我在上一篇留言中說：

「幾場戰爭下來，美國早就外強中乾，還在以20世紀50年代的『世界警察』或『民主經紀』自居，不時到處管閒事和虛聲恫嚇，為天下笑。」(05/03/13)。

今天在Real Clear World上看到Rosa Brooks教授的大作：《虛聲恫嚇之美國外交詞令》(1)。她列舉了一些美國總統和國務卿「管閒事」和「虛聲恫嚇」的實例，她再三引用馬夏維里的睿智來教訓美國的外交官們。(在我看來)Brooks教授也正確的闡釋了「現實主義」在國際政治的應用。這是一篇值得推薦的評論。

參考文章：

1.     Brooks, R. 2013, Would Machiavelli Have Drawn a Red Line?, 在本城市《分析美國領導下的國際秩序》一欄之下。

Manning和Garrett兩位這篇大作對中國內部問題或「挑戰」的分析可說深入。但類似的評論早已汗牛充棟，本欄已轉載多篇。兩位作者的建議，我相信對中國領導人來說，不無參考價值。他們的批評其實也適用於美國歐巴馬政府和歐洲各國領袖。環顧全球，目前是那些個國家比較岌岌可危，那些個國家領導團隊更焦頭爛額呢？

至於涉及中國「外交政策」部分的評論，則相當可笑。好像是只准美國出兵，不准中國表態。幾場戰爭下來，美國早就外強中乾，還在以20世紀50年代的「世界警察」或「民主經紀」自居，不時到處管閒事和虛聲恫嚇，為天下笑。這又是那門子的「和平發展」原則？

Does China have a strategy?

Robert A Manning and Banning Garrett, 05/02/13

As Xi Jinping and China's other new leaders begin their tenure, Beijing's behavior strongly suggests that although they may have strategic goals, China has no strategy for achieving them. Beijing continues to follow a development model it has outgrown and pursues an assertive, zero-sum foreign policy that is counter to its long-term interests.

The poisonous smog choking Beijing and other major cities is an apt metaphor for the challenges facing China's leadership:

an unsustainable status quo in a state-centric economic model that has exceeded the limits of utility;

a steep environmental price being paid for 34 years of breakneck development; and

a political elite whose legitimacy is increasingly weakened by endemic corruption, a lack of transparency, and little accountability.

Beijing's assertive behavior in Asia is mobilizing its neighbors against it at a moment when it needs a peaceful external environment more than ever to meet greater internal challenges.

Chinese leaders are well aware of the great challenges they face, but it seems they have neither a strategy nor the political will to adequately address them. Beijing's behavior appears a far cry from Western imagery of a far-sighted China guided by Sun Tzu and a long-term strategic calculus.

Xi: A reform agenda?

The legitimacy of China's ruling Communist Party has been based on performance: more than three decades of double-digit economic growth has been the foundation for the success of this de facto social contract. But the development model that has delivered this success needs change. China's state-centered, investment-driven, export growth model is delivering diminishing returns. This was the premise of China 2030, a report last year co-sponsored by the World Bank and the Chinese State Development and Reform Commission (SDRC), a leading policy body. China 2030, asserted that "realizing China's vision for 2030 will demand a new development strategy".

The report outlined the sweeping reforms necessary if Beijing is to realize its goal of becoming, "a modern, harmonious, creative, and high income society". The proposed development strategy requires strengthening the rule of law, a greater role for private markets and "increased competition in the economy". Importantly, the strategy argues that "reforms of state enterprises and banks would help align their corporate governance arrangements with the requirements of and permit competition with the private sector on a level playing field."

Thus far there are few signs that a sea change in China's approach to development is in the offing. The Chinese political elite is part of a wide network of vested interests encompassing those at the top of its state banks and state-owned enterprises and PLA-affiliated interests.

This points up the dilemma of China's new leadership. It knows that it needs to pursue far-reaching reforms that will have no small impact on the corruption and the benefits enjoyed by China's upper echelon. But faced with entrenched vested interests, the leadership appears somewhat perplexed as to how to implement specific new policies.

Moreover, the peaceful international environment that China needs now is being undermined by China's assertive activities in the East and South China Seas and its reflexive strategic competition with the US. It seems that in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, many Chinese hardliners concluded that China had emerged relatively stronger than the United States, which was viewed as on an accelerating trajectory of inevitable decline.

The resulting Chinese behavior, from India to Vietnam, has led China's neighbors to question its intentions and seek a counter-balancing network of actors led by the US. In effect, China has sparked the exact opposite result of what it intended, a sort of self-containment.

What strategic logic led some in China to think this is the moment to abandon Deng Xiaoping's dictum: "Hide your strength, bide your time"? At an historic juncture when China faces overwhelming domestic challenges, do some Chinese decision-makers nevertheless see this as the right time for an assertive China to confront the United States and its allies? It is difficult to discern a coherent Chinese strategy in all this.

What futures?

China appears to be lacking coherent and sensible domestic and international strategies that serve its self-proclaimed interests in peace and development. Nevertheless, there are many people in Beijing who understand that China needs a cooperative relationship with the US not only to ensure a peaceful environment for its development during a difficult period ahead but also to confront the global challenges that neither China nor any other country can manage unilaterally. They - and many of their counterparts in the US - recognize that a cooperative US-China relationship is essential for the future of both countries and a stable global future.

The 18th Chinese Party Congress Report called for "a new type of power relationship". While vaguely defined, the report contains a section called "Continuing to Promote the Noble Cause of Peace and Development of Mankind" with interesting, but again, platitudes about global challenges and common interests. This may be empty rhetoric, but it merits testing by the Barack Obama administration and other Group of 20 nations.

