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2008年中華人民共和國軍力報告
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http://news.yam.com/cna/international/200803/20080304618682.html
軍力報告:中擴軍意圖缺乏透明增添不確定性
中央社╱中央社 2008-03-04 05:30  

(中央社記者劉坤原華盛頓三日專電)美國五角大廈今天公佈「二零零八年中華人民共和國軍力報告」,強調中國的軍事發展缺乏透明。國際社會對它的擴軍意圖、決策過程及軍事現代化的主要內容所知有限,使得中國的未來走向充滿不確定性。

五角大廈根據美國國會「二零零零年國防授權法案」,每年必須向國會提交「中國軍力報告」,分析中國的軍力發展,以及美國國防部因應之道。

今年的軍力報告共五十六頁,分為六章和一個特別專題。第一章說明中國在過去一年的主要發展;第二章闡述中國的戰略;第三章是中國的軍事戰略和教條;第四章是現代化的目標和趨勢;第五章是推動現代化的資源;第六章是現代化與台海安全;特別專題是人民解放軍現代化的人力資源。

報告在導言摘要中指出,美國歡迎一個穩定、和平而繁榮的中國崛起,也鼓勵中國分擔國際責任,成為一個國際社會負責任的利害關係人。美國也是世界上協助中國各融入世界體系最盡力的國家。但是中國在崛起過程中,對軍事擴張和現代化保持神秘,國際社會對其瞭解有限,也因此造成中國未來的走向充滿不確定性。

報告指出,中國擴軍的重要原動力,就近程而言,是聚焦於準備可能發生的台海戰爭,包括美國的可能介入。此外,中國也為因保護資源或領土而可能引發的衝突備戰。

報告說,中國的擴軍,不但正在改變東亞軍事平衡,而且也已影響到亞太地區以外。例如中國發展的新東風三十一型和東風三十一A型洲際飛彈,正加強了中國的戰略攻擊能力。

此外,中國持續發展巡弋飛彈、中程彈道飛彈、反軍艦和航空母艦彈道飛彈。二零零七年並成功測試反衛星武器。顯示中國的擴軍,已從陸海空擴大到太空和網路。

報告指出,國際社會對中國擴軍的意圖、決策過程和現代化內容所知仍相當有限。中國領導人也仍未詳細解釋人民解放軍現代化的目的和目標。而由於缺乏透明將導致誤會和誤判風險的增加,美國不得不對未知的未來採取必要的防範措施。

Annual Report to Congress:
Military Power of the People's Republic of China
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/china.html


May the Force be with you

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報告提前出爐 美中台各有考量
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http://news.chinatimes.com/2007Cti/2007Cti-News/2007Cti-News-Content/0,4521,110505+112008030500071,00.html
中國時報 2008.03.05 
報告提前出爐 美中台各有考量
劉屏/華盛頓四日電

 美國國防部係應美國國會要求公布「解放軍軍力報告」年度報告。六、七年來,最早也要等到五月下旬才公布,最晚拖到七月底出爐。今年公布的特別早,頗出人意表。這回美國各部門的看法沒有太大差異,軍、政、情的觀點大體一致,新任部長蓋茨又充分授權,所以很快就定稿了。

 「台灣因素」方面,報告首次提到,只要「不獨」,北京也就「不急著統」,當然也就「不武」了。在台灣即將舉行總統大選之際,這份報告幫北京揭示立場,等於提醒台灣什麼是台灣的最佳選擇。但報告也提醒台灣,不論誰在台灣主政,都不能輕忽台海情勢潛藏的危機。

 正如華府智庫「戰略暨國際研究中心(CSIS)」資深研究員、前美國國防部中國科長米德偉指出,「如果台灣、中國、美國捲入台海衝突,大家會發現,解放軍是強勁的對手」。

 報告提前出爐的「中國因素」,乃是因為布希總統已宣布將出席八月的北京奧運開幕典禮。如果美國到了六、七月才公布報告,勢將破壞布希出訪的氣氛,所以早早公布,中共要罵,就趁早罵吧。

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美國中共軍力報告 明年中美合編
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http://news.chinatimes.com/2007Cti/2007Cti-News/2007Cti-News-Content/0,4521,110505+112008030500070,00.html
中國時報 2008.03.05 
美國中共軍力報告 明年中美合編
劉屏/華盛頓四日電

 美國國防部發布的中共軍力報告,明年將有重大轉變,即是美國將聽取中共方面的意見。同樣的,中共的國防白皮書也可望有美方意見參與。五角大廈公布《二○○八年中華人民共和國軍力報告》時,副助理部長謝偉森在記者會上指出,「美國政府希望以公允且信實的方式呈現事實」。

 主管亞太事務的謝偉森說,明年一定更好,原因之一是兩國將第一次合作編寫此一報告。

 雙方意見並陳 將首開先例

 美國每年發布此一報告,每年必然遭到中共強烈指責,例如中共批美國「散布中國威脅論」。但是謝偉森在三日告訴新聞界,中方已經同意與美國的撰稿人對話,不論是美國的報告或是中共每兩年發布一次的國防白皮書,「雙方的撰稿人將聚在一塊兒討論」。他說,美國國防部的中國、蒙古、台灣科科長海大衛不久即將率團前往大陸,「我們(美國人)坐下來與他們討論,他們也坐下來表達他們的反對意見」。

 謝偉森說,美國報告的編纂工作當然還是由美國人全權負責,但是這讓中方人士有機會在事前表達意見,也讓美國的疑問有機會得到答案。他說,沒錯,這種作法還是第一次。

 謝偉森上周在上海參加兩國的「防務諮商對話」,兩國在軍事上達成數項重要協議。其一是中方同意讓美方接觸中方的韓戰檔案,從而有助於美國搜尋韓戰失蹤將士的下落。這個工作,美國努力了至少十七年,一九九一年,謝偉森在美國駐北京大使館服務時,就開始與中方交涉此事,直到今天終於有了具體協議。

