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中國發展路線的討論 - ECFR

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China Analysis: One or two Chinese models?

The road to Chongqing or to Guangdong? China’s big development decision

The pact that China has made with globalisation, trading huge external dependence for miraculous export growth, may be unravelling. The crisis in the West is hurting exports, and inflation and bubbles at home are creating unrest in the vital coastal regions. With a crucial contest for Chinese leadership in 2012, Beijing is involved in a crucial debate about the value of two competing models of development that will influence who leads the country and its future direction.

The Chongqing experiment is based around a metropolis in Central China, which has – under the leadership of Bo Xilai – used massive state subsidies to woo flagship foreign firms like Apple, launched a giant social housing programme and fought the mafia.

The rival Guangdong model from Canton is instead based upon moving up the technological value chain, reinforcing the rule of law and representation of the people by NGOs.

The latest edition of China Analysis (‘One or two Chinese models?’), published by ECFR and Asia Centre, explores this debate over China’s future development, and the role the debate plays in the contest for leadership in Beijing.

The Chongqing model is an investment in the next wave of export-led growth by the mobilisation of inland Chinese assets, providing the growth needed to. But a slowdown in international demand could make this investment a risky proposition.

The Guangdong model involves a realignment of the Chinese economy away from export-driven GDP growth that is less capable of providing internal consumer demand or social welfare. Both are viewed as big issues that need resolving as the Chinese economy matures.

Both models have high level proponents, ahead of the replacing of seven of the nine Politburo Standing Committee members (the top table of Chinese politics). This debate has consequently become as critical as the debate over internationalisation of China’s currency.

If the international economic slowdown harms exports, the debate could become acrimonious, involving job displacement, lost subsidies and China’s future development.

Click here to download a pdf of ‘One or two Chinese models?’ (請按此處以取得原文)

ECFR, The European Council on Foreign Relations, (歐洲外交關係協會 汎歐事務智庫)

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重慶模式 vs 重慶幻象 - The Guardian, UK



Chinese politics: the Chongqing mirage

Whatever reform China needs, it is not Bo Xilai's model


Editorial, guardian.co.uk, 03/28/12


Western correspondents in Chongqing probing the background to the spectacular fall from grace of city boss Bo Xilai have found themselves pondering who to cast if this tale was a film noir. Robert De Niro, perhaps? Or might there be a role for Edward G Robinson? Certainly there is something about the extraordinary mixture of populism, demagoguery, organised crime, corruption and large-scale money-making in one of the world's biggest urban regions, more than 30 million people and still growing, that recalls the dark landscape of American gangster movies or makes observers go further back to reach for Dickens or Balzac.


New details are emerging about the real nature of the campaign against organised crime which for a while made Bo a political star, a man heading for high national office and even a man destined to fundamentally change all of Chinese politics with his so-called "Chongqing model". The elements of that model included responsiveness to public opinion, an enthusiastic pursuit of public support that had some of the style, at least, of electoral politics, a revival of Maoist slogans and images, and a war on corruption and crackdown on criminal gangs which led to thousands of arrests.


Now that Bo has lost his position, his critics are freer to point to evidence that the campaign against crime violated the law even by China's loose standards, used torture and illegal detention, extorted money from companies, and targeted Bo's political rivals while sparing his allies. On top of that, some of Bo's apparently commendable activities in city beautification and police reorganisation, as well as his famous "red songs" programme, were sustained by profligate spending that has left the city hugely in debt. Whatever it is that China needs in the way of reform, and the leaders in Beijing are pretty clear that it needs something, that something is not the Chongqing model. It provided an impression of rapid movement and beneficial change which was misleading. It promised social justice and clean government without delivering it. And it suggested a quasi-democratic accountability might be on the horizon when it was not.


Instead, citizens found themselves marshalled into patriotic choirs or sent off for stints in the countryside in a parody of cultural revolution measures that was more silly than sinister but was in any case irrelevant to China's real problems. The higher leadership, worried about the volatility and unpredictability Bo was introducing into politics, were probably right to close down the Chongqing experiment. That does not mean, unfortunately, that they have anything so far to offer their people other than the continuation of a very imperfect political status quo.