Persistent strategic mistrust clouds US-China relations, posing a major obstacle to far-reaching US-China cooperation. Each country sometimes portrays the other's intentions as a strategic challenge inherently hostile to its interests. Many Chinese strategists argue that US strategy is containment to keep China weak and divided and claim the US "pivot" to Asia strategy is proof of this intention. American strategists see China bent on dominating Asia and sharply curtailing US presence while bullying US allies and friends in the region.

Rethinking the US-China relationship

The strategic logic for building a US-China partnership is as compelling as the obstacles to it are difficult. The ability of Xi and Obama to rebalance the relationship so that it becomes predominantly cooperative rather than competitive is highly uncertain, buffeted by contending interest groups, factions, and political forces pulling in contradictory directions.

In addition to the long-term global challenges, there are a host of compelling near-term issues, progress on which could put the US-China relationship on a more cooperative path. On the issues below there is, at least in theory, ample common ground to find a balance of interests both the US and China can live with:

Afghanistan/Central Asia: As the US phases down its military presence in Afghanistan, China, which has substantial economic investments and has been free-riding on the US security presence, needs to rethink its approach. Overlapping US and Chinese interests in Afghan stability, counter-terrorism, and support for economic integration in Central Asia shape a potential agenda for new regional dialogue and cooperation;

Cyber-Security: Cyber-attacks are proliferating and a realm where agreement on global rules and norms are desperately needed. Both the US and China have a mutual vulnerability, and at the strategic level could benefit from moving from obfuscation on the issue to a serious dialogue aimed at establishing codes of conduct and accepted norms;

Greater Middle East: The ongoing turmoil and transformation in the Middle East and North Africa should be an area of overlapping interests in stability and accountable governments that are not hostage to extremist forces. Syria is the most pressing test case for Sino-American cooperation;

East Asia: There is an urgent need to create a new modus vivendi and rules of the road on what sort of US military footprint in the region China can live with, and vice-versa.

Alternative futures for China

How the US deals with China - and how China manages its internal transformation - will have major if not decisive impact on what future China evolves toward. Below are three futures for China - not predictions, but heuristic tools to think about outcomes of current strategic and policy choices: Harmonious World, Muddle Through, and Middle Income Trap.

1. Harmonious World: This is the best case scenario. China's new leadership begins over the next five to six years to strengthen rule of law, move its financial system to a more market-based allocation of resources, allows the yuan (renminbi) to become convertible and ascend as a global currency. Consumer-driven growth sustains a 6-7% annual growth rate as China decreases its reliance on exports and increases social stability through political and judicial reform to open up the political system and enhance rule of law, transparency and accountability. Internationally, as China and other G-20 nations push for a larger voice in rule-making, they cooperate with Western countries to revise the international rules-based order. China also finds a new, more stable and cooperative modus vivendi in East Asia.

2. Muddle Through: This future is a crisis-reaction rather than strategy-driven China in which the leadership responds with limited effectiveness to environmental crises, bursting of the residential real estate bubble, corruption, and increasing inequality and social discontent. China engages in reform by default more than by design.

Over a decade-long journey over a bumpy road, China, slowly takes steps to enhance rule of law, increase accountability, and gradually reforms the economic and financial system to enhance competitiveness, reduce the monopoly power of the state-owned enterprises, and take other steps, reluctantly and belatedly, to restructure the economy and slow the trend of increasing inequality. This future is characterized by a reactive foreign policy that is a mix of nationalism, caution, and both cooperation and competition with the US.

3. Middle Income Trap: Pressures to sustain 7-8% growth result in more excessive and politically motivated, unsound lending by state banks to keep the economy appear to be growing while increasing the debt load and engaging in unproductive investments. This proves counter-productive and hits a wall as the residential real estate bubble deflates, middle-class investors who put their savings into buying apartments are hit hard, and social unrest grows. China falls into the middle income trap as it fails to move up the value chain in production to compete with advanced countries and yet its higher wages render it unable to compete with other developing countries.

As China focuses increasingly on internal challenges, including social unrest and political instability, it tends to view the outside world as a source of its problems and a strategic threat, thus stoking nationalism.

Robert A Manning (rmanning@acus.org) is senior fellow with the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council. Banning Garrett (bgarrett@acus.org) is director of the Asia Program at Atlantic Council.

(Used with permission PacNet)

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/CHIN-01-020513.html

Reading the Tea Leaves of China's New Defense Strategy        

Rakmani Gupta, 04/27/13

The first Defense White Paper released by China under the new leadership of Xi Jinping initially appears to follow the general trend set by the seven white papers published earlier. Even as it emphasizes the familiar "five principles of peaceful coexistence," the "new security concept" and China's commitment to peaceful development, it differs from its predecessors in small, but very significant ways.

The first notable change is the very title. From the bland heading of "China's National Defense in -" this year's White Paper has a thematic title "The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces." The sections are not as numerous as previous papers and conform broadly to theme suggested by the title. What this has meant for the contents is that, although the White Paper does for the first time give numbers of the forces in the various arms of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), it does not elaborate on the domestic systems for the transformation of a mechanized army to an informationised one. The focus is on highlighting the activities of the armed forces, and the exercises, operations and joint-training programmes are adequately catalogued - but do not present any new information. The White Paper on China's National Defense in 2006 had put the number of PLA troops at 2.3 million. Subsequent White Papers did not give a comprehensive number.

This latest document gives the figures for the PLA Army, PLA Navy and PLA Air Force as almost 1.5 million. The status of the 800,000 plus that were counted in the 2006 document is not explained. These obviously include officers and troops of the PLA Second Artillery Force and possibly others in research organizations. That there has been a reduction in total numbers is a safe assumption but where precisely reductions have been affected remains unclear. The figures provided are far from comprehensive and can hardly be considered a major step towards transparency.

