謝謝你的指教。

關於第一點，如果我要強辯的話，我可以說不論有沒有全球化，人類活動可視為一個封閉系統，這當然是強辯。但也是我當初這樣想的一個(不充分)思路過程。

第二個的確"扯"得有點太超過，可說引喻失據。很高興能引起討論。

再謝。

胡老用熱力學第二定律來說明市場機制的限制，很有意思，很讓小弟耗費了點腦汁，不過思考的結論是這種說法應該不正確。

「市場」並不是個封閉的系統，它與“外界”(即人類經濟活動之外)總是不斷有能量的互相移動，譬如新生兒的誕生、人的死亡、新的農林漁礦資源的開發、原有物質資料的廢棄消滅等等，或者新觀念、新發明的產生也都是新加入系統的能量。

此外，「金錢」應該也不能算是驅動市場的能量，它只是市場內部活動的交換媒介。當然，這個媒介的充裕度會影響到市場活動的靈活度，但正常而言，它本身能產生的動力是很有限的(就是資金成本變動產生的動力)。我說“正常而言”指的是在“實質經濟活動”的情況下，只是事實上卻存在許多“非正常”的市場活動，也就是投機活動，或說金錢遊戲，那麼透過投機活動也可以產生市場動能，但那比較像癌細胞，並不是健康細胞。

扯遠一點，金錢遊戲這種癌細胞是無法避免的，因為“投資”和“投機”在本質上是難以區分的，若要殺死癌細胞就勢必會造成大量健康細胞的連帶傷亡，這是沒有“標靶藥物”的。因此，金錢遊戲是以市場機制為基礎的經濟活動的必要之惡。

In Fed We Trust, Sometimes: Bad decisions leave little room for faith.

Daniel Gross, 12/11/10

There’s an old saw in the investing world: don’t fight the Fed. Just as politicians shouldn’t square off with people who buy ink by the barrel, investors shouldn’t buck the folks who can print endless amounts of dollars. If the Fed says it wants rates to go down, and is prepared to buy bonds to make that happen, the market usually complies.

But not this time. Ever since Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke’s announcement in November that the central bank would purchase $600 billion in government bonds in an effort to lower interest rates, politicians, monetary officials, and investors seem to be spoiling for a fight. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble dubbed the policy “clueless.” A gaggle of right-wing economists and policy wonks penned an angry letter accusing Bernanke of economic malpractice. The bond markets threw a collective fit, pushing up interest rates in defiance. Some of these attacks are motivated by crass politics. But it’s clear now that the Fed no longer possesses the imperium it had in the 1990s because, too frequently, it has been behind the curve.

In the 1990s then-chairman Alan Greenspan was way ahead of economic trends. His reputation was cemented by a critical insight and gamble: advances in globalization, the advent of China into the world trading system, and the telecommunications revolution meant the U.S. could grow at a higher rate without risking inflation. But that was last century. Since then, the Fed’s record under Greenspan and Bernanke has been one of overshooting, furious rushes to catch up, and frequent displays of bewilderment.

After several months of a jobless recovery, Greenspan took the federal-funds rate down to 1 percent in 2003 and left it there for 13 months, even as the economy was powering ahead. His lethargy in raising rates allowed the housing bubble to inflate. The Fed similarly dozed through the subprime mess. In May 2007 Bernanke said, “We believe the effect of the troubles in the subprime sector on the broader housing market will likely be limited, and we do not expect significant spillovers from the subprime market to the rest of the economy or to the financial system.” In November 2007, when a congressman asked if subprime losses could reach $150 billion, Bernanke responded: “That’s in the ballpark.”

Bernanke, a fan of the woebegone Washington Nationals, must have had a large ballpark in mind. In June 2008, six months after the recession started, the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee reported the consensus among its members was that the economy would grow between 1 and 1.6 percent for the year. Oops! And despite having responsibility for overseeing the financial sector, and despite employing hundreds of economists, the Fed was continually surprised as one domino fell after another -- Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG, Lehman Brothers, the whole economic system.