 兩國簽定軍事熱線協定

 其次是兩國簽署了軍事熱線協定,這是繼元首熱線後,兩國間又一項重要的直接通訊機制。第三,中共同意與美國討論「核子策略及政策」,這也是美國努力多年才獲致的成果。第四,就美國成立「非洲司令部」,美國向中方說明美國的構想及立場,結果中方也有類似回應。而且雙方同意繼續討論有關非洲的軍事、安全等層面的議題。

 有了這一連串的具體協議、正面發展、未來展望,難怪謝偉森在記者會上侃侃而談,記者會後又繼續詳細回答記者詢問,欲罷不能,而他才從上海回到華府尚不足十二小時,但是完全看不出倦容。

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中共批美製造「中國軍事威脅論」
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http://udn.com/NEWS/WORLD/WOR1/4244048.shtml
中共批美製造「中國軍事威脅論」

【聯合報╱特派記者汪莉絹、李春/北京報導】 2008.03.05 03:59 am


針對美國防部公布的中共軍力報告,中共外交部發言人秦剛昨天批評,美方報告宣揚「中國軍事威脅論」,嚴重歪曲事實,干涉中國內政,違反國家關係準則,中方堅決反對,已向美方提出嚴正交涉。

秦剛說,中共要求美方摒棄冷戰思維,正確認識中國和中國的發展,糾正發表中共軍力報告的錯誤作法,以實際行動致力增進中美互信。

秦剛還表示,中方要求美方恪守堅持一個中國政策、中美三個聯合公報和反對台獨的承諾,停止售台武器和美台軍事聯繫,停止向台獨分裂勢力發出任何錯誤信號。

【2008/03/05 聯合報】

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美國防部:北京準備延後統一
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http://udn.com/NEWS/WORLD/WOR1/4244046.shtml
美國防部:北京準備延後統一
 
【聯合報╱華盛頓特派員張宗智、林寶慶/綜合報導】 2008.03.05 03:59 am
 
美國國防部三日公布2008中共軍力報告,指出中共對台策略,主要仍在圍堵和預防台灣走向法理獨立,而非尋求短期內解決台灣問題;只要北京認為兩岸關係朝向統一的目標,以及兩岸衝突的代價大於得利,北京顯然準備延後統一。

針對台海局勢,報告說,中共有全世界最活躍的飛彈計畫,到去年十一月為止,共軍對台部署九百九十至一千零七十枚短程飛彈,並以每年超過一百枚飛彈的數量增加。

此外,共軍的一百廿五萬地面部隊,約有四十萬部署在針對台灣的(南京、廣州及濟南)三大軍區;共軍正發展數種不同的軍事手段對付台灣,包括壓制、空中及飛彈攻擊、封鎖、兩棲入侵等方式。

今年的報告內容結構大致依循往年,除強調中共軍力不斷尋求現代化外,批評中共軍力不夠透明化。

報告重申,共軍現代化的近期目標仍針對台灣,但長期發展,是建立一個作業範疇超過台灣的武力。

報告表示,共軍目前最關切的是與台灣可能發生的軍事衝突,以及美國如何軍事介入台海衝突。報告列出幾項北京對台灣不能容忍的「紅線」,包括台灣正式宣布獨立、外國勢力干預台灣內政、無限期拖延兩岸統一對話、台灣取得核子武器以及台灣發生內亂等。

但報告也指出,這些「紅線」仍有模糊空間,可以讓北京有些回應的彈性。

報告也重申,中共目前的軍力,仍未擁有足以達成對台政治目標的把握,尤其是應付美國的介入;此外,台海發生軍事衝突,也可能影響日本等區域內其他希望和平解決兩岸爭端等國家的利益,引發中共內部不穩,並造成和美國關係的長期惡化。

報告點出中共具有攻擊全球電腦網路能力,及正在發展多維空間的武力計畫,包括建立太空作戰能力,正在研發可以干擾甚至摧毀衛星的武器。

【2008/03/05 聯合報】



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美軍力報告:中國訂犯台紅線有利於政治操作
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http://news.yam.com/cna/international/200803/20080305638930.html
美軍力報告:中國訂犯台紅線有利於政治操作
中央社╱中央社 2008-03-05 03:26     

(中央社記者林芥佑華盛頓四日專電)美國國防部發布年度「中國軍力報告」,其中在中國的台海戰略部分,報告指出,中國雖提出一國兩制的和平手段,但實際上卻毫無放棄對台動武的意圖,中國訂出犯台的「紅線」,以利北京政治決策的彈性空間。

根據軍力報告,中國犯台的「紅線」包括:台灣正式宣布獨立、朝向台獨的明確行動、外國涉入台灣內政、無限期延遲重啟兩岸統一的對話、台灣取得核子武器、以及內亂。

今年報告的第六章「軍力現代化與台海安全」,內容提及中國的台海戰略,報告指出,只要中國判斷時間趨勢有利於實現統一目標、或者發動台海衝突的代價遠高於利益,北京將會推遲統一。

報告指出,北京的短期戰略是阻止台灣法理上獨立,同時提出讓台灣高度自治(一國兩制)的和平方案,中國領導人透過嚇阻策略來執行這個政策,而嚇阻手段整合政治、經濟、文化、法律與外交、軍事等各領域的力量。

雖然北京聲稱和平方案是其主要目標,但中國解放軍的各項動作,包括快速增加佈署更多飛彈瞄準台灣、強化兩棲戰力、現代化的長程制空系統,都是針對台灣,並反映出北京毫無意願放棄對台動武。

報告分析,中國大陸過去曾警告過的「犯台情境」,並非固定不變,北京根據台灣方面有關政治現狀的行動或言論做出反應,解放軍能力提升也是變數,還有北京如何看待外國勢力與台灣的關係。

