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淺談「理性」
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0. 前言

0.1 兩種「理性」

我常常使用到「理性」這個概念。網友Dr. Boris Chang曾就此概念賜教(Chang 2006:留言︰#129、130、131、135、和141),我和他就理性一詞的意義做了一些對談(胡卜凱2006:留言︰#132、133、134、136、和137)。我借這個機會把自己對理性的了解或「用法」做一個比較詳細的說明。歡迎指教和討論。

首先我所用的「理性」不同於哲學中的「理性」一詞的「用法」(1)。

哲學中的「理性」:

「1. 智力。將(事件、事物等)一般化,了解來龍去脈,看出相關性,深思反省,比較同、異等等的能力。2. 推理能力(2)。」

哲學中的「理性論」或「理性主義」:

「一般而言,理性論指認為理性是(人類)知識主要來源的看法。(理性論者)認為(在取得知識過程中)理性先於,高於,和獨立於感官知覺(3)。」

心理分析學中的「合理化」一詞,請看第4.3節 – a中關於「找藉口」的說明。但是在心理分析治療過程中,「合理化」的概念有相當廣泛和複雜的功能,其作用並不限於「找藉口」。這一部分請參考(Horney 1966︰28 - 30頁)。

由於這些術語和相關的(哲學中)「理性論者」過於專門,本文將不討論這些概念。基本上,(哲學中)「理性論者」所說的「理性」這個概念,指人生來就有的一種官能。我所用的「理性」一詞,指人通過經驗而取得或學習到的一種能力。請見以下第1、2兩節的討論。

0.2 我的基本假設

唯物論和經驗論是我接受的許多基本假設中的兩個。我對前者的詮釋請見(胡卜凱2002)。認識論中的「經驗論」:

「1. 所有的觀念來自組織(集合、重組)過去的經驗(觀察到的,直接呈現於感官和感覺的),並將它們抽象化;2. 經驗是知識的唯一來源;… (4)。」

我正試圖綜合社會建構論和大腦神經網路連接論的說法,來建立一個「唯物人文觀」的論述(胡卜凱2006︰留言#132,第1.2節)。「唯物人文觀」的理論基礎之一,可以用Feldman教授的一段話來說明︰

「思想是有一定條理的神經活動。我們的語言和我們的思想及經驗緊密連結在一起,無法分開。… 我們所有的思想和語言都來自我們的生理結構和經驗(5)。」

這些看法是我了解「理性」這個概念的思想淵源。

0.3 本文結構

a. 第一節討論「理性」一詞的各種用法;
b. 第二節討論社會科學和日常生活語言中,(我所了解的)「理性」一詞中「理」的兩種「意義」或「用法」(5);
c. 第三節討論我就「理性」所下的定義;
d. 第四節討論和「理性」一詞相關的其他概念;
e. 第五節建議如何批駁我在本文中對「理性」一詞所採取的觀點;
f. 第六節中,我摘譯八段西方學者對「理性」的詮釋,補充我的論述。

1. 「理性」一詞的用法

1.1 「理性」一詞的各種用法

「理性」一詞在中、英文裏都有很多「意思」相近的衍生詞,人們用它們來表達和「理性」相近的一些概念或觀念,例如︰

a. 「理性的」、「合理的」、「講理的」、「有道理的」、「說得通的」、或「務實的」,
b. 「理由」或「判斷依據」,
c. 「『合理』的性質(條件)」,
d. 「推理」,和
e. 「推理能力」

等等以及其他類似的「用法」。以上「『合理』的性質(條件)」︰

一個行動需要或具有這些性質(條件),才能用「合理的」這個形容詞來描述。

1.2 實質理性和功能理性

Mannheim將社會學中「理性」一詞的意義歸納成兩種,「實質理性」和「功能理性」:

「社會學家在使用『理性』和『不理性』一詞時,有兩種不同的意義:我稱它們為『實質上』和『功能上』理性的或非理性的。『實質上理性的』指在某一個情況下,能睿智的了解到各事件內在關係的思考行為。因此,我以『實質上理性的』來形容睿智思考本身:其他的(思考)行為如錯誤的推理,或非思考行為(例如無論有意識或下意識的欲求、衝動、希冀、和感受等等,我稱為『實質上非理性的』。

另一方面,在社會學和日常生活語言中,我們也用到『理性』的第二個「意義」,例如:這個或那個企業或政府機構已完成『合理化』的過程。…。這一個『合理化』的意思指:為了達到一個預定目標所展開的一序列行動。在這一序列行動中的每一個環節,都有它被預定的功能和角色。更重要的是,當我們能協調規劃這一序列行動,依預定目標,採取最有效的方法來完成這些行動時,『合理化』會發揮它最大的威力。(這就是我所說的『功能上理性的』) (6)。」

1.3 「行動理性」(「工具理性」、「效益理性」)

在當下社會科學和哲學論述中,韋伯的「行動理性」經常被引用。以下是對他這個概念的詮釋之一︰

「行動理性是現代性和資本主義的通性,其特徵是用最有效的方式來達到一個(預定的)目的(7)。」

我認為「行動理性」和「功能理性」是相通的兩個概念。

2. 「理」字的兩種「所指」

在上面各種用法中,「『理』性」、「合「『理』」、和「推「『理』」等詞中的「理」這個「指號」,有兩種「所指」︰

a. 由現實情況(或稱「外在環境」)歸納出來的經驗法則。
b. 在某個社會中,多數人接受或遵從某些約定俗成的「習慣」(規範)或「規則」。

2.1 來自現實情況的「理」

「理性」一詞中「理」字的第一類概念來自現實情況。它相當於日常生活語言中的「務實」。中國古人稱這種處事的方式為「實事求是」;相當於上述曼罕的「功能理性」或韋伯的「行動理性」。這類「理」是人類根據過去某些一再重複或屢試不爽的「經驗」所累積的「法則」。也就是說:

在某種情況下,那種行為模式成功(達到目標或目的)的或然率最大。

所以這類「理」相當於俗話說的「經驗法則」。

以上的「經驗」一詞:

「…,(它)不只指個人經驗,也包括他人經驗(書籍、教育、交往等等)和集體經驗(文化、學問等等)。」(胡卜凱2006︰留言#133)