Conspicuous by its absence is also any mention of China's defence expenditure. As a document that purported to explain China's thinking on national defence, especially to other states, an exposition of defence expenditure was made in each previous edition. This was seen as recognition of the persistence of the "China threat" thesis and the need to mitigate it at least on the count of defence spending.

That defence expenditure does not feature at all in this eighth white paper is significant. It seems to suggest that the Chinese government is no longer concerned with fighting the idea of a China threat premised on its defence spending. Far from elaborating on earlier explanations (which were deemed unsatisfactory by a vast number of scholars), it would appear that Chinese leaders have decided to do away with the entire enterprise. Statements made during the National People's Congress with regard to the defence budget will now have to suffice. Unlike the last White Paper, the current one does not mention "suspicions about China, interference and countering moves against China." Is the new leadership then prepared to give up the rhetoric of victimhood that has pervaded China's foreign policy articulation?

Absent also is the reiteration of China's nuclear policy or its stance on issues of non-proliferation. Developments related to the Korean peninsula and its nuclear dimension are notable omissions. Were China seriously considering a change in its policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), as some readings into China's support for limited sanctions in the aftermath of the third nuclear test by North Korea have suggested, the White Paper would have been an excellent avenue for communicating this. That the White Paper steers clear of DPRK related issues hints, at best towards attempts to not overemphasise the problem, and at worst, an aversion to reviewing China's policy stance.

The latest White Paper clearly indicates growing Chinese confidence on the international stage. From emphasizing that China's "comprehensive national strength has stepped up to a new stage" in 2011, the current white paper simply states modernization of China's armed forces should be "commensurate with China's international standing." The Asia-Pacific region is once again identified as the hub of global economic development and strategic interaction. Curiously this white paper (unlike the last) stops short of identifying the United States (US) directly as the country that is reinforcing its military relationships in the Asia-Pacific and thereby making the situation there "tenser". The new leadership in China is perhaps aiming at reducing friction with the United States on maritime issues? Mention of the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement between the navies of the US and China for regular exchange of maritime information in a later section suggests that mechanisms of cooperation rather than disputes are sought to be highlighted at least with regard to the US. Japan is mentioned for "making trouble" over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute.

This is unsurprising and can be seen as a reaction to the Japanese Defence White Paper of 2012 which emphasized increased Chinese aggression. Rather than repeatedly emphasizing a "defensive" policy, the white paper enunciates the principle that, "We will not attack unless we are attacked; but we will surely counterattack if attacked." Those familiar with Mao Zedong's writings will recall that this was the first principle of ‘self-defense' Mao spoke of in his tactics in the anti-Japan United Front. The second related principle was one ‘victory'- that one must fight only when certain of victory. The third was the principle of ‘truce', which advised ending a fight when one is winning before a counter attack is made by the adversary. It remains to be seen if the current leadership is satisfied with resurrecting only the first of these principles or will take the other two into consideration.

There are changes in the threat perceptions as well. Although the familiar lament about Taiwan independence as the biggest threat to cross-Straits relations remains unchanged, no longer are "East Turkistan independence" and "Tibetan independence" highlighted as challenges even though the threats by the three evil forces of terrorism, separatism and extremism are seen to be on the rise.

Does this indicate a sanguine frame of mind as far as China's restive periphery is concerned or represents an attempt to downplay ethnic problems? The domestic challenges to social harmony and stability are also seen to be escalating. In this regard, the focus on the domestic role of the PLA in peacetime and its activities in local level economic and social development are important. The projection of the PLA's utility in fostering sustainable development (under the leadership of the Communist Party) helps emphasise the current leadership's concern with the lives of laobaixing - ordinary people.

There is an inclusion of "issues of subsistence and development security" to the usual traditional and non-traditional threats to security. It remains unclear what exactly these issues refer to. However, given that "development interests" and "overseas interests" are repeatedly mentioned throughout the document, an expansive interpretation of China's interests that would necessitate greater global activism can be expected. The emphasis on China's international role in this White Paper - be it humanitarian aid and disaster relief, the rescue of Chinese citizens during the Libyan crisis, peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the United Nations or naval escorts off the Gulf of Aden - suggests that China is seeking to legitimize its international presence. The trite task of "maintaining" world peace and stability is now transformed to "safeguarding" world peace and regional security.

This change in terminology can be seen as an important indicator of a changing external outlook. Will proactive policy action and Chinese exceptionalism replace the rhetoric of victimhood and ‘sabotage by outsiders'? This White Paper certainly seems to suggest so.

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) here.

http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/04/27/reading_the_tea_leaves_of_chinas_new_defense_strategy_105112.html

The Rise of China's Reformers?

Why Economic Change Could Come Sooner Than You Think

Evan A. Feigenbaum and Damien Ma, 04/17/13

With China’s political transition now complete, the country -- and the world economy -- is left with a pressing question: Does the new team in Beijing have the vision and the political will to revive stalled yet crucial economic reforms? Few observers are optimistic about the answer.

A growing chorus of pessimists, in China and elsewhere, has coalesced around three central arguments.

The first group, call them the “economic cynics,” argues that the bar for reform is just too high. This is because several underlying economic problems, including a real estate bubble, have worsened at precisely the moment that China’s economic growth has slowed. Chinese officials’ traditional solution to economic slowdowns -- accelerating exports -- has become harder in light of declining demand in advanced industrial countries.

What is more, these pessimists argue, even if China’s new leaders want to undertake bold reforms, economic problems have become so dire that they will overwhelm the new team’s ability to forge consensus around a fresh approach. According to China’s National Audit Office, for example, provincial, county, prefectural, and municipal governments are some 11 trillion yuan ($1.8 trillion) in debt. This problem could lead to another round of exploding bad loans that would constrain the banking sector and forestall financial sector reforms.