報告接著指出,這些情境,或說是「紅線」包括:台灣正式宣布獨立、所有朝向台獨的明確行動、外國勢力插手台灣內政、無限期延遲重啟兩岸統一的對話、台灣取得核子武器、以及台灣發生內亂。

報告也指出,北京在兩千零五年三月通過的「反分裂國家法」第八條,內容就指陳各項可能導致台灣「自中國分離的事實」,北京將對台採取非和平手段。

報告說,這些模糊的「紅線」定義,給予北京作因應策略的彈性空間,而北京當局的內部政治力量如何決策一向不對外透明,更增添這種模糊定義的氛圍。

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Presenter: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia David Sedney
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http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4165
Presenter: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia David Sedney

March 03, 2008

DoD News Briefing with David Sedney from the Pentagon Briefing Room, Arlington, Va.


            MODERATOR: Well, welcome, and thank you for joining us this afternoon. It's my pleasure to introduce to you the deputy assistant secretary of Defense for East Asia, David Sedney, who is here to present as well as answer some of your questions about the 2008 DOD Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China. He does have some of his subject matter experts along with him, and he may call on them if we get into some of the details.
 
            But with that, let me turn it over to David for a brief overview and then take your questions. David?
 
            Thank you.
 
            MR. SEDNEY: Thank you. Thanks very much. I think I see some familiar faces out there. Some people traveled along with Secretary Gates out to China, Japan and Korea back in November, I think it was. Happy to see you again.
 
            I'm here to brief you, really to answer your questions on the China Military Power Report. We've already released the report. I hope all of you had a chance to read it over. If you haven't read the entire report, I think the executive summary really gives you a lot of the real key issues there.   
 
            A couple of things I'd like to point out.  
 
            One is that this is the first year we've been able to basically release the report on time, and that goes to -- that's due to a great deal of effort by my staff here and a lot of other people in the U.S. government who've worked very hard over the past year to do that. The Congress has asked that the report be delivered every year on March 1st, and this year -- well, March 1st was a Saturday, so we were able to do it today. We were able to go up and brief the staff of the Senate and House Armed Services Committee, and they were very appreciative that we had done it this year.
 
            The second thing I want to stress is that while, as mandated by Congress, this is a military power report that's, of course naturally enough, drafted by the Department of Defense, it's the U.S. government's unified view on Chinese military power. So this report has been vetted and cleared across our entire interagency -- the White House, the NSC, State Department, the intelligence community, other agencies involved as well. So it really is a collective view. It's not specific to -- just to the Department of Defense.
 
            That said, the China Military Power Report, I think, as it states directly, portrays a China that not only is a rising economic power, but it's a rising military power. It shows that China's -- the new capabilities that China's acquiring have implications for not just the region but globally.  And it discusses a lot of areas where we don't have full knowledge of what we're talking about.   
 
            China's military buildup has been characterized by opacity, by the inability of both people in the region and people around the world to -- rather -- I'm sorry -- the inability of people in the region and around the world to really know what ties together the capabilities that China's acquiring with the intentions it has. So, there's a lot of areas where there's misunderstanding, a lot of areas where there's lack of knowledge. And we don't pretend, in this report, to be able to answer every question, because we can't.
 
            But this report is a very, very serious attempt, again, by the entire U.S. government, to present in a fair and factual way what we see as the facts of China's military power. We will always look to do better. We think this year's report is better than last year's, and I'm sure that next year's will be better than this year's. But, in -- it's designed, really, to speak for itself. So I'm not going to get into all the details, but if you have questions, we'll be prepared to answer them, including on details. And I have with me here David Helvey, who's our senior China director, who is a key lead on this effort.   
 
            I also wanted to mention to you that I've actually only been back a little over 12 hours from China, where on Thursday and Friday in Shanghai we had the fourth session of our Defense Policy Consultative (sic Coordination)  talks with the Chinese. You may have seen some of the earlier press reporting. We signed an agreement on the Defense telephone link that will enable us to go ahead and put the equipment into place in the next couple of weeks. That was a culmination of a very long effort, and I know those of you who were with us when you traveled with the secretary, we had some discussions about that. But that's done now, and that's really, I think, very good, very important news.
 
            We also signed an agreement with the Chinese on access to Korean War-era archives. My colleague Deputy Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Affairs Charles Ray signed that agreement. It had actually been 17 years in the making. I -- when I was posted in the embassy in Beijing back in 1991, I started talking to the Chinese about that. But the Korean War's a very sensitive subject for the Chinese and between us.
 
            But at the same time, our families of those who are still missing in action from the Korean War deserve much more information than they've had, and we think this is an important step forward.
 
            Beyond those two formal agreements in these talks that I had with the Chinese, which I would say were surprisingly successful, we also agreed to move forward on our dialogue on nuclear strategy and policy. Again, those of you who are with us -- with the secretary traveling, you will recall that he mentioned that. We're going to go ahead and start. We have a process. The Chinese have agreed to that process, and we're very happy about that. We think it's an area that really needs a lot more discussion between the U.S. and China, and one where we don't expect this to solve all the problems, and there are certainly a number of areas in the nuclear field that we address in this report as areas where we'd like to have more information. This dialogue won't address them all from the beginning, but it'll be a forum where we can deepen and expand our knowledge, and the Chinese, of course, will have a chance to discuss with us.
 
            Beyond that, the Chinese, who always object to the military power report, generally protest very strongly against it, that also have agreed to begin a dialogue where our drafters of the Chinese military power report and their -- the Chinese drafters of their regular white paper, which they put out about every two years, is that right, David?
 
            MR.
 
             : Every two years.
 
            MR. SEDNEY: Every two years -- their drafters and our drafters will get together. In fact, we'll be sending Mr. Helvey there to lead that delegation in the next few months.
 