這是社會科學中「經驗」一詞的通行用法。

此外,「經驗」這個概念本身蘊含它是一個人經歷過某些「現實情況」才得到的記憶或教訓。「現實情況」有兩個部分,「自然環境」和「社會環境」。在本文中,視上、下文的脈絡,「社會」和「文化」兩字有時是同義詞。

a. 「自然環境」並不受「文化」或「社會」因素的「制約」或影響。因此,通過「自然環境」部分而得的「經驗法則」,沒有特別的「文化性」或「社會性」。這是何以不論東、西社會,在大多數情況下,從「現實情況」而來的「理」或「經驗法則」,都有一些「客觀」的判準。例如:一個人為了「失戀」或「輸掉奧運金牌」而自殺;花個500到1,000萬台幣減肥等等,大概都在「非理性」行為之列。至於不要玩火,不要抽煙,不要沉迷於賭博之類也是同一類型的「理性」。因為不論在那個社會,這些行為(自殺、玩火、抽煙、賭博)都會對個人身體或財務帶來具體的負面後果。
b. 「社會環境」則是文化和歷史所建構的環境。歷史在此指有人類以來的活動經過及文字記錄。「社會環境」就是人類意識創造的環境。從這一部分得到的「經驗法則」,雖然也具有「現實性」,但它們受到過去「文化」或「社會」因素的「制約」或影響。也就會或需要被詮釋。

「意識」一詞在這裏完全沒有任何先天或神秘的意涵。(對我來說)它純粹是人類神經系統和外在環境互動的結果。

「社會」一詞在此不但指一個社會當下所面對的種種因素,也包括:一個社會所在地成員的文化和歷史因素,以及和此社會互動的其他社會(成員所建立)的文化和歷史因素。

「主觀性」指個人獨特的經驗。「獨特」除了指一個人的家庭和經歷這些個人因素外,也包括他/她由基因而來的生理結構(包括大腦神經系統的結構及各種神經傳導質)。後者使我們每一個人在相同的外在環境中,有他/她「獨特」的「刺激 -- 反應」模式(8)。我以此解釋何以每個人有其「主觀性」,即個別的「感受」或「主觀性質」。請參考第4.1節「人際相通性」的討論。

用一般語言來說,「社會環境」有其「主觀性」。

2.2 約定俗成的「理」

「理性」一詞中「理」字的第二類概念來自社會和文化,相當於「道理」,它包括:

天理、人情、世故、道德、習俗、和規則等。

這類「道理」是「約定俗成」的「理」,也就是「社會『建構(制約)』」和/或「文化『建構(制約)』」的「理」。換句話說,它們的來源或背景是文化傳統和「社會環境」。因此,它們具有個別的「文化性」或「社會性」。以這類「理」為準則的思考中,被某一個社會成員視為「理性」的行為,在某些情況下,未必被另一個社會的成員視為「理性」。反之亦然。「約定俗成」的「理」通常具有「主觀性」。例如︰

古代中國和日本的將領或武士,有「死節」的行為模式或規範。打仗常常要「戰至最後一兵一卒。」敗軍之將有時也以自殺或切腹來表示負責或擔當;或對自己沒有達到預定目標的自我懲罰。

西方軍事傳統中,在兩軍對峙的情況下,一旦一方認為大勢已去,其統帥就和對方協議「不受屈辱的投降」(9)。在西方社會中,達成這種方式的「投降」來避免無謂(「非理性」)的傷亡,才是一個將領「負責任」和「有擔當」的行為。

3. 「理性」的定義

在我接受的基本假設下(第0節),加上我對「理」這個概念的詮釋(本文第2節),(我認為)自然就得到我對「理性」這個概念的定義︰

「使用過去經驗來選擇和規劃當下或未來行動的能力。」(胡卜凱2006︰開欄文,4.3 – 2)節)

我相信在我的前提下,我對「理性」的定義是說得通的,而且這個定義有其實際應用。

這個「理性」的定義和「目的」(「目標」)以及「資源」這兩個概念有相當密切或內在的關係。「行動」的定義是:有「目的」的行為;試圖達到「目的」一定需要使用「資源」;「理性」的功能或使用「理性」的動機,在「有效」的達到這個「行動」的「目的」。

所以,沒有「目的」的行為未必需要使用「理性」。而在不需要講究「有效」的情況下,例如一個擁有無限「資源」的行動者,或只有當下這個(而再沒有其他)「目的」的行動者(如決定自殺的人),也未必需要使用「理性」(胡卜凱2006:留言#159)。


(待續)



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「理性」與其他議題
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上一篇貼文《何以人有理性以及理性的功能(The War on Reason – P. Bloom)的重點在討論「理性」,但其論述內容和本欄所觸及的其他幾個議題都相關。可以互相參照。例如:

 

Bloom教授對某些大腦神經學家與社會心理學家的批評,可視為【研究學問的盲點與歧路】一欄主題的例證,以及指出何以這些盲點與歧路會產生的原因。他的論述可以支持我在《「自由意志」的討論》一文中的觀點;也是對否定人有「自由意志」學者論述的批駁這些說法請見「自由意志」的討論】一欄貼文

 

這些議題都很重要(對我來說)也都很有趣,歡迎參與討論。

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何以人有理性以及理性的功能 – P. Bloom
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The War on Reason                                     

 

Scientists and philosophers argue that human beings are little more than puppets of their biochemistry. Here's why they're wrong.

 

Paul Bloom, the Atlantic (March Issue), 02/19/14

 

Aristotle’s definition of man as a rational animal has recently taken quite a beating.

 

Part of the attack comes from neuroscience. Pretty, multicolored fMRI maps make clear that our mental lives can be observed in the activity of our neurons, and we’ve made considerable progress in reading someone’s thoughts by looking at those maps. It’s clear, too, that damage to the brain can impair the most-intimate aspects of ourselves, such as the capacity to make moral judgments or to inhibit bad actions. To some scholars, the neural basis of mental life suggests that rational deliberation and free choice are illusions. Because our thoughts and actions are the products of our brains, and because what our brains do is determined by the physical state of the world and the laws of physics -- perhaps with a dash of quantum randomness in the mix -- there seems to be no room for choice. As the author and neuroscientist Sam Harris has put it, we are “biochemical puppets.”

 

This conception of what it is to be a person fits poorly with our sense of how we live our everyday lives. It certainly feels as though we make choices, as though we’re responsible for our actions. The idea that we’re entirely physical beings also clashes with the age-old idea that body and mind are distinct. Even young children believe themselves and others to be not just physical bodies, subject to physical laws, but also separate conscious entities, unfettered from the material world. Most religious thought has been based on this kind of dualist worldview, as showcased by John Updike in Rabbit at Rest, when Rabbit talks to his friend Charlie about Charlie’s recent surgery:

 

“Pig valves.” Rabbit tries to hide his revulsion. “Was it terrible? They split your chest open and ran your blood through a machine?”

