網路城邦
回本城市首頁 中國星火論壇
市長:古士塔夫  副市長: lukacsGuoding
加入本城市推薦本城市加入我的最愛訂閱最新文章
udn城市政治社會公共議題【中國星火論壇】城市/討論區/
討論區外交、軍事 字體:
看回應文章  上一個討論主題 回文章列表 下一個討論主題
美中兩國誰做老大?
 瀏覽10,601|回應66推薦2

Guoding
等級:8
留言加入好友
文章推薦人 (2)

Chocola
lukacs

參考包公所貼高鐵為何讓奧巴馬側目一文

“老二”面臨的嚴峻挑戰

http://www.zaobao.com/yl/tx100204_002.shtml

薛理泰

美國總統奧巴馬發表《國情咨文》時指出:“我不接受美國成為世界第二。”他在講話中兩次提到中國,既沒有貶低中國,也沒有指責中國,是把中國作為正面例子給予引證的。外界解讀時,或謂奧巴馬不能接受退居世界第二的前景,實際上給中國下了競爭的挑戰書。對奧巴馬這番表態還應該想深一層,更貼切的潛台詞或許是“我絕不能讓你當世界老大”。
 就整體經濟量而言,去年中國GDP可能超過日本,已經躍居世界第二。況且,近年中國軍力也呈現突飛猛進的勢頭。這可能是奧巴馬對美國可能退居世界第二的前景引起擔憂心理的緣由,也是中國民眾以至不少官員沾沾自喜的由來。

 姑且不說中國GDP未來能否長期穩居“老二”的地位,也不談以房地產為主要支柱之一的GDP結構是否合理,也不論GDP畸形膨脹能否持久地支撐中國作為一個世界強國的國際地位,對此,簡單地持認同態度似乎不妥。本文著重論述一下即使中國名副其實地成了“老二”,對中國未來的發展前景又意味著什麼。說白了,在上自中央下至民間欠缺危機意識,在大戰略層面又缺乏因時制宜的對策的情況下,以“老二”自居,恐非國家之福。


 成為蘇聯的翻版?


 奧巴馬在《國情咨文》中針對中國的表態,其實集中反映了近年美國高層漸趨一致的對待中國崛起的後果的一種共識。倘若中國果真坐穩了“老二”的席位,美國乃至整個西方世界勢必會得出一個結論,即中國不久將成為蘇聯的翻版,是同美國爭霸的又一個超級大國。這是不以北京領導人信誓旦旦的解釋為轉移的。

 一部世界史或者一部冷戰史,無非揭示一個客觀事實:小則在一個地理區域,大則在全球範圍,舉凡政治、軍事、經濟、文化意識形態層面的鬥爭,主要都是環繞著“老大”、“老二”之間不惜代價地展開,結果很難善了,無非成王敗寇,以一方被徹底擊敗告終。

 遠的暫且不說,僅舉百年以來的歷史為例。一次大戰前,英國穩坐“世界老大”的席位久矣。德國在內部統一以後,在迭次戰爭中,戰敗了歐洲強國奧匈帝國、法國,在世界強國中躍居“老二”。其後,德國整軍經武,國勢浸浸乎直逼英國,英國不甘退居其次,一次大戰終於爆發。二次大戰也是一個翻版。大戰前,希特勒德國猛然崛起,德意志民族的爆發力噴薄欲出,於是對英、法操縱的世界秩序提出挑戰(當時美國實行孤立主義,自外于英、法為主的世界秩序體系),在歐洲列強縱橫捭闔之下,兩大陣營隱然成形,以至大戰爆發。

 環顧當年國際形勢,英、德、法等國社會、經濟制度相仿,又都屬於一個大的民族範疇,“老大”著眼於維持既得利益,“老二”為了打破既定格局,尚且兵刃相見,拼個你死我活。其義無他,勢所然也。史實可考,其理昭然。

 二次大戰結束以後,冷戰時代悄然到來。西方世界開始對蘇聯全力圍堵。其根本原因,就是美國認為蘇聯已經成為“老二”,是同美國爭霸的另一個超級大國,對美國的世界領袖的地位構成了挑戰。以當年美、蘇爭霸之烈,如果不是熱核武器已經問世,雙方不能承受核大戰的慘重後果,恐怕第三次世界大戰早已爆發了。然而,在將近半個世紀中,西方世界在政治、軍事、經濟、文化意識形態等層面,對蘇聯實行“分進合擊”,孜孜矻矻,不稍懈怠。積年累月以後,蘇聯終於一朝崩潰。
 返求諸今日狀況,美國、中國之間狹義的雙邊關係以及中國同西方世界廣義的多邊關係,日後均會經歷劇烈的互動、變動。清夜拊心,視野遠移,發人深省。