            So we'll be able to sit down and discuss the -- that they'll be able to sit down and discuss their objections to the report. We, of course, are not going to be the position of having them edit it, but we're also -- that will also give us a forum for asking them a lot of the questions that are raised by the report.
 
            Additionally, we had discussions about Africa. We had a presentation on the formation of AFRICOM, and the Chinese gave us a presentation on their role in Africa. And we agreed to continue discussions on Africa in the military field, and I think that's a very positive thing.   
 
            We don't want anybody to see -- we don't want ourselves or the Chinese to see Africa as a forum for conflict or competition between the United States and China, but rather an area where we can work together to address the many needs in Africa, including in the security field. We had again, as I said, a very successful set of discussions on that in that way.   
 
            But I've said I would give a brief introduction. I've maybe gone past that already. So let me go ahead and turn it over to all of you for questions.   
 
            Q     Sir, just very briefly, your mentioning of the meeting of drafters, is that -- will that be the first time --  
 
            MR. SEDNEY: Yes. That would be the first time.   
 
            Q     Okay. I had a question for you on the military power report.   
 
            There seemed to be somewhat more emphasis on China's counter-space capabilities and their cyberwarfare potential. I'm wondering if those are two areas where you feel there is more reason for concern on U.S. --  
 
            MR. SEDNEY: Well, certainly in both those areas, there's reason for concern.   
 
            In the counter-space area, the Chinese test of an anti-satellite system, a little over a year ago, was something that really brought home, in a very dramatic way, the capabilities that China has been developing, not that we weren't aware of those developments beforehand. But when you see something actually used, then it certainly attracts your attention. Because you've seen that not only are they working on it but they've done it; they've acquired that capability.   
 
            We continue to ask the Chinese to sit down and talk to us about that test, and they haven't. Their reaction, as Secretary Gates said in his press conference back in November in Beijing, we really just haven't had a response on that. And so we continue to ask for that and press for that, and we hope we will get that.   
 
            And in the cyber area that you mentioned, there continue to be around the world, not just in the United States but around the world, many, many computer intrusions that are sourced back to the PRC.   
 
            While we're not able to definitively label them as the work of the PLA or the Chinese government, the techniques that are used, the way these intrusions are conducted are certainly very consistent with what you would need if you were going to actually carry out cyberwarfare, and the kinds of activities that are carried out are consistent with a lot of writings we see from Chinese military and Chinese military theorists.   
 
            So it's an area that I would say, yes, definitely is of growing concern, but again, one where we don't have very much clarity at all and where we really need to have a much better understanding of the Chinese. And it would be best, of course, if that understanding came from the Chinese themselves, if they were to come forward and tell us what's going on.   
 
            Q     David, what's the bottom line? I mean, should policymakers -- based on this report, should policymakers in Washington be alarmed? And the second question for you is, what does this report say about China's ambitions? Are they regional? Are they global?
 
            MR. SEDNEY: I think, as I said, this report is very careful -- it's not the China military policy report. It's the China Military Power Report. And so it's a description of China military power. It's not -- in terms of drawing the kinds of conclusions -- that's your discussion -- that's really, I think, in many ways for readers and policymakers to be --to make.   But I certainly wouldn't say that it's one where we would say that people should be alarmed. This process of the Chinese military modernization, the process of the growth and the rise of China, including in the military area, has been a phenomenon that has been under way for some years, and one that we've been tracking very closely. The mandate from the Congress in 1999 to begin this report was part of that process.
 
            I think the biggest thing for people to be concerned about, really, is the fact that we don't have that kind of strategic understanding of these Chinese intentions, and that leads to uncertainty, that leads to a readiness to hedge against the possibility that China's development will go in ways that the Chinese right now say it won't.
 
            The Chinese tell us today that their rise is peaceful. They tell us that their intentions are very much to be part of the international system. But when we have all these capabilities that are -- very clearly have regional and global reach, going to your point, so their capabilities are increasing and growing beyond just the area immediately around China, where it was, say, 20, 30 years ago, then questions develop.   
 
            And up until now, we don't have a sufficient understanding -- and when I say "we," I mean not just the United States, but also China's neighbors and the rest of the countries in the world. We're continually asked -- I'm personally asked by my colleagues from around the world, what do I think China's intentions are?  And I can give an opinion. We can all give opinions, but the people who can really give the answer are the Chinese.
 
            Q     Well, what do you think those intentions are?   
 
            MR. SEDNEY: Sorry?
 
            Q     What do you think those intentions are?
 
            MR. SEDNEY: I think those intentions are unclear. I mean, if I knew all the answers, then you have all the answers here. But China's a growing country. China's undergoing a lot of change.   
 
            And the problem that we have -- and this is not just in the military area, I would say, but there's a lot of areas where a lack of understanding of China -- opacity about China's processes, from a lot of areas I don't deal with now but I dealt with in the past -- for example, health and safety issues. You've seen all the stories over the last several years. So it's not just a military issue, this lack of transparency. And it's not just a military issue that it -- if -- that these issues are important now for China, because as China continues to grow and expand and influence the course of world events, it's important for us to have a clear understanding.
 
            Q     I wonder if you could talk a little bit about what the report says about the development of China's missile technology over the last year and the expansion both of regional missiles challenging Taiwan and more global intercontinental technology. And how much is that being -- what is that being driven by? Is it purely a Taiwan situation? Is it developing of a supply of Patriot missile defenses to Taiwan or other missile defense technology?
 
            MR. SEDNEY: Again, what's driving it is a question that I have to urge you to ask the Chinese, because we can make a certain amount of guesses or assumptions, and sometimes they can be pretty good guesses or assumptions, but the real answer to that has to come from the Chinese.
 