“Piece of cake. You’re knocked out cold. What’s wrong with running your blood through a machine? What else you think you are, champ?”

A God-made one-of-a-kind with an immortal soul breathed in. A vehicle of grace. A battlefield of good and evil. An apprentice angel …

“You’re just a soft machine,” Charlie maintains.

 

I bristle at that just, but the evidence is overwhelming that Charlie is right. We are soft machines -- amazing machines, but machines nonetheless. Scientists have reached no consensus as to precisely how physical events give rise to conscious experience, but few doubt any longer that our minds and our brains are one and the same.

 

Another attack on rationality comes from social psychology. Hundreds of studies now show that factors we’re unaware of influence how we think and act. College students who fill out a questionnaire about their political opinions when standing next to a dispenser of hand sanitizer become, at least for a moment, more politically conservative than those standing next to an empty wall. Shoppers walking past a bakery are more likely than other shoppers to make change for a stranger. Subjects favor job applicants whose résumés are presented to them on heavy clipboards. Supposedly egalitarian white people who are under time pressure are more likely to misidentify a tool as a gun after being shown a photo of a black male face.

 

In a contemporary, and often unacknowledged, rebooting of Freud, many psychologists have concluded from such findings that unconscious associations and attitudes hold powerful sway over our lives -- and that conscious choice is largely superfluous. “It is not clear,” the Baylor College neuroscientist David Eagleman writes, “how much the conscious you -- as opposed to the genetic and neural you -- gets to do any deciding at all.” The New York University psychologist Jonathan Haidt suggests we should reject the notion that we are in control of our decisions and instead think of the conscious self as a lawyer who, when called upon to defend the actions of a client, mainly provides after-the-fact justifications for decisions that have already been made.

 

Such statements have produced a powerful backlash. What they represent, many people feel, are efforts at a hostile takeover of the soul: an assault on religious belief, on traditional morality, and on common sense. Derisory terms like neurotrash, brain porn, and (for the British) neurobollocks are often thrown around. Some people, such as the novelist Marilynne Robinson and the writer and critic Leon Wieseltier, argue that science has inappropriately ventured outside its scope and has still failed to capture the rich and transcendent nature of human experience. The author and clinical neuroscientist Raymond Tallis worries that such theories suggest no meaningful gap separates man and beast, a position that he argues, in Aping Mankind, is “not merely intellectually derelict but dangerous.”

 

For the most part, I’m on the side of the neuroscientists and social psychologists -- no surprise, given that I’m a psychologist myself. Work in fields such as computational cognitive science, behavioral genetics, and social neuroscience has yielded great insights about human nature. I do worry, though, that many of my colleagues have radically overstated the implications of their findings. The genetic you and the neural you aren’t alternatives to the conscious you. They are its foundations.

 

Knowing that we are physical beings doesn’t tell us much. The interesting question is what sort of physical beings we are.

 

Nobody can deny that we are sometimes biochemical puppets. In 2000, an otherwise normal Virginia man started to collect child pornography and make sexual advances toward his prepubescent stepdaughter. He was sentenced to spend time in a rehabilitation center, only to be expelled for making lewd advances toward staff members and patients. The next step was prison, but the night before he was to be incarcerated, severe headaches sent him to the hospital, where doctors discovered a large tumor on his brain. After they removed it, his sexual obsessions disappeared. Months later, his interest in child pornography returned, and a scan showed that the tumor had come back. Once again it was removed, and once again his obsessions disappeared.

 

Other examples of biochemical puppetry abound. A pill used to treat Parkinson’s disease can lead to pathological gambling; date-rape drugs can induce a robot-like compliance; sleeping pills can lead to sleep-binging and sleep-driving. These cases -- some of which are discussed in detail by David Eagleman in Incognito: The Secret Lives of the Brain (excerpted in the July/August 2011 Atlantic) -- intrigue and trouble us because they involve significant actions that are disengaged from the normal mechanisms of conscious deliberation. When the victims are brought back to normal -- the drug wears off; the tumor is removed -- they feel sincerely that their desires and actions under the influence were alien to them, and fell outside the scope of their will.

 

For Eagleman, these examples highlight the need for a legal framework and criminal-justice system that can take into account our growing understanding of brain science. What we need, he argues, is “a shift from blame to biology.” This is reasonable enough. It’s hardly neurobollocks to think we should take the existence of a tumor into account when determining criminal responsibility for a sex offense.

 

But some cases raise thorny questions. Philosophers -- and judges and juries -- might disagree, for instance, as to whether an adult’s having been horrifically abused as a child can be considered as exculpatory as having a tumor. If the abuse visibly changed a person’s brain and stripped it of its full capacity for deliberation, should that count as a mitigating condition in court? What about individuals, such as certain psychopaths, who appear incapable of empathy and compassion? Should that diminish their responsibility for cruel actions?

 

Other cases are easier. It’s not hard to see the psychological distinction between the cold-blooded planning of a Mafia hit man and the bizarre actions of a paranoid schizophrenic. As you read this article, your actions are determined by physical law, but unless you have been drugged, or have a gun to your head, or are acting under the influence of a behavior-changing brain tumor, reading it is what you have chosen to do. You have reasons for that choice, and you can decide to stop reading if you want. If you should be doing something else right now -- picking up a child at school, say, or standing watch at a security post -- your decision to continue reading is something you are morally responsible for.

 

Some determinists would balk at this. The idea of “choosing” to stop (or choosing anything at all), they suggest, implies a mystical capacity to transcend the physical world. Many people think about choice in terms of this mystical capacity, and I agree with the determinists that they’re wrong. But instead of giving up on the notion of choice, we can clarify it. The deterministic nature of the universe is fully compatible with the existence of conscious deliberation and rational thought -- with neural systems that analyze different options, construct logical chains of argument, reason through examples and analogies, and respond to the anticipated consequences of actions, including moral consequences. These processes are at the core of what it means to say that people make choices, and in this regard, the notion that we are responsible for our fates remains intact.