The accumulation of behind-the-curve performances has harmed the central bank’s credibility. And the suspicion that the Fed remains in that position explains a good chunk of the market’s current skepticism. Given that the Fed rarely recognizes when the economy is about to shift into a higher gear or go into idle, why should we take its word that its $600 billion purchase of government bonds is all that stands between us and a double dip? And why should we take it on faith when it assures us that its policies won’t ignite inflation?

CBS’s 60 Minutes has long been a refuge for public figures seeking to restore credibility. So you can understand why Bernanke agreed to let Scott Pelley into the temple of monetary policy for the segment that aired Dec. 5. The gambit failed. In the days after Bernanke’s appearance, bond investors headed for the hills. Yields on the 10-year government bonds shot up to levels not seen in months. Sure, the tax deal between President Obama and congressional Republicans (implication: bigger deficits ahead) and perceptions that growth might accelerate played a part. But I can’t escape the feeling that the broad uncertainty about the Fed’s certainty accounted for a big chunk of the action.

Asked what degree of confidence he had in the Fed’s ability to control inflation, Bernanke responded: “One hundred percent.” Wrong answer, Ben! There are some historical dictums everyone should heed: Beware of Greeks bearing gifts. Don’t fight the Fed. And, oh, be cautious of financial titans who profess unvarnished confidence in their ability to manage affairs.

Gross is economics editor at Yahoo Finance.

http://www.newsweek.com/2010/12/11/the-fed-s-management-skills-inspire-little-faith.html

Bernanke defends bond buys, citing at-risk economy

Jeannine Aversa, Ap Economics Writer

WASHINGTON – Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke is stepping up his defense of the Fed's $600 billion Treasury bond-purchase plan, saying the economy is still struggling to become "self-sustaining" without government help.

In a taped interview with CBS' "60 Minutes" that aired Sunday night, Bernanke also argued that Congress shouldn't cut spending or boost taxes given how fragile the economy remains.

The Fed chairman said he thinks another recession is unlikely. But he warned that the economy could suffer a slowdown if persistently high unemployment dampens consumer spending.

The interview is part of a broad counteroffensive Bernanke has been waging against critics of the bond purchase plan the Fed announced Nov. 3. The purchases are intended to lower long-term interest rates, lift stock prices and encourage more spending to boost the economy.

Critics, from Republicans in Congress to some officials within the Fed, say they fear the Fed's intervention could spur inflation and speculative buying on Wall Street while doing little to aid the economy.

On other issues in the "60 Minutes" interview, Bernanke:

• Argued that unemployment would have been far higher — "something like it was in the Depression, 25 percent" — had the Fed not provided extraordinary aid to Wall Street firms, banks and other companies to ease a credit crisis.

• Said it could take four or five more years for unemployment, now at 9.8 percent, to fall to a historically normal 5 percent or 6 percent.

• Reiterated that the Fed is prepared to buy even more than $600 billion in Treasury bonds over the next eight months, should it decide the economy needs the fuel of even lower interest rates.

• Argued that the risk of inflation is overblown. Bernanke said he's "100 percent" confident the Fed will be able to ward off inflation, when the time is right, by raising interest rates and unwinding its stimulative programs.

• Called the risk of deflation — a prolonged drop in prices, wages and the values of homes and stocks — "pretty low." He said the likelihood would have been greater if the Fed weren't maintaining super-low interest rates.

• Urged Congress to improve the nation's tax code "by closing loopholes and lowering rates" for individuals and companies. He said doing so would create greater incentives for people to invest.

In material from the interview that didn't make CBS' broadcast but was later posted online in video form, Bernanke reiterated his view that an artificially low Chinese currency is "bad for the American economy because it hurts our trade."

It isn't helpful for China, either, he said, because it makes it harder for Beijing's policymakers to keep China's economy and inflation from overheating.

