blind China activist leaves for US with family
Robert Saiget, AFP, 05/19/12
Blind Chinese activist Chen Guangcheng was on a plane headed for the United States with his family Saturday, US officials said, ending weeks of uncertainty for the now world-famous rights campaigner.
Chen's escape from house arrest, turning up at the US embassy before leaving again, also caused a major diplomatic rift between Washington and Beijing, with China telling the US to keep its nose out of Chinese affairs.
"We can confirm that Chen Guangcheng, his wife and two children have departed China and are en route to the United States so he can pursue studies at an American university," the US State Department's spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said in a statement.
The departure of Chen, 40, caps an odyssey that began a month ago when he fled his rural home for the US mission in Beijing and later said he wanted to leave China for his and his family's safety.
Chen had been told earlier in the day at short notice to pack his belongings and leave the Beijing hospital where he had been waiting for more than two weeks for permission to depart from China, taking his young family with him.
Once at the Beijing airport, Chen, his wife and two young children received the passports enabling their departure, he told a friend.
The United Airlines flight for New York believed to be carrying Chen and his family was originally scheduled at 3:45pm (0745 GMT) but left at about 6:00 pm, according to airport staff.
Jiang Tianyong, a close friend of Chen's, said the "barefoot", or self-taught, lawyer had mixed feelings about leaving his home country.
"He seemed to be reluctant to leave and didn't consider it the optimal solution, even though he agreed that it was the best he could do to ensure his personal safety," Jiang, also a lawyer, told AFP.
Chen fled his closely guarded village home in the eastern province of Shandong on April 22 under the noses of plain-clothes security officers, with help from supporters.
In a video address to China's Premier Wen Jiabao that was posted online, Chen said he had suffered repeated beatings while under house arrest since 2010, and expressed serious concerns for his wife and family.
He pitched up at the US embassy in Beijing, less than a week before US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was due to visit China for one of the most important Sino-US meetings of the year.
Chinese and American diplomats scrambled to find a solution, and reached an initial agreement under which Chen would stay in China under less severe conditions.
Chen left the embassy but regretted it almost immediately, telling journalists that he now wanted to go to the United States. China later relented, saying he could apply to go abroad like every other Chinese citizen.
Chen, who has been invited to study law at New York University, was in touch Wednesday with Chinese officials, who told him they planned to give him a passport within 15 days.
In the event it was much quicker.
"We are looking forward to his arrival in the United States later today," Nuland, of the US State Department, said.
"We also express our appreciation for the manner in which we were able to resolve this matter and to support Mr Chen's desire to study in the US and pursue his goals."
One of China's best-known activists, Chen has won plaudits for investigating rights abuses including forced sterilisations and late-term abortions under China's "one-child" family planning policy, for which he served a jail term.
Bob Fu, the head of US-based organisation ChinaAid and a supporter of Chen, issued a statement thanking both the US and Chinese governments for making it possible for Chen and his family to leave.
"ChinaAid and the Chen family deeply appreciate the international community's tireless efforts to gain his freedom, including both the efforts of the US embassy and the US Congress, who held two timely hearings on his behalf," the statement said.
"Chen also wanted to express his gratitude to the Chinese government, who fulfiled one of its promises to allow his family to leave."
New York-based Human Rights Watch said it was "relieved" that Chen had been allowed to leave China, but said it was no time to declare a "mission accomplished".
"The US government and other foreign governments need to redouble their efforts to seek the protection of those relatives, friends and supporters of Chen Guangcheng who remain in China and are vulnerable to unlawful official reprisals merely due to their association with Chen and support for his cause," it said.
http://news.yahoo.com/china-activist-chen-guangcheng-says-beijing-airport-055709024.html
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徒勞無功之維穩大軍 - E. C. Economy
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China’s Little Dutch Boy
Elizabeth C. Economy, 05/10/12
China’s public security apparatus and all its friends in the propaganda and censorship departments must be exhausted--I know that I am exhausted just trying to keep up with them. Within the past month, they have had to figure out what to do about a blind political activist who escaped from illegal house arrest and traveled hundreds of miles to Beijing to take refuge in the American Embassy. They have had to keep an eye on 300 million Chinese micro-bloggers to determine who might have crossed a line here or there as the weibosphere has gone nuts over tales of leadership corruption and Chen Guangcheng’s harrowing journey. And they have had to keep watch over all those pesky foreign journalists who have had the temerity to practice actual journalism. Then, of course, there is the 800 pound gorilla--mapping out a strategy for managing the investigation and subsequent trials of former Politburo member Bo Xilai and his wife, Gu Kailai, who have been charged with “serious disciplinary infractions” and murder respectively.