 

But this is where philosophy ends and psychology begins. It might be possible that we are physical beings who can use reason and make choices. But haven’t the psychologists shown us that this is wrong, that reason is an illusion? The sorts of findings I began this article with -- about the surprising relationship between bakery smells and altruism, or between the weight of a résumé and how a job candidate is judged -- are often taken to show that our everyday thoughts and actions are not subject to conscious control.

 

This body of research has generated a lot of controversy, and for good reason: some of the findings are fragile, have been enhanced by repeated testing and opportunistic statistical analyses, and are not easily replicated. But some studies have demonstrated robust and statistically significant relationships. Statistically significant, however, doesn’t mean actually significant. Just because something has an effect in a controlled situation doesn’t mean that it’s important in real life. Your impression of a résumé might be subtly affected by its being presented to you on a heavy clipboard, and this tells us something about how we draw inferences from physical experience when making social evaluations. Very interesting stuff. But this doesn’t imply that your real-world judgments of job candidates have much to do with what you’re holding when you make those judgments. What will probably matter much more are such boringly relevant considerations as the candidate’s experience and qualifications.

 

Sometimes small influences can be important, and sometimes studies really are worth their press releases. It’s relevant that people whose polling places are schools are more likely to vote for sales taxes that will fund education. Or that judges become more likely to deny parole the longer they go without a break. Or that people serve themselves more food when using a large plate. Such effects, even when they’re small, can make a practical difference, especially when they influence votes and justice and health. But their existence doesn’t undermine the idea of a rational and deliberative self. To think otherwise would be like concluding that because salt adds flavor to food, nothing else does.

 

The same goes for stereotyping. Hundreds of studies have found that individuals, including those who explicitly identify themselves as egalitarian, make assumptions about people based on whether they are men or women, black or white, Asian or Jewish. Such assumptions have real-world consequences. They help determine how employers judge job applications; they motivate young children to interact with some individuals and not others; they influence police officers as they decide whether or not to shoot somebody. These are important findings. But as the Rutgers psychologist Lee Jussim points out in his recent book, Social Perception and Social Reality, these studies don’t mean what many people think they do.

 

For one thing, we apply stereotypes in a limited way, mainly when judging strangers. When we know someone, we’re far more influenced by facts about that individual than about the categories he or she belongs to. To a striking degree, too, we know what our stereotypes are. Ask people about their stereotypes of gay men, the elderly, or lawyers, say, and what they’ll tell you is likely to align pretty well with what social psychologists have found in their studies of unconscious bias. Furthermore, many stereotypes are accurate. To take one of the most obvious examples:

 

men really are more prone to violence and sexual assault than women are.

 

If you need to quickly judge the threat posed by a stranger standing at the corner of the street you’re about to walk down at night, you’ll probably fall back on this stereotype, consciously and unconsciously. And you’ll be right to do so.

 

None of this is to defend stereotyping. Strong moral arguments exist for why we should often try to ignore stereotypes or override them. But we shouldn’t assume they represent some irrational quirk of the unconscious mind. In fact, they’re largely the consequence of the mind’s attempt to make a rational decision.

 

A more general problem with the conclusions that people draw from the social-psychological research has to do with which studies get done, which papers get published, and which findings get known. Everybody loves nonintuitive findings, so researchers are motivated to explore the strange and nonrational ways in which the mind works. It’s striking to discover that when assigning punishment to criminals, people are influenced by factors they consciously believe to be irrelevant, such as how the attractive criminals are, and the color of their skin. This finding will get published in the top journals, and might make its way into the Science section of The New York Times. But nobody will care if you discover that people’s feelings about punishments are influenced by the severity of the crimes or the criminals’ past record. This is just common sense.

 

Whether this bias in what people find interesting is reasonable is a topic for another day. What’s important to remember is that some scholars and journalists fall into the trap of thinking that what they see in journals provides a representative picture of how we think and act.

 

Our capacity for rational thought emerges in the most-fundamental aspects of life. When you’re thirsty, you don’t just squirm in your seat at the mercy of unconscious impulses and environmental inputs. You make a plan and execute it. You get up, find a glass, walk to the sink, turn on the tap. These aren’t acts of genius, you haven’t discovered the Higgs boson, but still, this sort of mundane planning is beyond the capacity of any computer, which is why we don’t yet have robot servants. Making it through a single day requires the formulation and initiation of complex multistage plans, in a world that’s unforgiving of mistakes (try driving your car on an empty tank, or going to work without pants). The broader project of holding together relationships and managing a job or career requires extraordinary cognitive skills.

 

If you doubt the power of reason, consider the lives of those who have less of it. We take care of the intellectually disabled and brain-damaged because they cannot take care of themselves; we don’t let toddlers cook hot meals; and we don’t allow drunk people to drive cars or pilot planes. Like many other countries, the United States has age restrictions for driving, military service, voting, and drinking, and even higher age restrictions for becoming president, all under the assumption that certain core capacities, like wisdom and self-control, take time to mature.

 

Many commentators believe that we overemphasize reason’s importance. Social psychology, David Brooks writes in The Social Animal,

 

“reminds us of the relative importance of emotion over pure reason, social connections over individual choice, character over IQ.”

 

Malcolm Gladwell, for his part, argues in Outliers for the irrelevance of a high IQ. “If I had magical powers,” he says, “and offered to raise your IQ by 30 points, you’d say yes -- right?” But then he goes on to say that you shouldn’t bother, because after you pass a certain basic threshold, IQ really doesn’t make any difference.

 

Brooks and Gladwell are both interested in the determinants of success. Brooks focuses on emotional and social skills, and Gladwell on the role of contingent factors, such as who your family is and where and when you were born. Both are right in assuming these factors to be significant, and Gladwell is probably correct that IQ, like other human traits, follows the law of diminishing returns. But both are wrong to doubt the central importance of intelligence. Indeed, intelligence, as measured by an IQ test, is correlated with all sorts of good things, such as steady job performance, staying out of prison, and being in a stable and fulfilling relationship. One might object that IQ is meaningful only because our society is obsessed with it. In the United States, after all, getting into a good university depends to a large extent on how well you do on the SAT, which is basically an IQ test. (The correlation between a person’s score on the SAT and on the standard IQ test is very high.) If we gave out slots at top universities to candidates with red hair, we would quickly live in a world in which being a redhead correlated with high income, elevated status, and other positive outcomes.