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中國將牛步邁向改革 -- R. L. Kuhn



Xi Jinping rise and Bo Xilai demise: China will move forward with reform, slowly


Robert Lawrence Kuhn /March 26, 2012


The dismissal of Bo Xilai, China's controversial Politburo member, shows that Xi Jinping, slated to be China's next president, and top Communist Party members will move forward with reform step by pragmatic step, not backward to Maoist nostalgia or cult-of-personality populism.


Xi Jinping, the current vice president slated to be approved as general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in the fall and as president of China the following March, will be the first leader not chosen peremptorily by China’s prior leaders. Rather, he was selected through a broader polling of CPC officials. While neither transparent nor anonymous, the process is a big advance in China’s long march toward “intra-party democracy.”


China is an oligarchy, not a dictatorship, and ultimate authority will not be vested individually with Mr. Xi, but collectively with the CPC Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), currently with nine members. Everything in China reports to one of these nine. Xi will be first among equals, but equals the nine are, and their final composition shapes policy.


OPINION: 3 reasons why China isn't overtaking the US


This explains the intense focus on the firing of Mr. Bo, because it was assumed he would become a PSC member in the once-a-decade top leadership shuffle. Media savvy, Bo had built a name for himself by promoting the “Chongqing Model,” a leftist-populist mixture of strong state, Maoist paeans (“Red songs”), crime crackdown, equality over productivity, and wealth redistribution.


It was never that simple. Even had he reached his peak, Bo would not have ranked in the PSC’s top half. Moreover, some of his purported backers did not share his somewhat recent leftist views. Elite politics in China is not simplistic and one-dimensional, the mere maneuverings of competing factions. Loyalties run on personal relationships as well as political philosophies, and coalitions wax and wane around specific issues.


While many people praised Bo for jailing corrupt officials (even for executing them) and for reversing garish economic disparity, many officials worried, privately, about the revival of political mass movements and the potential for chaos. The Cultural Revolution, China’s decade-long descent into ideological madness that would end up crushing millions, hovers like an unexorcised demon.


Following the bizarre “visit” to the US Consulate of Chongqing by Vice Mayor Wang Lijun, Bo Xilai’s right-hand man for anti-mafia strikes (which liberals said violated human rights), Bo was fired. Irrespective of Bo’s deeper offenses or coming fate, the political fallout is unambiguous: The leftist-statist Chongqing Model has collapsed. This will become clearer as the PSC slots are confirmed for reformers.


Of the nine PSC members, all will have run large geographic regions and/or ministries, and six or seven will have led at least two provinces or major municipalities (as party secretary or governor/mayor). As such, all will have worked with Western CEOs and other sophisticated foreign leaders.


ANOTHER VIEW: Will China's Communist Party prove James Madison wrong? Unlikely.


Like his colleagues, Xi is not given to radical change. Not incidentally, following the Bo tumult, Xi called for “purity” among officials and admonished senior comrades not to “seek fame and fortune.” Major decisions, Xi wrote, “should be decided according to collective wisdom and strict procedure.”


For 25 years Xi served in China’s grassroots, running every level of government – village, county, city, province. He led three dynamic regions – Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, and Shanghai that were by population, economic vitality, and social complexity the equivalent of three European nations.


Xi differs from his colleagues by the travails of his youth – his revolutionary hero father, Xi Zhongxun, was purged and humiliated by Mao Zedong for 16 years. As a result, a teenage Xi Jinping was packed off to a poor, remote mountain village where he spent six years chopping hay, reaping wheat, and herding sheep. He lived in a cave house.


Xi was strengthened by the harsh experience. Although a “princeling,” the offspring of a political leader (a millstone in Chinese politics), Xi is known for a common man’s touch. Xi has said, “Many of my practical ideas stem from my life during that period, which has influenced me every minute, even today. To truly understand common folk and society is fundamental.” Take food quality: As governor of Fujian, Xi improved the process “from farm to dining table.”


Characteristically cautious, Xi told me when I met him in 2006, “We should not overestimate our accomplishments or indulge ourselves in our achievements.” He called for China to see “the gap between where we are and where we have to go.” In order to learn the best practices from abroad to adapt at home, Xi has visited 47 countries.


