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土耳其的崛起? - N. Ferguson
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The Mideast’s Next Dilemma

With Turkey flexing its muscles, we may soon face a revived Ottoman Empire.

Niall Ferguson, 06/19/11

On one issue the Republican contenders and the president they wish to replace are in agreement: the United States should reduce its military presence in the Greater Middle East. The preferred arguments are that America cannot afford to be engaged in combat operations in far-flung countries and that such operations are futile anyway.

The question no one wants to answer is what will come after the United States departs. The “happily ever after” scenario is that one country after another will embrace Western democracy. The nightmare scenario is either civil war or Islamist revolution. But a third possible outcome is a revived Ottoman Empire.

An Anatolian dynasty established on the ruins of the Byzantine Empire, the Ottomans were the standard-bearers of Islam after their conquest of Constantinople (now Istanbul) in 1453. Their empire extended deep into Central Europe, including Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary.

Having established Ottoman rule from Baghdad to Basra, from the Caucasus to the mouth of the Red Sea, and right along the Barbary Coast, Suleiman the Magnificent could claim: “I am the Sultan of Sultans, the Sovereign of Sovereigns … the shadow of God upon Earth.” The 17th century saw further Ottoman expansion into Crete and even western Ukraine.

Over the next two centuries, however, the empire became “the sick man of Europe,” losing most of its Balkan and North African possessions. World War I proved fatal; only the old Anatolian heartland was reconstituted as the Turkish republic. The rest was carved up between Britain and France.

And that seemed to be the end of the Ottoman era. Until very recently, the question people asked about Turkey was whether (or even when) it could join the European Union. Staunchly pro-American in the Cold War, the Turks seemed to have their gaze fixed unwaveringly on the West, just as the republic’s founder, Kemal Atatürk, had intended.

But since 2003, when Recep Tayyip Erdogan was elected prime minister, that has changed. The founder of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Erdogan is a seductive figure. To many, he is the personification of a moderate Islamism. He has presided over a period of unprecedented economic growth. He has sought to reduce the power of the military. It was no accident that one of President Obama’s first overseas trips was to Istanbul. It was no surprise when the AKP won a third consecutive general election earlier this month.

And yet we need to look more closely at Erdogan. For there is good reason to suspect he dreams of transforming Turkey in ways Suleiman the Magnificent would have admired.

In his early career as mayor of Istanbul, Erdogan was imprisoned for publicly reciting these lines by an early-20th-century Pan-Turkish poet: “The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets, and the faithful our soldiers.” His ambition, it seems clear, is to return to the pre-Atatürk era, when Turkey was not only militantly Muslim but also a regional superpower.

This explains his sustained campaign to alter the Turkish Constitution in ways that would likely increase his own power at the expense of the judiciary and the press as well as the military, all bastions of secularism. It explains his increasingly strident criticism of Israel’s “state terrorism” in Gaza, where pro-Palestinian activists sent a headline-grabbing flotilla last year. Above all, it explains his adroit maneuvers to exploit the opportunities presented by the Arab Spring, chastising Syria, seeking to check Iran, and offering himself as a role model.

“Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul,” declared Erdogan in his victory speech. “Beirut won as much as Izmir; Damascus won as much as Ankara; Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, Jerusalem won as much as Diyarbakir.”

The Turkish leader once compared democracy to a streetcar: “When you come to your stop, you get off.” We are in for a surprise if the destination under his leadership turns out to be a new Muslim empire in the Middle East.

http://www.newsweek.com/2011/06/19/turkey-the-mideast-s-next-dilemma.html



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伊朗權力鬥爭 -- T. Karon
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Enfeebling Ahmadinejad: Iran's President Downsized for Challenging the Ayatullah

Tony Karon, 06/22/11

How do you say "lame duck" in Farsi? (According to Google's translation service, the answer would be: علیل وناتوان) And in a twist worthy of Game of Thrones, less than two years after his disputed reelection and the brutal crackdown on opponents that followed, Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been reduced to a علیل وناتوان. And that's just about where the clerical Supreme Leader Ayatullah Ali Khamenei -- who abandoned the political neutrality required of his office in 2009 to hail Ahmadinejad as the candidate whose views were closest to his own -- wants the president.

On Tuesday, Iran's parliament moved closer to impeaching Ahmadinejad, after striking down the appointment of one of his allies to the post of Deputy Foreign Minister, and opening impeachment proceedings against the President's handpicked foreign minister, Ali Akhbar Salehi. And that's just the latest barrage of slings and arrows Ahmadinejad has suffered in the legislature, which just this week included canceling his merging of the ministries of transportation and housing, and forbidding his merging of the oil and energy ministries. Similar attacks have been coming for months in what has become open season on the controversial president within the corridors of power -- even while those that opposed him on the streets, and even at the hustings, remain on lock down.

It's not as if the Majlis, Iran's elected parliament (although both elections and legislation are limited by clerical supervision), has suddenly become the center of power in the Islamic Republic and is calling the reckless populist president to heel; parliament is castigating Ahmadinejad at the pleasure of Ayatullah Khamenei and the conservative clerical establishment. Khamenei had appeared to bet all his political chips on Ahmadinejad during the electoral dispute, backing the president and the security forces' vicious crackdown on those who opposed him (even though the leaders of the Green Movement opposition had pledged fealty to the theocratic system). At least, that's what Ahmadinejad appears to have believed, because he soon began pushing back at Khamenei's authority and moving to concentrate power in his own office.

Ahmadinejad also embraced a new ideological position threatening to the Islamic regime's traditional clerical elite, combining a millennarian claim to be connected with the messianic "Mahdi" figure of Shi'ite Islam (and therefore not needing clerical guidance in matters Islamic) with a new more secular Persian nationalism that de-emphasized the state's Islamic nature. As the clerics became increasingly alarmed by Ahmadinejad's unorthodox ideas and encroachment on their power, Khamenei struck in April, forcing the reinstatement of an intelligence minister fired by the President. Ahmadinejad retaliated with an unprecedented show of defiance, going on strike for 11 days. But he lost that showdown, and has been on the back foot ever since, under fire in parliament and seeing increasingly senior supporters and aides arrested and interrogated.

Don't expect impeachment to proceed to its conclusion, however. Those  close to Khamenei reportedly insist that the supreme leader, having humbled Ahmadinejad and clipped his wings, will allow the president to serve out the rest of his term -- "only, of course, if he mends his ways, rids himself of his unsavory aides and accepts his role as a mere foot soldier in the divine deliberations of the ayatollah," according to analyst Abbas Milani. "Ahmadinejad supposedly has two years left in office. As things stand today, it is unlikely that he will make it that long. And if, at the end, he is still somehow president, Ahmadinejad will surely be but a mere empty shell of the bombastic, combative, feverishly messianic persona he created for himself before the crisis began."

If the experience of Ahmadinejad's predecessor, Mohammed Khatami, is anything to go by, a علیل وناتوان president is precisely how Khamenei sees the role. None of that bodes particularly well for nuclear negotiations with Tehran.  Not that it necessarily makes things worse. The apparent outcome of the past two years of palace intrigue in Tehran  does suggest that the address for any dialogue with Iran is still the Supreme Leader. Not that he's necessarily much interested in the nuclear deals currently on offer from the West.

http://globalspin.blogs.time.com/2011/06/22/enfeebling-ahmadinejad-irans-once-cocky-president-pays-a-price-challenging-its-clerical-supremo/



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