Critics who fear the Fed's bond purchases are raising the risk of inflation have complained that the purchases mean the Fed is, in effect, printing more money. In the interview, Bernanke called that a "myth." He insisted the Fed isn't printing money when it buys Treasurys and said the program won't expand the amount of money in circulation in a "significant way."

Lou Crandall, chief economist at Wrightson ICAP, said Bernanke is right that the Fed's purchases won't significantly change the amount of money circulating in the economy. That's mainly because banks aren't lending most of the money they already hold in reserve. When the Fed buys Treasurys, it increases the reserves in the banking system. For those reserves to actually "create" money, the banks would have to lend it.

Still, Crandall suggested that the bond-buying program creates the appearance of printing money, something that could put the central bank's credibility at stake.

Bernanke's appearance Sunday night is part of a public-relations blitz he's mounted since the Fed announced the program Nov. 3. In private and public appearances, Bernanke has sought to explain and defend the program to ordinary Americans, investors and lawmakers on Capitol Hill.

His efforts have included an Op-Ed article in The Washington Post and discussions with students in Jacksonville, Fla., economists in Jekyll Island, Ga., business people in Columbus, Ohio, central bankers in Europe and members of the Senate Banking Committee.

Criticism has come from both home and abroad. Officials in China, Germany, Brazil and other countries have argued that the Fed's plan is a scheme to give U.S. exporters a competitive edge by keeping the value of the dollar weak. A weak dollar makes U.S. goods cheaper abroad and foreign goods more expensive in the U.S.

It's rare for a sitting Fed chairman to grant an interview, whether for broadcast or print. But this was Bernanke's second appearance on "60 Minutes." His first was in March 2009. At the time, he was facing anger over Wall Street bailouts and rising anxiety about the economy.

In the interview that aired Sunday, Bernanke pointed out that the economy is growing at an annual pace of around 2.5 percent — far too slow to reduce unemployment. For a self-sustaining recovery, consumers and businesses would need to spend more, so the economy could grow faster.

Bernanke has said he hopes the Fed's bond-buying program will help lift stock prices. In part, that's because lower yields on bonds would cause some people to shift money into stocks.

Higher stock prices would boost the wealth and confidence of individuals and businesses. Spending would rise, lifting incomes, profits and economic growth. Bernanke has referred to this as a "virtuous cycle."

But when asked in the interview whether the recovery is self-sustaining, Bernanke responded: "It may not be. It's very close to the border."

Given the economy's still-weak growth, he said: "We're not very far from the level where the economy is not self-sustaining."

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20101206/ap_on_bi_ge/us_bernanke60_minutes;_ylt=AnKD0COSzBYq0Q6_ZnG1oMMbr7sF;_ylu=X3oDMTJvcTU0aG1mBGFzc2V0A2FwLzIwMTAxMjA2L3VzX2Jlcm5hbmtlNjBfbWludXRlcwRjcG9zAzYEcG9zAzYEc2VjA3luX3RvcF9zdG9yaWVzBHNsawNiZXJuYW5rZWRlZmU-

Ben Bernanke hopes his risky plan will perk up the economy

Wednesday, October 20, 2010

ON NOV. 2, voters go to the polls -- and, perhaps as important, the Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve Board convenes in Washington. All indications are that the Fed will embark on a major effort to stimulate the economy. With unemployment still high and inflation threatening to become deflation, Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke seems to believe that the Fed should act, lest the economy slip into permanent, Japan-like stagnation -- or worse. His determination is laudable but risky. The unorthodox approach he seems to favor could easily have negative side effects.

The Fed has exhausted its usual means of increasing the money supply: lowering the interest rate at which banks may lend one another their reserves held at the Fed. This so-called federal funds rate is now zero. You can't go any lower than that, so the Fed has expanded the money supply further through "quantitative easing": buying more than a trillion dollars' worth of mortgage-backed securities with freshly printed money. Now the Fed is poised for more such "quantitative easing" -- market mavens call it "QE2" -- in an effort to bring long-term interest rates down further.