            Certainly, in terms of the quality and effectiveness of their missile forces, the Chinese continue to demonstrate the ability to produce an effective missile force, and from our -- from what we see of it, it's something -- it's a missile force that is -- as it is able to carry out the missions which they appear to have a design for it. First of all, of course, is Taiwan. The -- and both the kinds of missiles that they're developing and they're basing are -- I think in that case it's very clear that they're aimed against Taiwan, and they've continued to increase the numbers of missiles, as we point out in the report, at a fairly advanced and very fast rate, that they deploy opposite Taiwan.
 
            But they also are developing a wider range of missiles, and they've had missiles for a long time. The Chinese have had a missile capability for a long time, and they certainly continue to have missiles that are capable of carrying their -- their nuclear weapons. And they continue to have what they are, I think, clearly designing as a nuclear deterrent and keeping in place a nuclear deterrent, and that missile capability is very strong.
 
            The Chinese are very capable in a broad range of these areas. 
 
            Q     Well, then, what would you say is the biggest change from the last report? What are the developments -- because we've seen this incremental increase in military spending for some time now, what's the biggest change?
 
            MR. SEDNEY: I have to say there's no one biggest change. If you look through this year's report and compare it with last year's report, you'll see a number of areas where there are changes and there are things that are new. But there's no one big dramatic change. I can't -- (chuckles) -- I can't write your headline for you here, and I don't think there is a headline out of that.
 
            It really -- the real story is the continuing -- is the continuing development, the continuing modernization, the continuing acquisition of capabilities and the corresponding and unfortunate lack of understanding, lack of transparency about the intentions behind those and the way they're going to be deployed. What is China going to do with all that?
 
            Q     Can you -- you mentioned a couple of times several areas of misunderstanding. What are the one or two areas that are the most troublesome to you and specifically one or two programs that are most troublesome, that you don't have that understanding on -- of?
 
            And then, also, you said last year the Chinese protested very strongly against the report.
 
            Can you tell us some of the specific things they protested against? If there haven't been any major changes in the report this year, are they presumably going to protest the same specifics, or --
 
            MR. SEDNEY: I've worked on U.S.-China relations for almost 25 years, and I can feel very certain they're going to protest against this year's report again and most likely very similar to what they did last year. And they will say that it is anti-China. They say it portrays a China threat. They will say that it mischaracterizes China. Those are the sort of things they've said in the past, and it's -- maybe it's not fair of me to give their press lines before they have a chance to get their press release out, but that's what I would expect.
 
            And our response to those or to that will be that this is the report that's done the very best we can, based on the information we have, and we would love to hear more from you about what those strategic intentions are behind your developments.
 
            I think in terms of areas where we would like to do more, it's a little dangerous to single out one, because there are really so many. But I think the areas that were raised in the previous questions -- space, cyber, nuclear issues; missile issues. Those are areas that I get questions on very regularly, not just from people here in the Pentagon but from people in the region and around the world. So those are some of the areas that are important.   
 
            (Off mike.)
 
            Q     Just a couple of things. First, on the section on cyber- attacks, it talks about intrusion and attacks. Can you just define also the difference there? And do you regard any of the intrusions which were traced back to China from the past year as in fact being attacks, or do you regard them as more an attempt to kind of snoop in and look at things?
 
            MR. SEDNEY: I think we've been fairly careful in the language to distinguish between the intrusions, which we know have been happening, and attacks, which are things that can happen and can use the techniques. The exact same techniques that you use to intrude into a computer you could use to then attack it later on. And so we are not saying that there have been -- that these things are attacks, but they are intrusions. And intrusions also give you the ability to both look at what's inside and take out what's inside.   
 
            And that has clearly happened. Large amounts of data have been taken out in these intrusions. That doesn't mean that that data has been destroyed, but it could have been.
 
            It doesn't mean it's been altered, but it could have been. So there are all these possibilities there.
 
            That, I guess, is -- it's a very careful answer to your question, and I think I have to be careful when I answer your questions.
 
            Q     Isn't that an attack if you went into my house and took things out of my house? Isn't that more than an intrusion?
 
            MR. SEDNEY: We're getting into philosophy here, but if I -- I think it's, perhaps, more like if someone went into your house and took a picture and left what was there, but then they went off -- but they went off with the image of it.
 
            But I think the whole area of cyber presents new challenges to us, both in the defense world, the intelligence world and the legal world. The whole world of the Internet presents these kind of challenges that we're struggling with, but it is important for countries to behave responsibly. And I think you'll notice in the report that we point out statements by other governments directly through the Chinese about their concerns, because it's not just the United States that has been subject to these intrusions -- (word inaudible) -- in China. It's been countries all over the world.
 
            MODERATOR: (Inaudible) -- first row, and then we'll go to the second row.
 
            Q     Is it fair to say that this report paints a picture of China accelerating its capability to attack U.S. carriers through anti-ship cruise missiles and this whole area- denial theory strategy. That seems to be a message here, that they're accelerating their development of missiles like that.
 
            MR. SEDNEY: I would say they're continuing to develop it. I'm not sure I'm comfortable with the term "accelerating the development," but they're certainly developing it. They're certainly putting a lot of resources into it, and they certainly are, as I said before, very technical and very capable. And I think we make that point here.
 
            Q     I have one follow-up. They bought from the Russians the SS-N-27B SIZZLER. The U.S.-China commission says that's its most advanced anti-ship missile in the world because of its supersonic capabilities. What capability does, in fact, China now have, because these missiles are on eight of their 12 KILOs?
 
            MR. SEDNEY: Getting into some -- into a little technical area, but why don't I go ahead and ask my colleague, David Helvey, to go ahead and answer that.
 
            Q     With a capability that the report talks about.
 
            DAVID HELVEY (director, China, Taiwan and Mongolia Affairs, U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission): It's -- as the report talks about, yeah, with the most recent batch of KILOs, China had the SS-N-27Bravo Anti-Ship Cruise Missile, and as you point out, it's a very effective, very capable anti-ship cruise missile.
 