Xi advised me that “to understand our dedication to revitalize our country, one should appreciate the pride Chinese people take in our ancient civilization.” Chinese “made great contributions to world civilization and enjoyed long-term prosperity,” he said, “then suffered national weakness, oppression, humiliation. Our deep self-motivation is rooted in our patriotism and pride.”


THE MONITOR'S VIEW: Future of China economy will force political reform


One could see this determined mind-set during Xi’s recent US trip, for which my colleague Adam Zhu and I prepared with Xi’s senior staff. Known for his disdain of “empty talk,” Xi chided his staff: “Don’t tell me what you think I want to hear. Tell me what you really think.” Reflecting his view that engaging the world is not just a matter of meeting other leaders, Xi’s visit to the US had a clear tripartite structure: diplomacy in Washington, people in Iowa, and business in Los Angeles. Throughout the visit, Xi was a man at ease – initiating spirited conversations, offering firm handshakes. He was having a grand time.


Xi’s personal motto is “Be proud, not complacent. Motivated, not pompous. Pragmatic, not erratic.” Comfortable with authority, Xi manifests none of the airs of a high official impressed with his own status.


Xi, of course, upholds the primacy of the party. Yet, recognizing China’s “earthshaking change,” he advises officials to embrace greater change – to “emancipate our minds and overcome the attitude of being satisfied with the status quo, the inertia of conservative and complacent thinking, the fear of difficulties, and timid thinking.”


Though some would have Xi quicken reform, political as well as economic, he will likely move slowly. Stability will continue as China’s touchstone.


One challenge for Xi Jinping is high expectations. A senior aide confided, “Xi is ready, but it won’t be easy.”


OPINION: China's political system is more flexible than US democracy


Where exactly Xi and his fellow Politburo Standing Committee members will take China is not clear. What is clear is that they will move forward with reform step by pragmatic step, not backward to Maoist nostalgia or cult of personality populism.


Robert Lawrence Kuhn, an international corporate strategist and investment banker, is a longtime advisor to China’s leaders. He is the author of “How China’s Leaders Think” and “The Man Who Changed China,” the biography of former President Jiang Zemin.


© 2012 Global Viewpoint Network/Tribune Media Services. Hosted online by The Christian Science Monitor.



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第一篇文章 重慶路線」和「廣東路線 -- 兩個不相容的發展經濟方式》(“Chongqing and Guangdong: two conflicting models")

作者 Yang Chan

內容 07/30/2011在北京舉行的圓桌論壇 理性探討廣東路線」和「重慶路線摘要

(“A rational discussion of the ‘Guangdong Model’ and the ‘Chongqing Model’”)


Mao Yushi, President, Unirule Institute, Beijing.

Xiao Bin, Professor and Vice President, Department of Public Affairs, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou.

Yang Fan, Professor, Department of Commerce, China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing.

Zhang Musheng, Vice Secretary, The Chinese Tax Institute, Beijing.

Qiu Feng, Vice President of the Science Committee, Unirule Institute, Beijing.

Xiao Shu, Senior Analyst, Nanfang Zhoumo weekly newspaper, Guangzhou.

Li Weidong, Political Analyst, former Director of the monthly China Reform, Beijing.

Shi Xiaomin, Senior Economist and Vice President, China Society of Economic Reform, Beijing.

Zhang Shuguang, Researcher, Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; President of the Academic Committee, Unirule Institute, Beijing.

Xu Dianqing, Professor, National School of Development at Peking University.

Gao Quanxi, Professor, Faculty of Law at the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics.

Li Shengping, Political Analyst and former Director of the Beijing Institute for Research in Social and Technological Development.

Cai Xia, Professor, Department of Teaching and Research on the Construction of the Party, Party School of the Central Committee of the CCP, Beijing.

Yang Ping, Director of the bimonthly Beijing Cultural Review.

Wang Zhanyang, Professor and Director, Research Department of Political Science, Institute of Socialist Studies, Beijing.

Zhou Hongling, President, Beijing “New Era” Institute for Research in Public Education.


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