The second group, call them the “social doomsayers,” argues that bad policies and poor governance are fueling unprecedented social unrest -- with more than 100,000 protests taking place each year by some estimates. This group insists that since preserving political stability is Beijing’s top priority, the government will avoid undertaking reforms that risk short-term economic dislocation and might further exacerbate social discontent.

According to this group, China’s leaders are caught in a bind: if they reform too much, they risk opening the floodgates to more protests; but if they reform too little, they risk leaving intact the underlying causes of the unrest. Two oft-cited examples of the latter dilemma are environmental degradation and land seizures by local officials, which have been the major reasons that ever more Chinese have taken to the streets. But local governments are still focused on economic growth at all costs rather than cleaning up the environmental costs of this growth. Unless Beijing devolves independent fiscal authority to provincial and municipal governments -- a very tough reform, by any standard -- and changes the political incentives that reward growth above all other objectives, local officials will continue to seize and sell land to developers to raise revenue. So under either scenario, this group insists, political caution will constrain the new leadership’s options for reform.

The final group, call them the “political doubters,” questions the new leadership’s resolve to overcome powerful vested interests that will resist reforms, especially among China’s state-owned enterprises. These powerful corporate players, this argument goes, will obstruct the leadership’s well-intentioned goal of boosting household incomes, defeating efforts to force state firms to pay more dividends that can be redistributed into social welfare programs.

None of these three camps is entirely wrong. Each describes a certain facet of the considerable challenges China’s new leaders now confront. But their pessimism ignores a central lesson of China’s recent history -- one that undoubtedly resonates with at least some members of the new policy team:

reform is possible when the right mix of conditions comes together at the right time.

Indeed, China has had significant bursts of economic reform in the past, most notably in the late 1990s during the premiership of Zhu Rongji. That era proved that bold reform is achievable when three conditions are present:

a crisis of political credibility at home,

vulnerability to an economic or financial crisis abroad, and

a leadership savvy enough to recognize the need for change.

Today, Beijing does face enormous obstacles, and the forces arrayed against reform are numerous and entrenched. But each of these three conditions is once again present in China, potentially boosting the prospects for real and enduring economic change.

A CRISIS OF CREDIBILITY

Consider the first condition: a crisis of domestic political legitimacy. In the early 1990s, Beijing faced one of its toughest tests of popular support as it attempted to recover from a series of political challenges to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the tumultuous 1980s. At the time, Beijing was in the throes of both a political crisis and a revenue crisis as dwindling tax receipts remitted by provinces and cities to the central government hollowed out the central government’s coffers.

Throughout the 1980s, dizzying changes moved the country away from major elements of centralized planning toward greater reliance on market forces, including price liberalization. These changes ushered in a wave of inflationary pressures and rampant social discontent, which culminated in the protests of 1989.

In the aftermath of the political tumult, reforms were briefly shelved before being revived in 1992 as Beijing sought to restore economic momentum and win back popular support. By the late 1990s, a capable premier, Zhu, had begun to restructure China’s weak and unwieldy state sector and to reform the banking system, notwithstanding the destabilizing effects of laying off millions of Chinese government workers.

This period is instructive because today’s Chinese leadership -- under pressure from rising expectations, social dislocation, and popular discontent -- again finds itself trying to bridge a credibility gap with the Chinese public. And the new team, not least the new president, Xi Jinping, has publicly recognized that the stakes are high. With worsening social and economic inequality, abysmal food safety, corruption, and rising middle-class expectations, Chinese governance is being tested in unprecedented ways. And since merely delivering growth is no longer sufficient to assure the government’s mandate, the leadership has good reason to look to reforms as a means of addressing social cleavages and environmental degradation.

EXTERNAL ECONOMIC SHOCKS

A second important factor that drove China’s reforms in the 1990s involved the aftereffects of the Asian financial crisis of 1997­–98, which exposed the inherent vulnerability of the Chinese economy to such shocks. Zhu and other Chinese leaders leveraged the moment of that crisis to move China toward its long-standing goal of membership in the World Trade Organization. They successfully pushed for a credible package of reforms that both prepared Chinese companies for global competition and opened the door to foreign capital inflows. Put simply, an external crisis enabled homegrown economic reformers to push forward serious economic and institutional changes.

That formative experience is especially pertinent today, as China continues to deal with ripples from the global economic crisis that began in 2008. Despite emerging from the crisis earlier and stronger than nearly any other major economy, China remains vulnerable in two ways: it can no longer rely on exports, and it lacks the flexible monetary and financial tools that could help it fight inflation and forestall the shock of another financial crisis.

Beijing has weathered the most recent storm largely because it injected huge sums of cash into the economy -- about $600 billion in stimulus and billions more in other bank lending, both of which helped to stave off a wholesale collapse in economic growth. But the effectiveness of these tools will diminish in the years ahead. The government cannot simply rely on stimulus after stimulus, and such a strategy would only further deepen imbalances in China’s economy. In the five years since China achieved its peak GDP growth rate of 13 percent in 2007, its growth rate has dropped significantly and the leadership now targets a more balanced 7.5 percent.

TOUGH-MINDED LEADERSHIP

Many of China’s reforms in the 1990s would not have been possible without a few hard-nosed leaders who not only correctly assessed the country’s economic ailments but also had the political will to take strong actions. Zhu, for instance, was known to berate local officials for their mistakes and inefficiencies -- and his confrontational style was supported by a number of his colleagues in Beijing. It is already apparent that Xi and the new premier, Li Keqiang, differ from their immediate predecessors in both style and tone. But more than that, their programs and speeches suggest that, at minimum, they have accurately diagnosed the ills that currently beset the Chinese economy. And on paper at least, they have prescribed many of the right solutions. In March, Li invoked “reforms” nearly two dozen times during his first press conference as premier.