But with all of this effort, what have they really achieved? No doubt those whose job it is to block and stop have a lot of resources at their disposal--chief among them is an internal security budget that exceeds the country’s defense budget. When they tell China’s Internet providers to shut down a micro-blog or two, the servers do it. One popular micro-blogger, whose account was blocked in recent weeks, said in an interview with the South China Morning Post [paywall], “The closure was not carried out by Sina.com voluntarily…but I am not shocked by the decision, given that anything can happen in the country.” Whatever the intention behind closing down his blog, clearly he has not been deterred from speaking out. The security apparatus also helped take care of one foreign journalist, Melissa Chan, by blocking the renewal of her visa; it’s not clear whether this came as a result of her work or the reporting by some of her Al-Jazeera colleagues. Whatever the case, China pays a stiff price for this kind of behavior. It’s tough to promote your soft power when you don’t let people into your country to write about you. The toughest nut, however, has yet to be cracked: how to be transparent about the extraordinary situation surrounding Bo Xilai and his family, to contain the situation so there isn’t further fallout within the leadership, and to persuade everyone in and outside China that the transition to the next generation is proceeding as planned. So far, the only whisper of a strategy is proclaiming the Bo case a triumph of the rule of law in China and rumors that the Party Congress is going to be delayed by several months. (These rumors, themselves, however, have been proclaimed by Chinese news outlets to be without merit and the work of “overseas hostile elements” with “ulterior motives” who want “publicity.” )
A job maintaining control in China is not for the faint of heart. And it seems that even with all the time, money, and effort they expend to keep the dam from breaking, they are like the little Dutch boy with his finger in the dyke. The pressure behind the Great Wall just keeps mounting. All those people, all their interests, and all their voices just won’t stop coming.
http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2012/05/10/chinas-little-dutch-boy/
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我在《「挾洋人以自重」?》一文中說:
「當一個政府,還是個號稱世界第二強國的政府,非法軟禁它的國民,不是一個月,不是一、兩年,而是七年之久;… 」
我在《嚴詞譴責》一文中也說道:
「或者,你解釋一下:
號稱世界第二強國的政府,為什麼需要非法軟禁一位瞎子達七年之久?
為什麼你認為:世界第二強國政府非法軟禁一位瞎子達七年之久是說得過去的?」
承沒啥大不了 (lieagle)網友指出「七年」是個錯誤;我到wikipedia上查了一下,果然「非法軟禁它的國民,不是一個月,不是一、兩年,而是七年之久;… 」是個錯誤。在此向沒啥大不了 (lieagle)網友道謝,並為當初沒有查證向網友們道歉。
不過,根據wikipedia的報導,陳先生在2005年即遭「非法軟禁」,2006則被以「莫須有」式的罪名被判刑4年3個月;2010年出獄後又遭「非法軟禁」,直到今年5月他逃離山東。所以我鄭重更正以上兩段話為:
「當一個政府,還是個號稱世界第二強國的政府,非法軟禁及以『莫須有』式的黑獄監禁它的國民,不是一個月,不是一、兩年,而是七年之久;… 」(《「挾洋人以自重」?》)
「或者,你解釋一下:
號稱世界第二強國的政府,為什麼需要非法軟禁及以『莫須有』式的黑獄監禁一位瞎子達七年之久?
為什麼你認為:世界第二強國政府非法軟禁及以『莫須有』式的黑獄監禁一位瞎子達七年之久是說得過去的?」(《嚴詞譴責》)
或許,沒啥大不了 (lieagle)網友能對以上兩段話做個回應或「解釋」。
在我看來,我不認為把「七年」更正為「『兩年多』加上『四年多(黑獄)』」能改變我「輕蔑」和「譴責」的「正當性」以及「力道」。
在我看來,對任何一個正常人來說,我評論的重點應該是「非法軟禁」,而不是「非法軟禁的期間」,以及「有4年3個月的期間是『黑獄式』的正式監禁」。
或許,對一個喜歡或只有能力「多拉西扯」的人來說,它正提供了一個「多拉西扯」的機會或「正當性」。
Chen Guangcheng
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(上略)
Linyi authorities placed him under house arrest from September 2005. He attempted to escape for contacts in Beijing in October, but was beaten and held back.[2]
Chen was removed from his house in March 2006 and was formally detained in June 2006 by Yinan county officials.[2] He was scheduled to stand trial on 17 July 2006 on charges of destruction of property and assembling a crowd to disrupt traffic,[1] but this was delayed at the request of the prosecution.[17] According to Radio Free Asia and Chinese Human Rights Defenders, the prosecution delayed the trial because a crowd of Chen supporters gathered outside the courthouse. With only a few days' notice, authorities rescheduled Chen's trial for 18 August 2006.