            But one of the things that it's important to point out is that the missile itself is -- (off mike) -- technology in terms of having the operational capability, it's a function of the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance network, the training and the integration of all those.   
 
            So this is still a new weapons system for China, and we're going to be watching carefully how they integrate that anti-ship cruise missile into their submarine force with the ISR architecture that they need to have.
 
            Q     Does it give them a major boost, though, that they didn't have a year or two ago?
 
            MR. HELVEY (?): It terms of having that particular weapons system, yes. That weapons system is significantly more sophisticated than the previous anti-ship cruise missiles that they've had. As you may know, they had the Sunburn --  
 
            Q     Right.
 
            MR. HELVEY (?): -- on the Sovremenny class guided missile destroyers. Well, this one has a much longer range. But like the Sunburn, the Sizzler is designed to go after ship-based self-defense systems. So in that sense, it's capable. It's similar to the Sunburn, but this one has a longer range, and it's fired from submarines.
 
            Q     Thank you.
 
            MR. SEDNEY: Okay. Here's --
 
            Q     The intrusions, the computer network intrusions, have they been in classified systems? And the data that's been taken out, has it included classified data?
 
            MR. SEDNEY: No and no.   
 
            Q     Even the government systems have all been unclassified?
 
            MR. SEDNEY: Yes.
 
            Q     What advantage do they gain -- could they gain from that?
 
            MR. SEDNEY: They gain an awful lot. There's a lot that is unclassified knowledge, that it -- by, in some cases, the sheer volume, other cases by the indications, and other cases by the fact that we're an extraordinarily open society that people -- not just the Chinese, perhaps, but all kinds of people around the world can get. And there's always that struggle in our society and in our way of doing business between openness and utilities, using the Internet and that kind of thing and the need to keep secrets. I think it's something that we are constantly reviewing here, working very hard to make sure that things that are classified remain classified.   
 
            But at the same time, there's -- there really is a whole lot of things that are in the unclassified world that, taken together -- and I would include in this a lot of proprietary business material that is not classified because it might not have even been something that is developed by, paid for by, associated with the Department of Defense.
 
            There's a whole range of scientific and technological material, that is available through people in the contracting world and elsewhere, that just isn't classified, that can be the subject of these intrusions.   
 
            Q     The report talks about espionage. Is that connected, linked to the cyberintrusions?   
 
            MR. SEDNEY: Well, again we're very careful here to say that we don't know that there's a direct link between the PRC government, the PLA, the organizations and these intrusions. That's -- we don't have that. But the kinds of things that are done are certainly the kinds of things that espionage agencies would do. But I don't have -- there isn't that direct link. And so I can't answer that question that way.  
 
            Q     Two questions.   
 
            First, do you have any better knowledge now, than a year ago or two years ago, as to how the decision-making process works within the Chinese senior leadership and the military. Specifically the ASAT test and more recently the Kitty Hawk -- who was responsible?   
 
            And second of all, if you look at the balance of forces across the Taiwan Strait, ground forces are down. And while airpower is up, the number of bombers and fighters, within range of Taiwan, is quite a bit down. What does that say about what China's doing vis-a-vis Taiwan and their posture there?   
 
            MR. SEDNEY: Well, first of all, on any particular numbers of planes and also capabilities deployed across the Taiwan Strait, those are things that can change very rapidly. The Chinese can deploy. The Chinese have a lot of resources, throughout the country, which they can deploy in the Taiwan Strait area and which they practice deploying on a regular basis.   
 
            So if you're looking at the Taiwan Strait, we wouldn't look just at any one point in time. You know, we do look at what's based there. But it's important to remember there's even a larger number of assets there.   
 
            In terms of the -- did you want to add anything, David?   
 
            MR. HELVEY: I would also point out that as China's military forces improve, in terms of the quality of their equipment, you'll also see the retirement of older platforms and airframes. So in some cases, you may see a decrement in total numbers, but you have a higher percentage of much more capable platforms and systems.   
 
            So, I mean, I would factor that in mind, that this is a military that is undergoing a comprehensive transformation. And so a lot of things are changing on a year-to-year --  
 
            Q     So it would be wrong to interpret this as a less aggressive stance across the Taiwan Strait.   
 
            MR. SEDNEY: Well, it would be wrong to interpret it as a less capable stance. I wouldn't -- and I think, as we say in the report, it's a more capable stance. The Chinese continue to increase their capabilities.
 
            Q     And on the leadership question?
 
            MR. SEDNEY: On the leadership question, I would say no. We don't have any better understanding than we did a year ago of Chinese leadership decision-making processes and what goes into those -- what goes into that. That continues to be an area where we really don't have a very good picture.
 
            Q     But when you met them last week, did you ask them who took the decision on the Kitty Hawk and did they have an explanation?
 
            MR. SEDNEY: I guess there -- as someone reminded me before I came out here, there are some questions which I can't answer, and that would be one of them. Certainly we've discussed the issue of the Kitty Hawk with them, but I'll just leave it at that.
 
            Q     Yeah, on the nuclear strategic talks you said China agreed on, could you elaborate on the process that they agreed on? And also, do we expect the head of the 2nd Artillery, Jing Zhiyuan, to be here this year?
 
            MR. SEDNEY: We don't have a timetable for the actual visit of General Jing. As you know, that invitation was issued, I think, a little over a year and half ago, two years ago. David?
 
            MR. HELVEY: November 2006.
 
            MR. SEDNEY: November 2006 was -- an invitation was issued. But we do have a process in place now. This process was proposed by the PLA, and the first part of that will be a discussion between Chinese military officers and Chinese military academics and counterparts here in the U.S. And we expect that to happen in the next month or so, and -- maybe two months. And then from there we'll go on to the next steps. But it was the Chinese proposal to move ahead with that. And we do look forward, very much, to having a visit or exchange, a meeting, with General Jing and our STRATCOM commander. But whether that'll be this year or next year, that'll depend upon the pace of this process.
 