 

Still, the relationship between IQ and success is hardly arbitrary, and it’s no accident that universities take such tests so seriously. They reveal abilities such as mental speed and the capacity for abstract thought, and it’s not hard to see how these abilities aid intellectual pursuits. Indeed, high intelligence is not only related to success; it’s also related to kindness. Highly intelligent people commit fewer violent crimes (holding other things, such as income, constant) and are more cooperative, perhaps because intelligence allows one to appreciate the benefits of long-term coordination and to consider the perspectives of others.

 

Then there’s self-control. This can be seen as the purest embodiment of rationality, in that it reflects the working of a brain system (embedded in the frontal lobe, the part of the brain that lies behind the forehead) that restrains our impulsive, irrational, or emotive desires. In classic studies of self-control that he conducted in the 1960s, Walter Mischel investigated whether children could refrain from eating one marshmallow now to get two later. What he found was that the kids who waited for two marshmallows did better in school and on their SATs as adolescents, and ended up with better self-esteem, mental health, relationship quality, and income as adults. In his recent book, The Better Angels of Our Nature, Steven Pinker notes that a high level of self-control benefits not just individuals but also society. Europe, he writes, witnessed a thirtyfold drop in its homicide rate between the medieval and modern periods, and this, he argues, had much to do with the change from a culture of honor to a culture of dignity, which prizes restraint.

 

What about the capacity for moral judgment? In much of social psychology, morality is seen as the paradigm case of insidious irrationality. Whatever role our intellect might play in other domains, it seems largely irrelevant when it comes to our sense of right and wrong. Many people will tell you that flag burning, the eating of a deceased pet, and consensual sex between adult siblings are wrong, but when pressed to explain why, they suffer what Jonathan Haidt has described as “moral dumbfounding.” They flail around trying to find reasons, which suggests it’s not the reasons themselves that guided their judgments, but their gut intuition.

 

But as I argue in my book Just Babies, the existence of moral dumbfounding is less damning that it might seem. It is not the rule. People are not at a loss when asked why drunk driving is wrong, or why a company shouldn’t pay a woman less than a man for the same job, or why you should hold the door open for someone on crutches. We can easily justify these views by referring to fundamental concerns about harm, equity, and kindness. Moreover, when faced with difficult problems, we think about them -- we mull, deliberate, argue. I’m thinking here not so much about grand questions such as abortion, capital punishment, just war, and so on, but rather about the problems of everyday life. Is it right to cross a picket line? Should I give money to the homeless man in front of the bookstore? Was it appropriate for our friend to start dating so soon after her husband died? What do I do about the colleague who is apparently not intending to pay me back the money she owes me?

 

Such rumination matters. If our moral attitudes are entirely the result of non-rational factors, such as gut feelings and the absorption of cultural norms, they should either be stable or randomly drift over time, like skirt lengths or the widths of ties. They shouldn’t show systematic change over human history. But they do. As the Princeton philosopher Peter Singer has put it, the moral circle has expanded: our attitudes about the rights of women, homosexuals, and racial minorities have all shifted toward inclusiveness.

 

Regardless of whether or not one views this as moral progress (some nihilists and cultural relativists think there is no such thing), it does suggest a cumulative evolution. People come to moral conclusions, often through debate and consultation with others, and these conclusions form the foundation for further progress. Just as modern evolutionary theory builds on the work of Darwin, our moral understanding builds on the moral discoveries of others, such as the wrongness of slavery and sexism.

 

We’re at our worst when it comes to politics. This helps explain why recent attacks on rationality have captured the imagination of the scientific community and the public at large. Politics forces us to confront those who disagree with us, and we’re not naturally inclined to see those on the other side of an issue as rational beings. Why, for instance, do so many Republicans think Obama’s health-care plan violates the Constitution? Writing in The New Yorker in June 2012, Ezra Klein used the research of Haidt and others to argue that Republicans despise the plan on political, not rational, grounds. Initially, he notes, they objected to what the Democrats had to offer out of a kind of tribal sense of loyalty. Only once they had established that position did they turn to reason to try to justify their views.

 

But notice that Klein doesn’t reach for a social-psychology journal when articulating why he and his Democratic allies are so confident that Obamacare is constitutional. He’s not inclined to understand his own perspective as the product of reflexive loyalty to the ideology of his own group. This lack of interest in the source of one’s views is typical. Because most academics are politically left of center, they generally use their theories of irrationality to explain the beliefs of the politically right of center. They like to explore how psychological biases shape the decisions people make to support Republicans, reject affirmative-action policies, and disapprove of homosexuality. But they don’t spend much time investigating how such biases might shape their own decisions to support Democrats, endorse affirmative action, and approve of gay marriage.

 

None of this is to say that Klein is mistaken. Irrational processes do exist, and they can ground political and moral decisions; sometimes the right explanation is groupthink or cognitive dissonance or prejudice. Irrationality is unlikely to be perfectly proportioned across political parties, and it’s possible, as the journalist Chris Mooney and others have suggested, that the part of the population that chose Obama in the most recent presidential election is more reasonable than the almost equal part that chose Romney.

 

But even if this were so, it would tell us little about the human condition. Most of us know nothing about constitutional law, so it’s hardly surprising that we take sides in the Obamacare debate the way we root for the Red Sox or the Yankees. Loyalty to the team is what matters. A set of experiments run by the Stanford psychologist Geoffrey Cohen illustrates this principle perfectly. Subjects were told about a proposed welfare program, which was described as being endorsed by either Republicans or Democrats, and were asked whether they approved of it. Some subjects were told about an extremely generous program, others about an extremely stingy program, but this made little difference. What mattered was party: Democrats approved of the Democratic program, and Republicans, the Republican program. When asked to justify their decision, however, participants insisted that party considerations were irrelevant; they felt they were responding to the program’s objective merits. This appears to be the norm. The Brown psychologist Steven Sloman and his colleagues have found that when people are called upon to justify their political positions, even those that they feel strongly about, many are unable to point to specifics. For instance, many people who claim to believe deeply in cap and trade or a flat tax have little idea what these policies actually mean.

 

So, yes, if you want to see people at their worst, press them on the details of those complex political issues that correspond to political identity and that cleave the country almost perfectly in half. But if this sort of irrational dogmatism reflected how our minds generally work, we wouldn’t even make it out of bed each morning. Such scattered and selected instances of irrationality shouldn’t cloud our view of the rational foundations of our everyday life. That would be like saying the most interesting thing about medicine isn’t the discovery of antibiotics and anesthesia, or the construction of large-scale programs for the distribution of health care, but the fact that people sometimes forget to take their pills.