But translating rhetoric into credible actions will be more difficult. China’s new leaders have risen to the top only to inherit a growth model that is running out of steam, undermined by a combination of aging populations and weak consumption in developed countries. At the same time, many Chinese companies, especially in the state sector, remain uncompetitive or could face serious financial difficulties if state subsidies, including for energy and land, are withdrawn.

It is important to consider, moreover, why the last group of Chinese leaders seemed to overlook structural maladies in the Chinese economy. Despite a recognition that, in former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s words, the economy was “unbalanced, uncoordinated, unstable, and unsustainable,” previous leaders could rest easier in the knowledge that China could still mostly grow its way out of its immediate problems. In fact, growth was so stellar in the 2000s that the leadership cohort under former President Hu Jintao judged that it could probably afford to coast on the reform dividends of previous decades.

But although China’s economy grew rapidly throughout the first decade of the twentieth century -- largely on the basis of investment and soaring exports -- it did not grow much stronger in a fundamental sense. It remained relatively exposed to disruptions in global demand because domestic demand in China was too low, and it reflected new inequalities and imbalances. The costs of the capital-intensive and export-led growth model are now so obvious and startling that they can no longer be ignored or swept under the rug. For instance, recent estimates have put the environmental cost of China’s growth at at least $230 billion, or about 3.5 percent of China’s GDP in 2010.

So it is beyond doubt that Xi and Li understand, and even acknowledge, that reform is no longer a choice but a necessity. The scope, scale, and depth of those reforms, however, will ultimately depend on whether the new team shows some of the nerve and sense of timing that yielded the ambitious decisions of the 1990s.

DEVOLUTION, CHINESE STYLE

What are the signposts of real economic reform? Several indicators will be important to watch over the next year and a half. One major indicator will be the degree to which Beijing reduces the state’s role in the economy by devolving fiscal and budgetary authority to local officials. Steps in this direction would include passing off the power to approve infrastructure projects to local governments, cutting unnecessary administrative red tape, and prohibiting ad hoc administrative fees levied by local governments.

Some form of decentralization will also likely take place on the fiscal side. Many provinces have seen their fiscal coffers wither in the years since 1994, when a major tax overhaul redirected revenues toward the central government in Beijing. Local governments now depend on transfers from the central government to pad their budgets. And when these transfers prove insufficient, as they usually do, they often turn to selling land to developers and relying on debt financing through shadowy lending channels to secure the revenue they need. Given that China lacks a well-developed municipal bond market or a strong independent local tax base, it is easy to see how a local fiscal system in disarray -- one that provides incentives to sell land for housing development -- has contributed to the country’s overheating property market.

Another area ripe for reform is energy pricing. Throughout China’s economic boom, Beijing has artificially suppressed energy prices because energy is a critical input in China’s capital-intensive growth model. So with Beijing’s persistent fear of spiraling inflation, the government has often intervened to ensure that the prices of electricity and coal, among other energy sources, remain stable. But the fact that energy is cheap means that Chinese industry has little incentive to improve efficiency. Instead, the country’s companies have turned into energy guzzlers and decimators of the environment. Raising the price of energy to reflect its true cost would force Chinese businesses to improve efficiency and develop cleaner production methods.

A third area to watch is China’s social welfare system, particularly health care and pensions. Beginning with reforms in 2009, China’s broken health-care system has been gradually stitched back together and will likely enter a new stage under the new government. Similarly, the fragmented and woefully inadequate pensions system will also need to move beyond its current state as a large-scale unfunded mandate. Both reforms are necessary if Beijing is to deal with an aging society and to support consumption by drawing down precautionary savings.

BEIJING DREAMIN’

In isolation, each of these reforms would be modest. Yet their cumulative effect could be enormous. It is worth noting, however, that expectations for economic reforms should be tempered by the reality of China’s present economy -- an $8.3 trillion behemoth that is more complex and mature than it was 15 years ago. In this sense, windfalls from today’s reforms will likely be more limited in scope than when the country was starting from a lower base in the 1990s.

But that is what the new leadership confronts -- a wide-ranging set of reform alternatives that include, but are not limited to, the options noted here. The constraints on reform in China have never been intellectual -- there are plenty of good economists in the country pushing a wide array of creative ideas. The principal obstacles remain political. The lesson of the 1990s is that it takes the right mix of domestic and external challenges, combined with a healthy dose of bold leadership, to induce significant reforms.

But those conditions are again present today. And recent statements suggest that a longer-term reform agenda is likely in the works and could be unveiled during the CCP’s third plenum this fall. (Capital market reforms, such as an expanded use of corporate and government bonds and a further relaxation of restrictions on foreign institutional investors, are thought to be probable.) If Chinese leaders do choose the third plenum as the place to announce new reforms, it will be because it is pregnant with political symbolism: it was at another third plenum, in 1978, that Deng Xiaoping, the architect of China’s market reforms, won consensus around the vision that set China on its course to becoming the world’s second-largest economy.

It would be impossible for any Chinese economic reform program to be completed expeditiously and without resistance. Reform, by definition, will rearrange the playing field for powerful political and economic interests. But if the new team is serious about revitalizing China’s economy and realizing its much-touted “Chinese dream,” then deeper economic reforms are necessary. Beijing would do well to heed the words of Li, its new premier: “It’s useless screaming about reform until you’re hoarse. Let’s just do something about it.”