            Q     Just one question: that for a few years we saw from this report the number of the missiles deployed of Taiwan is increasing continually. But on the other hand, we don't really see the discussion about, you know, how U.S. or Taiwan is going to deal with this problem. In the past we have suggested on the Chinese side to freeze the numbers or even, you know, withdraw some of the missiles. But in the report, we don't see this kind of discussion anymore. I wonder: is there a reason you can't, you know, tell us?   
 
            And the second question is that the report also indicated the balance has shifted to China's favor, you know, steadily, for a few years. And you have discussed this with Taiwan authority in the past. I wonder: have you achieved any, you know, solid accomplishments after your talks with, you know, Taiwanese counterparts? This year has -- any progress has really been made to address this -- (off mike)?
 
            MR. SEDNEY: Well, first, on the issue of the policy that comes out of the military power that's described here, you're correct; it's not addressed in the report. But that's because we're keeping the report focused on the facts. What are the -- what is the extent of China's military power? And yes, in the case of the missiles, they're deploying across from Taiwan, this is clearly an issue that we're very concerned about and which we have raised very strongly and consistently at high levels over the years with the Chinese. There have been various proposals at the policy level about that. And so far, of course, we haven't seen that happen. The missiles continue to be deployed, and as you said, they continue -- the numbers continue to increase.   
 
            In terms of the response of Taiwan to this shift, we were very pleased this year to -- that Taiwan passed in July a 2007 budget, in December a 2008 budget, which increased rather substantially the amount of money and the percentage of its resources that Taiwan will be spending on its own defense. And we think that's very important.
 
            And we'll be -- we've made it -- as a result, we've made a number of notifications, which have been in the press, about the weapons systems Taiwan will be acquiring. And we think those will help address that -- the issue of the balance in the Taiwan Straits. But that certainly won't address it completely, because as China continues the -- its -- both its modernization and its deployment of forces on Taiwan, that process that you had mentioned does continue, and we continue to not just watch it carefully but take all appropriate measures that we have to do to be prepared for any eventuality.
 
            MODERATOR: We have time for maybe one more.
 
            Q     There was a cyberintrusion last summer that affected DOD e- mail accounts, forced some of them to be knocked down. Was that determined to have originated in China?
 
            And separately, can you tell us what percentage or what's the estimate for how many of the cyberintrusions in the U.S. target DOD or defense industries?
 
            MR. SEDNEY: On the last question of how many -- what percentage of them target DOD, no, I don't. We know they are very broad -- widespread, and I would be -- I would hazard that we don't really know the full extent of them. So to say what percentage of them are DOD would imply that we know about all of them, and I don't think that we do. And I have to plead a little bit of ignorance on that also because the sort of global cyberdefense thing is not my area.
 
            In terms of the specific thing you mentioned, I know that there were a lot of reports about that, but I don't think that I have enough information to comment on that for you.
 
            We mentioned one more -- maybe I'll take one more because you had up -- you your hand up from the very beginning, and I --
 
            Q     Throughout these military power reports, the lack of transparency has been a great concern. And here in this report, we see that for defense expenditure figures, 2007, the DOD low estimate is almost twice of that of China's announced budget. So what are you doing specifically to try to get more transparency on the part of the People's Republic of China?
 
            MR. SEDNEY: For one thing, we make it a point -- and it's not just because we want to know the numbers; it's because of the impact of the numbers on policy -- we make it a point in all of our discussions, whether they're at the working level or the very highest levels -- the secretary made it a point when he met with the top Chinese leaders last fall to continue to make this point.
 
            The response of the Chinese has been, I would say, very slow. There's been a little bit of progress over the years, but so little that it's really hard to measure against the scope of the problem.
 
            I hope, in these upcoming discussions, we'll be able to get a little better idea of that.   
 
            The Chinese will be announcing, in the next couple of days, their budget for the coming year, including their military budget. I would very much appreciate it. I would call on them to be more transparent and forthcoming in describing that military budget when they announce it in the next couple of days.   
 
            Q     (Off mike.)   
 
            MR. SEDNEY: (Off mike) -- because, of course, they knew it was coming. It comes every year.   
 
            We didn't brief them on the content of it. But since it's a congressional report, we do that to Congress first. We will be actually, David and I will be, going and talking with them in a few minutes actually. And they've had the chance to read it already.   
 
            Q     The Chinese?   
 
            MR. SEDNEY: The Chinese, yeah. We'll have the Chinese defense attache coming in, and giving him an opportunity, to both give his reaction but also to talk to him about it.   
 
            Q     Do you do that every year?   
 
            MR. SEDNEY: Pardon me.   
 
            (Cross talk.)   
 
            Yes, and we do it very broadly. David and his colleagues will be meeting a very broad range of defense attaches and others and doing -- there's a lot of interest, and we're responsive.   
 
            Thank you.