On the eve of his trial, all three of his lawyers were detained by Yinan police. Two were released after being questioned and their phones confiscated. Xu Zhiyong of the Yitong Law Firm, perhaps the lawyer with the most knowledge of the forced abortion cases Chen was working on, was detained after authorities accused him of stealing a man's wallet. He was not released until the trial concluded on the 18th. None of Chen's lawyers were allowed in the courtroom for the trial. Only Chen's brothers were allowed inside. Not even Chen's wife was allowed to hear proceedings. Instead, authorities appointed their own public defender for Chen just before the trial began. As a result, the defender had not even read the case report before he walked into the courtroom. The defender did little to help his new client's case and did not raise any objection to the proceedings or to any of the evidence presented, despite Chen's protest in the court. The trial lasted just two hours.[18][19] On 24 August 2006, Chen was sentenced to four years and three months for "damaging property and organising a mob to disturb traffic".[20]
(下略)
原載 -- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chen_Guangcheng
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「黨即國家」?或:「維『誰』的『穩』」?
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我曾經說過:有些人把「國家」或「政府」當做「我」的代名詞。也就是說,他/她們不好意思說:「這件事對『我』有利。」或:「『我』需要如此這般。」;或怕這樣說了,別人對這個說法嗤之以鼻。於是,這些人宣稱:
「這件事對『國家』有利。」或:「『國家』需要如此這般。」
後者如:「『國家』需要『維穩』。」(因此,他/她們在「國家」預算中,把「維穩」經費編得比國防經費還高。「維穩」者,古之「護院」,今之「保全」也。)
上一篇評論(America’s outdated view of China – P. Link)基本上談的是同一個觀念。
如果一個人的「利益」跟掌權者相同或相當,例如,此人是掌權階層的一員,或他/她是掌權者的「跟班」、「二奶」、「小三」、「小王」 、「樁腳」 、「走狗」 、或「五毛黨」 ,則我可以理解這些人接受乃至於宣揚這種用法的動機。如果一個人的「利益」跟掌權者並不相同或相當,則接受這種用法,在我看來,就不免「豬仔」之譏。所謂「豬仔」,指「被張三賣了還幫著張三數鈔票」的笨蛋。
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「維穩」羊頭/神話的拆穿 - P. Link
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America’s outdated view of China
Perry Link, 05/11/12
When the human rights lawyer Chen Guangchengescaped extra-legal house arrest and beatings and found his way to the U.S. Embassy last month, he became an instant hero on the Chinese Internet. How had he escaped? How could a single blind man tear such a hole in the government’s pervasive blanket of weiwen, or stability maintenance? Many called it a “miracle”; stories of “China’s blind spiderman” went viral. Eventually someone who had helped Chen tweeted an account. Chen had done merely this: “In nineteen hours climbed eight walls, jumped a dozen or so irrigation ridges, fell down a few hundred times, injured a foot, and finally crossed a stream that got him out of the village.”
The Internet is the first medium in the history of Communist rule in China that the government has not been able to fully control. The authorities hire hundreds of thousands of police and spend billions of yuan annually monitoring the Web and blocking unwanted messages. Yet for hundreds of millions of Chinese, the Internet continues to grow as a source of uncensored news and platform for popular expression. Regarding Chen, Internet opinion has been overwhelmingly positive.
Online chatter in recent years has generated new notions of what it means to be Chinese. For decades China’s rulers have insisted that “China” means not much more or less than “Chinese government leaders.” To be “patriotic” has meant to support the party-state; anyone who disobeys is “anti-China.” After the astrophysicist Fang Lizhi took refuge in the U.S. Embassy in 1989, China’s government demanded, as a condition of his release, that he promise to refrain from “anti-China” activity. Fang agreed — but refused to allow the party to own the word “China.” He pledged that “my concerns for China, as a Chinese citizen, will be for its peace, its prosperity, and its modernization.” Then, after his release, he continued to criticize China’s rulers.
Twenty-three years ago, Fang, who died last month at 76, was a lone pioneer. Today, people frequently distinguish between themselves and their rulers. The practice has become sufficiently common online that Chinese authorities have declared zhengfu (government) a “sensitive term” that Internet filters must highlight so police can check how it is used. To avoid the filter, microbloggers refer to their government in such sarcastic terms as guichao (esteemed dynasty) and xi chaoxian (western North Korea). Meanwhile, use of gongmin (citizen), in the dignified sense in which Fang used it, has spread widely.