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139295/evan-a-feigenbaum-and-damien-ma/the-rise-of-chinas-reformers?cid=nlc-this_week_on_foreignaffairs_co-041813-the_rise_of_chinas_reformers_4-041813

習近平的中國夢 能讓新左派再集結

石之瑜/台大政治系教授, 04/10/13

重慶模式曾經是新左派實踐理念之所在，但因為薄熙來事件而一夕瓦解。儘管實際負責的黃奇帆市長當時全身而退，繼續在職，新左派的士氣大跌是不爭的事實，重慶也不再能提供範例。

所謂新左派，原本是在面臨市場化與資本主義霸權大軍壓境之際，亟思維繫工農兵的階級利益，試圖從社會主義理想中另覓出路，進而與民族主義、文化保守／創新主義再結盟而成的鬆散的公共知識群體。

值得注意的是，習近平接班之後，在薄熙來事件中抱著看笑話心態的自由主義知識界，並沒有表現太多的歡欣鼓舞，南方周末為言論尺度的抗爭，好像一度震動到了龍脈，又好像沒有。反而，新左界似乎重新騷動起來，對於中國未來發展模式的探索，再度受到重視。中國崛起的氣氛在總體上有利於新左派的反思，他們因應時代對中國模式的理論呼喚，比自由派只能否定中國模式的思維定式，顯得生氣蓬勃得多。主張中國模式的各種立場容或各說各話，但往往長篇大論，著書成冊，而反對中國模式的自由派多半興趣不大地寫寫雜誌文章。

習近平最近從時間與空間兩個角度雙管齊下，打開了今後新左派恢復集結的論述根基。他在空間上提出了「鞋子論」，也就是發展如同穿鞋，鞋子合不合腳，只有穿鞋的人自己知道。這其中似乎有點自由市場的消費偏好概念，但其實也替階級分析與階級利益的正當性提供了基礎。在時間上，習近平提出了「中國夢」的發展遠景，將民族立場標示出來，既挑戰中國知識界上從理論上跟緊腳步，也挑戰世界華人社群重新正視自己的身分。中國夢雖是如此抽象的概念，卻等於把個人消費主義從鞋子論裡排除了，因為這鞋子必須是群體的。

新左派議論中國模式並沒有一個定向，人言言殊，因此重點不僅僅在於個別理論是否高深或正確，而在於他們共同營造了中國崛起的氣氛。談重慶模式也許是政治禁忌，但是談中國模式儼然不是。黨中央原本認為不適合鼓吹這個話題，因為韜光養晦的原則所要求的是低調，而中國模式非常高調。可是如今，中共官方雜誌也加入了中國模式的討論，而中國夢更將是未來幾年的主旋律。新左派的例證堂而皇之從重慶延展開來，許許多多與重慶類似的政策將可以浮上檯面，不像幾個月前還要藏起來。則擺脫政治明星以後的新左派，空間與心情都寬鬆了起來。

一言以蔽之，新左派的再集結是不可避免的，儘管西方政治界與輿論界主要是聲援自由主義學者，他們猶如日本漫畫中的黑暗界，值得觀察家同情。但是，外界要認真面對的真正對手，仍然是廣泛定義的新左派，他們是未來替中國代言的主要知識泉源，也是測定資本主義與霸權秩序之外有無其他可能選項的主要陣營。中國崛起當然可能是和平的，但是不久之後，圍繞新左派輿論戰線的硝煙四起，恐怕不可避免。

【2013/04/10 聯合報】

http://udn.com/NEWS/OPINION/X1/7820425.shtml

六四領袖：改革靠民間不望習李

中央社, 04/01/13

中國大陸「六四」學運領袖周鋒鎖近日表示對習李新政不抱希望，未來的希望在於民間組織起來，向當局施壓。然而，目前政府箝制社會能力比1989年更強，公民維權處處受限。

香港明報報導，周鋒鎖近日成功過境香港。

他並作客當地網路電台節目「聽風者」，對香港市民支持平反「六四」表示感謝。談到「占領中環」運動，他表示，要求地方自治直選的權利是天經地義的。

他直言，對於新接班的國家主席習近平和總理李克強「不抱希望」，認為大陸民主化的希望在民間，只有民眾有組織地行動才能有所改變，因為習近平、李克強都是「既得利益集團的代言人」，從1980年代開始，既得利益集團一方面壓制公民權利，另一方面掠奪財富的做法已成常態。

他並指，「六四」事件時提出的要求公開官員財產、新聞自由，大陸至今仍未實現，「這要求的是制度變化，不是某個人上台可以做到，胡溫當年大家也曾經有期望，現在看來也沒有什麼」。

周鋒鎖說，既然不能寄望「從上至下」的改革，未來的希望在於公民「由下至上」推動變革，「終究有一天中國會發展成公民社會，這是必須的」。

他認為，目前大陸公民對反腐敗等的訴求並不亞於1989年，但政府箝制社會運動的能力更強，公民的有組織反抗被限制在具體事件，「你只能關心自己村裡的地被拆遷，而不能關心整個拆遷的制度」，因而不能上升到對普遍的民主、自由、人權的訴求。

據報導，「六四」民運人士近年雖多次遭港澳拒絕入境，但也有成功個案。2009年「六四」20周年時，吾爾開希入境澳門被拒，但熊焱入境香港。

2011年，王丹申請前往香港悼念支聯會前主席司徒華被拒，但北京工自聯成員呂京花成功。去年，被坦克輾斷雙腿的方政也赴港參與紀念「六四」活動。1020401

http://news.chinatimes.com/mainland/11050501/132013040100597.html

習式外交的老途新徑

泰國世界日報 社論, 03/29/13

習近平就任中國三位一體最高領導人之後，以國家元首身分展開其第一次外交出訪之旅，習近平的外交開篇之旅，首先被視作一個塑形之旅，向外界展示其新的外交形象。但到習近平完成今次外交行動，更值得討論的，是其習式外交的新謀篇布局，即中共新一代的外交戰略的建構。