 

Reason underlies much of what matters in the world, including the uniquely human project of reshaping our environment to achieve higher goals. Consider again our racial and gender stereotypes. Many people believe that circumstances exist in which it is wrong to use these stereotypes when making judgments. If we are worried about this, we can act. We can use reason to invent procedures that undermine our explicit and implicit biases. Blind reviewing and blind auditions block judges from using stereotypes, even unconsciously, by shielding them from information about candidates’ race or sex or anything else other than the merits of what one is supposed to be judging. Quota systems and diversity requirements take the opposite tack, and are rooted in different intuitions about the morally right thing to do; they enforce representation by minority groups, thereby taking the decision out of the hands of individuals with their own preferences and agendas and biases.

 

This is how moral progress happens. We don’t become better merely through good intentions and force of will, just as we don’t usually lose weight or give up smoking merely by wanting to. We use our intelligence. We establish laws, create social institutions, write constitutions, and evolve customs. We manage information and constrain options, allowing our better selves to overcome those gut feelings and appetites that we believe we would be better off without. Yes, we are physical beings, and yes, we are continually swayed by factors beyond our control. But as Aristotle recognized long ago, what’s so interesting about us is our capacity for reason, which reigns over all. If you miss this, you miss almost everything that matters.

 

Paul Bloom is a professor of psychology and cognitive science at Yale University, and the author of Just Babies: The Origins of Good and Evil (2013).

 

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/03/the-war-on-reason/357561/



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歷史和歷史哲學
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胡卜凱
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我沒有聽過 歷史哲學的課程,不過論述要講得通,不是拿什麼「聽過沒聽過這個或那個 課程」來唬弄。

現在是笑貧不笑娼的時代,讀書並沒有什麼可驕人之處。但為了回應你的「唬弄」,我也就「唬弄」一下:

我讀過的和歷史哲學相關書籍:

* Berdyaev, N. 1969, Tr., Reavey, G., The Meaning of History, Meridian Books, NYC

* Braudel, F. 1980, Tr. Matthews, S., On History, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago

* Carr, E. H. 1961, What Is History, Vintage Books, NYC

* Dray, W. H. 1971, Philosophy Of History, 虹橋書店,台北

* Hegel, G. W. F. 1953, Reason in History, The Library of Liberal ArtsThe Bobbes-Merrill Co., NYC

* Loewith, K. 1957, Meaning In History, Phoenix Books, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago

* Meyerhoff, H. 1959, The Philosophy Of History in Our Time: An Anthology, Doubleday Anchor Books

* Stoianovich, T. 1976, French Historical Method: The Annales Paradigm, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY USA

* 胡秋原, 1970,史學方法之要點:並論純瞎說,學術出版社,台北

* 胡秋原, 1966,中西歷史之理解:東方社會論源流及駁費正清中國觀,中華雜誌社,台北

我讀過《尚書》、《左傳》、《史記》、《中國大歷史》等,和軍史局出版的 (國軍)八年抗日史;我讀過至少各三本以上和古代文明史、希臘史、歐洲史、法國大革命、1848革命等五個主題相關的書籍。

我書架上的斷代史、各國史、特殊領域史的書,大概有70本。我沒有讀過或讀完每一本,它們主要是做參考用。例如,我在看職田信長的日劇時,買了一本《日本史》讀。我很喜歡朵斯陀也夫斯基的小說,所以買了一本《俄國史》,讀了該書十九世紀的部分。

所以我想我的歷史知識和對歷史哲學的了解,不會在「聽過」一、兩個學期,或一、兩個學年歷史或歷史哲學課程的人之下。尤其以我對哲學和社會科學理論的了解,只「聽過」一、兩個學期或一、兩個學年歷史或歷史哲學課程的人,恐怕沒有什麼跟我說嘴的空間。

********************************

我不認為每一個個個人的生活經驗是「歷史」的一部分。我也不相信有很多歷史學家或歷史哲學家會這樣認為。許多人頂多只是一個統計數字。例如:

21世紀初期台灣有2,300萬人,其中600萬人因經商、工作、求學、或落跑,住在中國大陸



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抱歉
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胡卜凱
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抱歉

我不了解你在說什麼

或許請你有條理的表達一下

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淺談「理性」 -- 2
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胡卜凱
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4. 和理性相關的概念

4.1 「人際相通性」

「人際相通性」指:人能了解彼此的意圖、需求、思想、行為等等。

這個概念有兩個基礎:

a. 人類面對的是近似的「自然環境」,因而受到類似的「刺激」;同時,人類具有同樣或近似的生物性,並由98%相同的DNA組合構成;所以,人類在類似的「刺激」下,也會產生類似的「反應」。因而人類的「經驗」是類似的。
b. 「文化」必定在「現實環境」中建立。因為地理環境和歷史發展的差異,不同地區人類的「社會環境」具有不同的型態,但是由於上述「刺激」 -- 「反應」過程具有相同或高度近似的基礎(「自然環境」和DNA),則「反應」模式的結構自然也有相當的雷同性。因而人類會建立類似的「制度」。「制度」一詞在此是用它最廣泛的意思,也就是指「文化」。

4.2 「客觀」

在我的論述裏,「客觀」一詞用來描述:

當一個判斷過程,或認知、思考活動,至少具備了「現實性」、「合規則性」、和「人際相通性」這三種性質之一。

第2.1節中提到的「天理、人情、世故、道德、習俗、和規則」等等,是人們在幾萬年到幾十萬年的生活過程中逐漸建立的。這個生活過程是「文化演化」的過程,也是人和自然環境奮鬥、在社會制度中掙扎和發展的過程(「刺激」 -- 「反應」模式)。

綜合以上的說法,約定俗成的「道理」和從「社會環境」而來的「經驗法則」,雖然有強烈的「文化」色彩或個別社會的烙印,但基本上它們都具有某種程度的「現實性」和「人際相通性」。上面已提到,由「自然環境」而來的「理」或「經驗法則」自然而然的具有「現實性」。