It is regrettable that American experts on U.S.-China relations continue to use “China” and “the Chinese” to refer exclusively to elite circles within the Beijing government. For these experts, “the Chinese” view of anything — currency, technology transfer, cyber-war, Tibet, Taiwan, Syria — is inevitably the government’s view, no matter how far it departs from the views of other Chinese. They warn that such adherence is a matter of respecting the “sensitivities” of “the other side” and that if Washington supports human rights or democracy it will be “seen in China” as American sabotage. But seen this way by whom in China? In the days since Chen left U.S. protection to go to a Beijing hospital, Chinese opinion online has weighed heavily on the side of saying the Americans did not help Chen enough.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-us-governments-outdated-view-of-china/2012/05/10/gIQAUvgaGU_story.html?wpisrc=nl_opinions
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你这位先生总以逻辑提醒网友,那么请你提出证据我在为软禁陈做辩护。
作为网友,相信没有谁有能力掌握足够的事实,大家能做到的只是尽可能依据可靠的信息和自己生活经历对事件作出判断。我最初的意见至少得到事实印证,美国人至今也没有提出陈的要求,是吧?陈的要求和陈的维权形象无关,你不会发对吧?
倒是很好奇你是否有尊重事实的习惯,你能具体说说陈被软禁的日期吗?
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不要東拉西扯什麼狗屎,什麼激動,什麼生存能力。你又忘了我一再勸告你的:就事論事,依理說理,以論點駁論點,還有,不要喃喃自語?
請你簡單解釋一下:
號稱世界第二強國的政府,為什麼需要非法軟禁一位瞎子達七年之久(不是一個月,不是三、五年,是七年ㄝ)?
說不出個名堂,編不出一套理由,你就自己玩吧。
我相信此處的多數網友跟我一樣,早已厭倦你的鬼扯,也看穿你的本來面目了。
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“这次美国人踩到了狗屎”
在给你看下网上传的陈对政府的要求(看到的是图片,这里好像不能上传,简单写点)
1:政府向他提供7所大学供他选择上学和移居
2:政府提供他上学的费用和家庭生活费用,包括一套住宅
还有些政府要听他的申诉和调查等
这象是个维权人士的诉求吗?
对陈的事我不知道详细,也无意为政府辩护。不过可以讲下我对这事的看法供你批判。
中共有个上访制度,相信你也听说过(我在肥皂箱论坛里曾讲过这事),百姓可以越级上告,时间长了培养出一批偏执的人,坚信自己是冤枉的,不断上访。信访办不胜其烦,在北京整天有一帮人在闹也影响体面,因此给地方官施压,让地方官管这事,人数多了如何如何。这些人又没犯法,地方官也不好办,因此各显神通,大多是花钱买平安,不得已了就会象网上流传的那样动用警察强制带回甚至动粗。另有一类人看出门道,找个理由就上访,地方上给银子就没事了,过些日子接着上访,事实是在讹诈政府
依我对事件的理解,陈应该属于后者
美国人不知就里,自以为得到一个让中共出丑的机会,接到大使馆才发现此人是个麻烦。他提的要求中共不可能接受,他又声称中共不接受准备在美使馆住几年,估计把那位华裔大使吓个半死。如此你就可以理解美国人的行为。
再说个未必可靠的消息,说中共当面对陈的许诺是要他接受“再教育”(这是大陆过去对罪犯使用的词汇),美国人很聪明的把这个再教育解释为许诺了让他上大学,顺利把他骗出了大使馆^_^
我相信你会有些媒体朋友,何不打电话问点内幕消息?
陈这人自己没有啥生存能力,我对他也没多大恶感,生存压力而已。当然也不会有你那样正义的感觉,如此而已
事实如何建议你还是等着事件发展为好
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我從不謾罵,我的文章都有論點,也就是理由。因此,我是嚴詞譴責。不過,看來我是在對牛彈琴。碰到沒有反省能力的人,奈何?至於我的理由說不說得通是另一回事兒,批評者可以用論點或理由反駁。
閣下的文字倒是說得上謾罵,因為你沒有說出個理由;或根本說不出個理由;或本來就沒有個理由可說。此之謂謾罵、胡說八道、或喃喃自語。
或者,你解釋一下:
號稱世界第二強國的政府,為什麼需要非法軟禁一位瞎子達七年之久?
為什麼你認為:世界第二強國政府非法軟禁一位瞎子達七年之久是說得過去的?
最後,「走狗」一詞好像沒有國家之分。替本國政府做「走狗」也還是條「走狗」。你認為做中國政府的「走狗」比較高級嗎?
本文於 修改第 9 次
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