習近平首度外交行動，包括到訪俄羅斯，訪問非洲的坦尚尼亞、南非、剛果，及在德班參加金磚國家領導人峰會。這一外交行動的安排，從內容上看，與胡錦濤就任中國國家主席後的首次外交行動，有傳承之意。當年胡錦濤上台之初，第一次出訪，也是選擇到訪俄羅斯、哈薩克斯坦和蒙古。且相同的是，當年胡錦濤的首度外交秀，與今天習近平的首度外交秀，同樣有扭轉外部環境，顯示外交的由守而攻的積極意義。

不同的是，今天習近平的首度外交出訪，雖然看似中國綜合國力已經完成階段性的提升，既已坐上世界第二經濟大國之位，又開始成為世界強國。但崛起階段性的完成，又令中國處於外交的新困局，面臨處理與周邊國家錯綜複雜關係的難題，又要處理與頭號強國美國關係的課題。所以，習近平不只是要作外交戰略的調整，還有為自己本屆五年任期乃至未來十年的外交戰略新定位。

自改革開放以來，中國的外交戰略有一條主線，叫和平發展，即全力改善外部關係，以為自己內部的發展，創造一個和緩有利的環境。這一外交戰略的主線，長期以來表現為「韜光養晦」的策略，以及處理國家關係的「和平共處五項原則」為基礎的獨立自主外交政策。

習近平登台之初，當然不會改變這一外交戰略的總基調，也不想貿然改變自鄧小平以降，江澤民、胡錦濤主政時期的外交戰略表述。但除了習近平有建立自己的外交路線的天然衝動之外，他也有重新建構外交戰略的需要。這是因為，中國的國際地位變了，中國面臨的國際環境也變了。

中國的國際地位之改變，不用多說了，但也正因為在中國崛起過程中的這個改變，令中國外交走了一些彎路，特別是在胡溫領政下的過去五年間，出現一些重大的外交失誤，令外交戰略有重新構建的需要。

而中國面臨的國際環境改變，更值得討論。當然，首先就是中國崛起過程中，國家綜合實力的提升，令周邊國家產生中國擴張之憂，過去一段時間以來，有與日本在釣魚島和東海問題的衝突，與越南、菲律賓等在南海的爭端，還有仍在隱伏尚未發作的中印兩國邊境之爭等。這些衝突和爭端，不僅是地緣政治的偶發事件，還來自整個周邊地區對崛起後中國的必然疑慮。

更大的改變，還在中國與美國的關係，這表現為美國宣布重返亞洲，以及已經展開連串實質性部署。過去一年間，美國不僅加強與日本、韓國的盟國關係，也直搗中國的後花園，包括緬甸和越南。美國的行動，不僅是對中國的一種制衡，還已令中國感受到冷戰結束以來，或者說中國對外開放以來多年未見的壓力。　

中國外交戰略的重新構建，始自中共十八大，在中共新領導習近平的主持下，中國不僅在改變外交形象，也在轉變外交戰略。這些轉變，表現在對日關係中，釣魚島衝突的更加強硬，同時也表現在對北韓問題上，與以美國為首的國家合作施壓的柔軟。

習近平這一代中共領導人，成長於中國改革開放年代，其視野已不同於其前輩。以中共十八大對新外交戰略傳承和創新的表述，以習近平首度出訪的安排，可以看到，其最重視的首先是「新安全觀」，即尊重多樣文明、謀求共同發展、構建和諧世界與和諧周邊。

與之同時，習近平一代中共領導人，正試圖傳遞新外交戰略的新思路，即處理國際關係時強調「合作共贏」，處理與美國等大國強國關係時追求既博弈又合作的「平等關係」，以求維持中共根本體制和核心利益，既建立強大安全屏障，又維護良好外部關係。這一外交戰略，相信在習近平首訪開篇之後，將逐步展現。

What Xi Sees in Africa

J. Peter Pham, 03/25/13

Just days after completing his ascent by adding the state presidency to his posts as Communist Party general secretary and Central Military Commission chairman, Xi Jinping has embarked on his first trip overseas as China’s top leader, a journey that includes a week in Africa, with stops in Tanzania, South Africa, and the Republic of the Congo.

This prominent focus given to Africa in Chinese foreign relations should come as no surprise. Xi inherits from his immediate predecessors a relationship with Africa that has changed dramatically over the last two decades. Under Jiang Zemin, China launched a national strategy of “going out” (zouchuqu zhanlue) to secure access to stable supplies of raw materials and natural resources needed to sustain the country’s rapid economic development -- and forestall any social instability. Chinese firms were actively encouraged to explore investment opportunities abroad and open up new markets by establishing either joint ventures or wholly Chinese-owned subsidiaries in various countries. This policy was reaffirmed by Hu Jintao whose administration, in the midst of the global economic downturn in 2009, used its vast foreign exchange reserves, the largest in the world, to accelerate overseas expansion by Chinese companies, especially in Africa. 

While resources have been a big factor in Chinese engagement of and investments in Africa, the focus has shifted in response to changes in Africa’s economic landscape. In fact, of the estimated $9.3 billion worth of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa in 2010, 42.3 percent went to services and another 22 percent went to manufacturing, with only 29.2 percent going to the extractive industries.

Trade is booming between African countries and China, with some 12.5 percent of all African exports going to China. In 2009, China overtook the United States as the continent’s biggest trade partner. Last year total annual trade between China and Africa surpassed the $200 billion mark. Beijing’s diplomats paved the way for this expansion signing trade agreements with forty-five African countries, bilateral agreements regarding the promotion and protection of investment with thirty-three, and accords to avoid double taxation with eleven. 