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中國批美報告 籲美放棄冷戰心態
法新社╱陳政一 2008-03-04 17:05     

 
 
(法新社北京四日電)中國今天嚴詞駁斥美國國防部有關中國軍力的報告,並要求美國放棄冷戰心態。這份報告對中國日益強大的軍力表示關切。

中國外交部發言人秦剛告訴記者:「這份報告嚴重扭曲事實,並試圖干預中國事務。」

他表示:「中國堅決反對此事,並已向美國提出嚴正抗議...這對我們雙方關係毫無益處。」

秦剛堅稱,中國對任何國家均不構成威脅。

他表示:「我們呼籲美國放棄冷戰心態,正確了解中國以及中國的發展,改正錯誤,並促進互信和建設性合作。」

他說,中國的擴軍屬於防衛性質,符合這個國家的快速經濟發展。他也批評美國試圖捏造「中國威脅」論。

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中國軍力報告:去年中國疑多次侵入美國網路
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中國軍力報告:去年中國疑多次侵入美國網路
法新社╱鄭詩韻 2008-03-04 14:05    

 
 
(法新社華盛頓三日電)美國國防部今天公布的一份報告指出,過去一年間,美國政府以及其他機構的電腦網路多次遭到似乎源於中國的網路入侵行動滲透。

報告說,這些侵入最後可能無法追蹤回溯至中國政府或軍方,但國防部中東事務助理部長謝偉森表示,這些入侵行動愈來愈引發關切。

他在國防部中國年度軍力報告的簡報中說,「如果你真的要發動網路作戰」,這些入侵行動「當然符合你所需」。

他說:「這類活動的遂行,與我們看到中國軍方及軍事理論家的許多著作相符。」

謝偉森說,這些入侵無一涉及機密的美國政府電腦網路,也未取走機密資訊,但他說,侵入非機密網絡也可能取得重要資訊。

他說:「我會這樣歸納,許多私營企業的商業資料之所以不列為機密資料,是因為這些資料並非由國防部研發、出資,或是與國防部有關連性。」

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軍力報告:中國隱憂問題多 星火可燎原
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軍力報告:中國隱憂問題多 星火可燎原
中央社╱中央社 2008-03-04 14:24     

(中央社記者劉坤原華盛頓三日專電)美國五角大廈今天公佈「二零零八年中華人民共和國軍力報告」指出,雖然中國藉著經濟發展迅速崛起,看起來很風光,但隱憂很多,星星之火可以燎原,稍一不慎即可能發生問題。

報告指出,中國的第一大隱憂就是必須保持經濟成長。經濟繼續成長才能確保中國的崛起、維持中國共產黨的地位並繼續進行軍事現代化。一旦經濟緩下來,就可能導致失業、通貨膨脹、社會不安定;如果發生經濟恐慌或倒退,那後果更不堪設想。中共要繼續掌權,就只好訴求於民族主義。

而且一旦經濟發生問題,中國領導人恐怕缺乏處理市場經濟危機的經驗。

第二大隱憂是人口壓力。由於經濟發展,估計在公元二千年到二零三零年之間,將有四億人口從鄉村遷徙到城市。四億人口比美國全國人口還多,中國政府必須面對人口遷徙而產生的種種複雜問題。

此外,中國人口老化將越來越快。估計到二零二五年,老人人口將從現在的一億四千六百萬,增加到二億九千萬人。

第三大隱憂是國內的政治壓力。中共將面對人民對政府改善效率和負責任的要求,同時也將面對繼續視異議份子為罪犯、繼續控制網路、繼續迫害工會和西藏、維吾爾等少數民族的壓力。

由於經濟的發展,社會上自然將產生受教育的中產階級,他們將要求擴大參與政治決策、以及爭取言論自由。

第四大隱憂是貪污問題。中國稽察單位從一九九六年到二零零五年,共查獲一千七百億美元的貪污贓款;中國各省半數的交通主管因貪污被判刑入獄。學術研究估計,光是二零零三年一年,中國因貪污所造成的損失就達八百六十億美元,等於是百分之三的國內生產毛額。

第五大隱憂是環境污染問題。專家估計,中國因空氣和水污染每年必須付出的健康和非健康代價達一千多億美元,相當於百分之五點八的國內生產毛額。

中國官方統計,二零零五年共發生五萬一千件與環保有關的抗議事件,相當於平均每星期一千件。

不只中國民眾受苦,連日本、南韓都受到中國的酸雨和沙塵暴的侵襲。

第六大隱憂是台灣海峽兩岸情勢。台海隨時可能爆發戰爭以及美國可能介入,這是人民解放軍的夢魘。中國現在已退而求其次,以防止台灣尋求法理獨立為優先,而不急於迅速尋求統一。

第七大隱憂是區域因素。中國關切台灣、北韓、緬甸、南沙群島、釣魚台、阿富汗、巴基斯坦等地區隨時可能爆發戰爭,進而波及中國,影響經濟發展和社會安定。它也擔心北韓突然崩潰、或中亞民主化,對北京造成短程或長程的挑戰。

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美國防部:2015年前中國難造航母
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美國防部:2015年前中國難造航母
中央社╱中央社 2008-03-04 13:01     

(中央社記者林芥佑華盛頓三日專電)美國國防部今天發布年度中國軍力報告,指當前中國雖尚未開始建造航空母艦,但越來越多跡象顯示,中國領導人將推動建造航母方案。報告引述專家分析,中國在二零一五年之前難以自製航母,但外國技術協助等級若提升,有可能使中國航母建造案出現新局面。

美國國防部去年持續關切中國進行航母艦造計畫的可能性。今天公布的五角大廈年度「中國軍力報告」,也針對航母議題有一篇專欄。

報告指出,雖無證據顯示中國開始建造一艘新的航母,但卻有證據持續指出,中國領導班子將進一步推動建造航母計畫。例如:二零零六年初中國公佈第十一個五年計畫,中國官方媒體引述高階政府與軍方官員的講話,皆指陳中國將發展航母。

報告也提及,重新打造俄羅斯提供的庫茲涅佐夫級航母,顯示中國計畫利用這個舊系統平台作為訓練;俄羅斯媒體也報導,中國有興趣購買俄製蘇愷三十三型航母用戰鬥機。

二零零六年十月,俄國媒體報導,中俄兩國已在協商總額二十五億美金的五十架蘇愷三十三型戰鬥機購買案,但至沒有任何官方發布這筆軍購案的訊息。

官方及非官方的分析家皆認為,中國在二零一五年之前應該無法自製一艘可運行的航母,但中國自己的造艦能力若改變以及國外協助建造案的等級提升,可能使中國發展航母計畫出現外界難以預料的新局面。

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