這是一般人通常把「理性」和「客觀」當做同義詞使用或將兩詞連用的原因。

4.3 「合理化」

和以上兩類「理」的概念相關的行為有「合理化」。「合理化」有兩個不同的意思:

a. 它相當於日常生活語言中的「找藉口」。它蘊含的意思是︰

一個人為了修飾一個不合天理、人情、世故、道德、習俗、或規則等的行為;不面對現實情況的行為;或違反經驗法則的行為,而舉出一些「理由」(「藉口」)來說明行為者的動機,以取得別人的認可、同情、或支持等。

b. 「合理化」的第二個意思已在以上第1.2節討論Mannheim的功能理性時說明。它指:使得一個制度或組織有效達成其預設目標的行動。我建議用「理性化」來指示這種用法,以免和第一個用法混淆。

5. 相對主義和批駁策略

凡是不接受經驗論、社會建構論、「唯物人文觀」、或以上我所了解的「理性」一詞所指的人,不需要,也很可能不會同意我對「理性」的定義和詮釋。由於我也接受「相對主義」,所以任何根據其他理論做為「前提」而導出的,關於「理性」這個概念的定義,只要能言之成理,即使我未必接受這個或那個「理性」(定義)的內容,我都需要接受它們是「成立」的定義。

由於對「理性」一詞的共識是進行公共論述和執行公共行動的基礎,我歡迎其他人提出自己對「理性」的定義或詮釋,講出一套支持這個定義或詮釋的說法,大家一起切磋琢磨。

如果有人試圖批駁我對「理性」定義,我建議她/他可以從四方面切入︰

a. 指出唯物論、經驗論、社會建構論、「唯物人文觀」、或以上對「理性」的詮釋「不成立」的理由;
b. 指出我的定義不能從a項中的五個論述推出;
c. 指出我的定義和a項中的任何一個論述自相矛盾。
d. 指出我的定義和多數人對「理性」的認知不合。

由於我不接受(目前)有絕對真理或標準的說法,我認為︰

根據我「基本假設」之外的前提來批駁我對「理性」定義的論述,是「不相關」的「批駁」行動。也就是一個「無效」或「不成立」的「批駁」行動。它只能建立一個和我的定義並行,或具有同等「真值」的定義。這個觀點是黑格爾「內部批判」概念的應用(本欄留言#18︰0.2 - 1)節;Stern 2004︰41頁;Rosen 1985︰26 - 30頁)。「真值」指符合既定規則而得到的陳述所具有的性質。

6. 附錄 -- 西方學者對「理性」的詮釋

以下摘譯八位西方哲學家和社會科學家對「理性」的詮釋或觀點,來補充我以上的說明。(雙引號及英文引號都根據原文所用。)

a. 「綜上所述,柯氏認為歷史有四個基本的特性:第一,『歷史是科學的,也就是說,…』;第二,『歷史是人文的,也就是說,…』;第三,『歷史是合理的,也就是說,歷史對歷史問題所提供的答案是基於證據而來』;最後,『…』(10)。」

b. 「在本書中,我將使用韋伯研究新教教義與資本主義關係時,所使用的行動目的論,做為解釋個人層次行動的理論。這一個理論也是大多數社會科學學者,和一般人在使用通俗心理學來詮釋自己和他人的行為時的理論。… 我們說自己了解別人行動的”理由”,相當於說我們了解此人試圖達到的目的,以及何以這位行動者認為其行動能幫助他/她達到這個目的。… (要達到此目的)我將用經濟學中的「理性」概念。這個「理性」概念是經濟學理論中理性選擇者的基礎。其基本想法是行動者認為不同的行動(或物品)對他/她來說,有某些特殊的利得。同時,(此理論)也接受行動者將選擇能達到利得最大化作為這個原則(11)。」

c. 「在Habermas的想法中,理性並不在一個人擁有某些知識,而在此人”如何取得及使用這些知識”(12)。」

d. 「傳統上學者一向把理性分成兩種:『實踐理性』和『理論理性』。實踐理性考慮我們應該做什麼;理論理性考慮我們應該相信什麼(13)。」

e. 「在休姆的思考中,理性只能決定(行動)方式的選擇,它不能決定如何排定兩個不同目的之間的優先順位;在蘇格拉底的思考中,理性也能夠決定如何排定兩個不同目的之間的優先順位(14)。」

f. 「理性選擇論被如此命名的原因是:其基本假設在認為一個人會理性的選擇行動方式,來達到他/她所希望達到的目標(15)。」

g. 「穆勒認為政治經濟學的主題是:它只考慮人唯一的目的在擁有財富,而且一個人有能力判斷這個目的對自己的效用(16)。」

h. 「(理性選擇論者)以一個社會制度對整個社會來說的合理性和功能性,來解釋它何以被建立和可能繼續存在。但他/她們並沒有去考慮個人所做的理性選擇對社會制度可能有的影響(17)。」(此段批判理性選擇論者沒有對個人的「理性選擇」做充分的考慮。)

附註:

1. 請參考Frege對「意思」和「意義」(「用法」)的區分(Frege 1960:57 - 61頁)。
2. 1. The intellect. The capacity to abstract, comprehend, relate, reflect, notices the similarities and differences, etc. 2. The ability to infer. (Angeles 1981:238頁)。Angeles教授然後列舉了13個和reason相關的哲學術語。
3. In general, the philosophic approach which emphasizes reason as the primary source of knowledge, prior or superior to, and independent of, sense perceptions. (Angeles 1981:236頁)。Angeles然後列舉了rationalism的10個要點。笛卡爾和萊布尼茲以後,康德和卻文斯基(或譯為杭斯基)兩位大概是最有名和最有影響力的理性論者。
4. 1. The view that all ideas are abstractions formed by compounding (combining, recombining) what is experienced (observed, immediately given in sensation). 2. Experience is the sole source of knowledge. 3. … (Angeles 1981:75頁)。洛克和休姆是經驗論的開山祖師。古典經驗論和理性論是同屬唯心論下的認識論學說。但近代或現代哲學中的經驗論,則建立在唯物論的假設之上。
5. ... Thought is structured neural activity. Language is inextricable from thought and experience. ... All of our thought and language arises from our genetic endowment and from our experience. (Feldman 2006:第3頁)。我所根據的其他學者著作,散見於我其他相關的文章。
6. Sociologists use the words “rational” and “irrational” in two senses, which we will call “substantial” and “functional” rationality or irrationality. ... We understand as substantially rational as an act of thought which reveals intelligent insight into the inter-relation of events in a given situation. Thus the intelligent act of thought itself will be described as “substantially rational”, whereas everything else which is either false or not an act of thought at all (as for example derives, impulses, wishes, and feelings, both conscious and unconscious) will be called as “substantially irrational”. But in sociology as well as in everyday language, we also use the word “rational” in still another sense when we say, for instance, that this or that industry or administration staff has been “rationalized”. ... but rather that a series of action is organized in such a way that it leads to a previously defined goal, every element in this series of actions receiving a functional position and role. ... a series of actions will, moreover, be at its best when, in order to attain the given goal, it coordinates the means most efficiently. (Mannheim, K. 1940, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, Harcourt, Brace, and Co., NYC, quoted in Mills 1961:508 - 509頁)
7. the rationality typical of modernity and capitalism - is characterized by the most efficient use of means to reach an end. (Lindholm, Internet)。行動理性:instrumental rationality。
8. 我同意華生或史金勒的「行為主義」有過於偏執的地方。但我接受「行為論」的基本觀點:我們只能透過「可觀察到的行為」來了解人的性質、思想、意向、傾向、和活動等等。根據這個觀點,我也傾向於接受:凡是不能或不可能被「觀察到的」(人的)性質、思想、意向、傾向、和活動,大概沒有什麼被了解(研究)的價值。
9. 不受屈辱的投降︰honorable surrender。此詞在東方文化中不能譯為「光榮投降」或「榮譽投降」。
10. From this there emerges a view of history as having four essential characteristics; first,‘that it is scientific, or …’; secondly, ‘that it is humanistic, or …’; thirdly, ‘that it is rational, or bases answers which it gives to its questions on grounds making appeal to evidence’; and, finally, ‘…’. (Collingwood, R. G., The Idea of History, 18頁, quoted in Ayer 1984:210頁) 。上文中以「基於證據」來詮釋「合理的」或「理性的」,就相當於本文第2節中對「理」的第一個詮釋 -- 現實情況的「理」。
11. The individual-level theory of action I will use in this book is the same purposive theory of action used in Weber’s study of Protestantism and capitalism. It is the theory of action used implicitly by most social theorists and by most people in the commonsense psychology that underlies their interpretation of their own and other’s actions. ... We say that we understand the “reasons” why the person acted in a certain way, implying that we understand the intended goal and how the actions were seen by the actor to contribute to the goal. ... For this I will use the conception of rationality employed in economics, the conception that forms the basis of rational actor in economic theory. This conception is based on the notion of different actions (or, in some cases, different goods) having a particular utility for the actor and is accompanied by a principle of action which can be expressed by saying that the actor chooses the action which will maximize utility. (Coleman 1994: 13 – 14 頁)
12. For Habermas, for example, rationality consists not so much in the possession of particular knowledge, but rather in “how speaking and acting subjects acquire and use knowledge”(Habermas 1984:11頁, quoted in Turner/Roth 2003:97頁).
13. Rationality is standardly divided into the practical and the theoretical. Practical rationality concerns what we should do ; theoretical rationality concerns what we should believe. (Turner/Roth 2003:110頁).
14. On a Humean account rationality determines only the means, and has nothing to say concerning the relative preference ranking of any two ends. On the Socratic account, rationality determines the preference ranking of the ends also. (Turner/Roth 2003:115頁).
15. Rational choice is so called because it is based on the assumption that human beings are rational in their choice of means to reach their preferred ends (see Elster 1986, interpreted in Turner/Roth 2003:143頁).
16. Mill suggests that political economy “is concerned with him [man] solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of that end.” (Mill 1950: 420頁, interpreted in Turner/Roth:144頁)
17. The emergence and survival of social institutions are explained in terms of their rationality, functionality for society, as a whole, but without an account of the rational choice of the individuals, … (Posner 1980: 第5頁, interpreted in Turner/Roth:160頁 n. 8)

參考書目及文章(我沒有直接引用的文獻,不列於此。):

Angeles, P. A., 1981, Dictionary of Philosophy, Barnes and Noble Books, NYC
Ayer, A. J. 1984, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, Vintage Books, NYC
Chang, B. 2006,《「文革」討論 -- 論述方式的分析和檢驗》,http://tb.chinatimes.com/forum1.asp?ArticleID=849041
Coleman, J. S. 1994, Foundations of Social Theory, The Belknap Press of Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. USA
Feldman, J. 2006, From Molecule to Metaphor, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA USA
Frege, G., 1960, Ed., Geach, P. /Black, M., On Sense and Reference, in the Translations from the Philosophical Writings of G. Frege, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, London
Lindholm, C. Internet, Charisma, Crowd Psychology and Altered States of Consciousness, http://www.bu.edu/anthrop/faculty/lindolm/ASCCnotes.html
Mills, C. W. 1961, Ed., Image of Man: The Classic Tradition in Sociological Thinking, George Braziller, Inc. NYC
Rosen, M. 1985, Hegel's Dialectic and Its Criticism, 雙葉書店,台北
Stern, R. 2004, Hegel and the Phenomenology Of Spirit, Routledge, London
Turner, S. P./Roth P. A. 2003, The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Social Science, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA., USA
胡卜凱2006,《「文革」討論 -- 論述方式的分析和檢驗》,http://tb.chinatimes.com/forum1.asp?ArticleID=849041

中英名詞對照

以;號分開的是不同的意義;以、號分開的是相同或近似的意思。

「合理」的性質(條件):reasonableness
「非理性」性質、非理性行為(模式):irrationality
人際相通:intersubjective
人際相通性:intersubjectivity
不成立:invalid
不受屈辱的投降︰honorable surrender
內部批判︰immanent critique
文化性:culture-specific
主觀性質(或「意識內容」):qualia
功能理性:functional rationality
合理化;理性化:rationalize, rationalization
成立:valid
有效的:effective
行為主義:behaviorism
行為論、行為學派:behavioralism
行動理性(或譯工具理性、效益理性):instrumental rationality
制約:condition, conditioning
社會性:society-specific
社會建構論:social constructionism
非理性的(不屬於理性的)、不合理、不合理的、不講理的、沒有道理的、說不通的、不務實的:irrational
經驗法則:empirical rules, regularity, uniformity
推理、講理:reason, reasoning
推理能力:rationality, reasonableness
理由、判斷依據:rationale
理性、務實:reason, rationality
理性的、合理的、講理的、有道理的、說得通的、務實的:reasonable, rational
理性論(理性主義);合理原則(合理主義):rationalism
理性論者;理性化者:rationalist
無效的:ineffective
意義(Frege):sense (Frege)
經驗論:empiricism
實質理性(形式理性):substantive rationality (formal rationality)


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