The government has also set up the China-Africa Development Fund, a stock equity fund that gives special support to Chinese enterprises when they invest in Africa. Since its establishment in 2007, the fund has invested in everything from agricultural development to machinery manufacturing to electric power generation to building materials to industrial parks and port logistics. Another recent trend is the establishment of industrial parks as well as special economic and trade cooperation zones in key African countries -- including Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria, and Zambia -- with the goal of improving infrastructure so as to facilitate the opening of manufacturing operations by Chinese firms which then can benefit from favorable tax and regulatory regimes. 

China has also not failed to recognize the opportunities for itself, both diplomatically and commercially, in the significant infrastructure build out that is underway throughout Africa in the transportation, communications, power, water, healthcare, and other sectors. A 2010 State Council report on “China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation” noted: “In order to help African countries to improve their infrastructure, the Chinese government has offered many preferential loans, and supports its financial institutions to expand the amount of commercial loans to Africa. China has constantly intensified its efforts in financing for Africa since the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. From 2007 to 2009, China provided $5 billion of preferential loans and preferential export buyer’s credit to Africa. It has also promised to provide $10 billion of preferential loans to Africa from 2010 to 2012.” These government credits have helped to finance major infrastructure projects across Africa involving Chinese enterprises, including everything from the new terminal at the Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam International Airport in Mauritius to the 400-megawatt Bui Dam in Ghana to the even larger 1,250-megawatt Merowe High Dam in Sudan, the largest hydropower project on the continent thus far. 

Government encouragement and facilitation has also helped paved the way into African markets for telecommunications equipment manufacturers Huawei Technologies and ZTE which, between them, are active in some fifty countries on the continent. The pair have established more than forty third-generation telecom networks in more than thirty African countries and built national fiber-optic communications networks and e-government networks for more than twenty African countries. All told, an estimated 300 million Africans use communications services from one or the either firm daily.

Chinese participation in infrastructure development is the cause of some controversy in Africa, as Chinese firms are widely perceived to be bringing their own workers. Moreover, increased trade with China is, in some ways, a double-edged sword for African countries when it comes to imports. On the one hand, it makes relatively affordable goods available, which clearly benefits African consumers. On the other hand, Chinese manufacturers tend not to establish many links with local firms, preferring instead to turn to reliable and cost-competitive established suppliers back in China. Moreover, as Lamido Sanusi, governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, complained in a recent Financial Times op-ed, “China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones… It is a significant contributor to Africa’s deindustrialization and underdevelopment.”

Paralleling China’s growing investment in Africa are its expanding political and security interests. If Africa’s abundant natural resources are critical for maintaining China’s “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi) in the world, then certainly African states, which together constitute the largest regional bloc in many international organizations, are just as integral to Beijing’s long-term grand strategy of promoting its version of “democracy in international relations” (guoji guanzi minzhuhua) -- that is, a more multipolar political and economic global order. 

China currently has diplomatic relations with fifty of Africa’s fifty-four states -- the sole exceptions being Burkina Faso, The Gambia, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Swaziland, all of whom continue to have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The issue of Taiwan aside, Beijing has a consistent policy of not imposing explicit political conditionalities on its aid recipients. This non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations fits well with the policy preferences of many African heads of state or government, some of whom bristle at the democratization and good governance agenda promoted by traditional aid donors in the West. Senior Chinese leaders have also gone to great lengths to engage their African counterparts on the latter’s home turf; while the current tour is Xi’s first trip to Africa as China’s state president, it is his sixth visit to the continent. The new twenty-story African Union Conference Center and Office Complex in Addis Ababa, inaugurated last year after it was built by China at the cost of some $200 million, is iconic of the close ties which Beijing has carefully cultivated with Africa’s governing institutions and elites.

A relatively new area of Chinese engagement in Africa has been in the security sector where China’s involvement has been hitherto limited to arms sales to various governments, some quite questionable. After having long taken a dim view of international peacekeeping missions, China has become increasingly involved in international peacekeeping to the point that the number of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) personnel currently participating in UN stability and security operations is roughly equal to the combined total of the other four permanent members of the Security Council. Beijing currently has some 1,868 military and civilian personnel deployed on nine UN missions, with more than four-fifths of them -- 1,520 individuals -- assigned to six African missions: the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the UN Mission Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). Whatever else in accomplished by these engagements, it remains that the PLA has accrued significant tactical, operational, and strategic advantages from the deployment of its personnel across Africa.

Moreover, since January 2009, vessels of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) have been operating almost continuously in the Gulf of Aden and other waters off Somalia as part of a worldwide naval deployment to counter Somali piracy. While, by all accounts, the PLAN has cooperated with other coalition forces in anti-piracy operations, including the United States-led Combined Task Force 151 and the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia’s Operation Atalanta, it is also true that the continuous deployment -- currently, the fourteenth Chinese task force is on station -- has the double advantage of advancing a number of wider Chinese interests off the East African littoral. 

The extensive network of economic, political, and military ties across Africa which Xi Jinping will be inspecting this week testify not only to the Beijing’s emergence as one of the leading actors on the continent as well as a major force in its politics and security, but also to Africa’s buoyant economic prospects and its growing geopolitical importance. The challenge for the United States and Africa’s other traditional partners is give the continent the attention it deserves (in contrast to his Chinese counterpart’s weeklong African foray just days into his presidency, President Obama has spent less than twenty-four hours in Sub-Saharan Africa since taking office more than four years ago) and, when they do so, to move beyond mere humanitarian sentiments and old habits about aid and to truly develop a comprehensive, proactive strategy that engages the new realities of an increasingly significant and dynamic region. 

J. Peter Pham is director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/what-xi-sees-africa