The case for QE2 is straightforward. By bidding up the price, and thus lowering the yield, of Treasuries and other safe debt instruments, the Fed encourages investors to put their money into different, potentially higher-yielding investments such as stocks. This reduces the cost of capital for businesses, which enables them to expand, which creates jobs. Other hoped-for effects include a further slide in home mortgage rates and greater demand for U.S. exports. A student of the Great Depression and Japan's recent deflationary woes, Mr. Bernanke has long believed that those disasters could have been avoided through timely, aggressive central bank intervention. After QE2, no one will be able to accuse him of sleeping on the job.

But QE2 is a gamble, as Mr. Bernanke acknowledges. "We have much less experience in judging the economic effects of this policy instrument," he said on Oct. 15, "which makes it challenging to determine the appropriate quantity and pace of purchases and to communicate this policy response to the public."

The risks include, crucially, a surge in commodity prices, which have already taken off in anticipation of QE2. Higher prices for food and gasoline would cancel out some of the growth QE2 might achieve. A cheaper dollar might indeed help exports -- or it could set off asset bubbles in emerging markets and trigger competitive devaluations by U.S. trading partners. Though inflation remains well below the Fed's target of roughly 2 percent, it's not clear how the Fed will sop up all the extra liquidity it's creating once growth resumes.

The deeper fear is that QE2 is a cyclical solution to a structural problem. Many corporations are flush with cash already but simply don't see enough opportunities for profitable investment within the United States. The list of reasons include households with too much debt; political and policy uncertainty; a growing mismatch between the skills of unemployed U.S. workers and the available work; and a broader shift in economic dynamism from the developed to emerging markets.

It's worth remembering that Mr. Bernanke, like many others, hoped that one round of quantitative easing, plus fiscal stimulus, would be enough to turn the economy around. He now says that the Fed will "proceed with some caution" toward QE2. Given the uncertainties, that's a promise we hope he'll keep.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/19/AR2010101906476.html

1.     背景資訊(續)

1.4   債券的特質

在討論「銀根爆量」前，我們還需要先了解「債券」的特性。邀請網友的說明相當清楚，我在此略做補充。

發行債券的包括(中央)政府機構、地方政府、和公司行號。債券基本上是債券發行者所寫(印行)的欠條。而持有債券者則相當於放款或貸款的人。債券有三個要素：債券面值、債券(固定)利率、和債券償還(兌現)期限。當然，我們也要考慮債券發行者到期償還債券的可靠度。

如果持有債券者只計畫每年收到利息，然後到期還本，則債券和固定利率的定存相當。當債券持有者需要現金週轉，或視市場利率打算就利息收入做其他更適當的規劃，就產生了債券市場的買賣活動。

由於債券的利率固定，當市場(當下)利率高於債券利率時，出售債券者需要降價求售。反之，當市場(當下)利率低於債券利率時，出售債券者可以用高於面值的價格售出。

舉個例子，如果市場利率是6%而債券利率是5%，則只有傻瓜才會放棄6%的(當下)利率去買5%的債券。假設債券面值是100元，而持有者願意降價求售(如84元)，則因為發行機構付利息時仍以面值計算，所以買債券者用84元可以得到(近於)5元的利息收入，利率相當於時下的6%(84X0.06 = 5)，但她/他同時以84元代價得到100元的商品，償還時可以淨賺16元。自然有人會做這筆生意。

反之，如果市場利率是4%而債券利率是5%，則可能有投資人願意出略高的價格(如125元)去買利率5%的債券，因為他/她可以得到(相當於時下4%利率)的利息收入。因此，債券的價格(在面值之外)隨市場利率的變動而反向升降。

同理，當債券市場價格上升時，持有債券者可以脫手變現，所以放款者必須降低利率，持有債券者才肯跟他/她借錢。反之，當債券市場價格低於面值時，由於債券持有人可能不願意脫手，放款者可以提高利率，債券持有人仍然可能願意付利息借錢。

以上的說明，並沒有考慮其他因素，如鈔票貶值的可能或債券發行機構破產的風險。雖然如此，這個理論在我看來有其說不通的地方(由我上一段強調「債券持有人」可見端倪)。當然，我這個看法很可能是由於我無知。我就留待債券達人或高手來解釋了。

債券和其他商品一樣，其價格受供求原理影響。當聯儲會收購債券時，相當於哄抬債券價格。美國聯儲會就利用這個機制，以買賣債券操縱市場利率，從而控制銀根或貨幣供應量。聯儲會所買賣的債券，以美國財政部發行的長、短期公債為主。

2.      聯儲會債券交易和銀根的關係

媒體上常說聯儲會「印鈔票」。「印鈔票」是一個傳統或過時的用詞。事實上，聯儲會並沒有權力或機器「印」鈔票。何以聯儲會買債券會造成「銀根爆量」？

首先，美國各地區/城市構成聯儲系統的聯邦儲備銀行是所謂「銀行的銀行」，它們並不辦理「庶民」的業務。這是邀請網友指出聯儲會有「調整貼現率」和「調整存款準備率」等權力或功能的原因。其次，聯儲會也不直接向「庶民」買賣債券。而是向持有債券的各級銀行或金融機構購買。當聯儲會購買債券時，它並不需要用到現金。它只要告訴某銀行或金融機構：

本會向貴行購買1個億美元的債券，請貴行在「帳面」上將該債券移轉到聯儲會名下，本會則在貴行「帳面」上增加1個億的美元。

當銀行帳面上多了1個億時，表示它的儲備金多了1個億。照規定，銀行可以貸款的額度是其儲備金的倍數。假設放款額度是儲備金的5倍，則該銀行憑其帳面上(不是實際上)所多的1個億，就可多貸出5個億的美元。依照聯儲會計畫，它將在8個月內購買6,000億美元的債券，根據以上5倍比例的假設，美國各地銀行可以在今後8個月內，多貸放30,000個億的美元。

由於全球化和電腦化的結果，現在金融交易(除了貪污和在地黑社會的運作外)都是電子轉帳，或稱高科技五鬼搬運。

這是聯儲會購買債券造成「銀根爆量」的原理和機制，也是全球各國擔憂「熱錢」湧入的原因。否則，30,000個億的美元要多少個和多大的皮箱才能「湧入」各國？

3.   銀根爆量方案的目的(功能)和效能

聯儲會採取這個措施的背景自然是金融風暴後，目前美國失業率高達9.6%和低通膨或通貨緊縮。2010的GDP成長率預估在2%上下，經濟近於停滯。根據上述貨幣理論和市場需要注入新能量的自然法則，聯儲會在黔驢技窮下，只能祭出銀根爆量方案。此方案試圖達到兩個目的：

a.   降低長期利率，鼓勵企業和民間借貸；

b.   增加銀行放款額度，使得願意借貸的企業和民間人士有足夠的頭寸可以調度。

聯儲會主席柏南齊宣稱這個措施能帶動美國企業界的投資走勢和民間消費能力，從而減低失業率和幫助美國經濟復甦。

它的一個附帶效應則是

c.   使美元貶值。

在理論上「美元貶值」號稱能夠增加美國出口商品的競爭力。但這個說法其實有兩個盲點。

1)   同性質的商品才有在價格上「競爭」的問題。中國的商品(除了軍火火之外)至少在過去並不和美國商品競爭。

2)   價格並不單單由成本和匯率兩者決定。利潤也佔售價相當大的比例。各國政府與其在匯率上做文章，何不比較一下各國的「利潤政策」？難道聯儲會的柏南齊、美國商務部官員、和美國商會領袖不懂「薄利多銷」的原則？

至於銀根爆量方案是否能達到柏南齊所宣稱的效果，則此處已轉貼了一些專家的評論，我就不冒充內行了。

* 本文所用術語或資料都可在網上搜尋到。先偷個懶，以後有空再補齊。