擔心中國崛起的後果

 西方政治家評判正在崛起的某個國家是否會構成威脅,是基於該國即將擁有的綜合實力,而不是其在某個時段的主觀意向。實力是客觀存在的,為其在未來可能造成的災難提供了可行的手段,而最終的意向則是捉摸不定的,領導人更迭即可能出現大幅度的變化。

 他們可能認為,中國已經成為“世界工廠”,又是聯合國安理會常任理事國,還是一個在亞太地區極有影響力的核大國。中國在這三個基礎上崛起,不久以後必然成為一個能與美國爭鋒的超級大國。這就是西方國家關於“中國威脅論”的立論依據。簡言之,他們只是擔心中國崛起的後果,而不是崛起的方式。
 西方流行一種說法,即“崛起的大國就意味著崛起的威脅”,正在為“中國威脅論”推波助瀾。中國官員、學者卻總是試圖僅從中國崛起的方式是和平的角度去解釋,顯然是一廂情願。這豈非低估了西方戰略家的智慧?如此說辭及做法,不啻緣木求魚。
 與“老大”對立的力量坐上“老二”的席位,還有不能不予以考慮的一層隱憂。在“老三”、“老四”的位子上,無論“老大”還是“老二”,都不至於視之為非要去之而後快的對象。然而,“老二”卻往往成為眾矢之的,不但“老大”視為眼中釘,在“老大”策動之下,連“老三”、“老四”、“老五”都會群起而攻之。一次大戰、二次大戰之前,位居“老大”的英國面臨“老二”德國的緊逼,不是聯合“老三”、“老四”等同“老二”兵刃相見了嗎?
 假如美國決策已定,絕不能讓中國當世界老大,對策不出兩個範疇:其一是化擔憂為動力,發動一場新的產業革命;其二是橫刀奪愛,拉中國的後腿,挫折中國發展的勢頭。或者雙管齊下,畢其功於一役。如此,中國發展的機遇期就失之交臂了。

            (作者是斯坦福大學國際安全和合作中心研究員)

回應 回應給此人 推薦文章 列印 加入我的文摘

引用
引用網址:http://city.udn.com/forum/trackback.jsp?no=53732&aid=3855482
 回應文章 頁/共7頁 回應文章第一頁 回應文章上一頁 回應文章下一頁 回應文章最後一頁
韓國經濟
推薦0


solpaonew
等級:4
留言加入好友

 
http://www.hongdezk.com/a/hantangguilai/20171101/187324.html
回應 回應給此人 推薦文章 列印 加入我的文摘
引用網址:http://city.udn.com/forum/trackback.jsp?no=53732&aid=5720464
十九大后第一波外事活动,习近平如何向世界释放信号
推薦0


solpaonew
等級:4
留言加入好友

 

10月30日,习近平30日在人民大会堂会见清华大学经济管理学院顾问委员会海外委员和中方企业家委员。

习近平指出,我期待美国总统特朗普即将对中国的访问。中方愿同美方一道,高瞻远瞩,相互照顾彼此利益和关切,妥善化解分歧和矛盾,共同推进中美合作,实现互利共赢,我们对中美关系的前景持乐观态度。

清华大学经济管理学院顾问委员会是一个阵容豪华却行事低调的“智囊团”。这个委员会中,国务院前总理朱镕基任名誉主席,成员包括数十位世界影响力重大的跨国公司董事长、总裁或首席执行官,世界知名商学院院长,知名学者(包括诺贝尔经济学奖获得者)、国内标志性企业家,及国内财经高级官员。其名誉委员还包括中纪委原书记王岐山、美国财政部原部长保尔森等人。

在昨天的会见中,清华大学经济管理学院顾问委员会主席布雷耶、保尔森基金会主席保尔森、黑石集团董事长苏世民、苹果公司首席执行官库克、脸书公司创始人兼首席执行官扎克伯格等代表委员们先后发言。http://www.guancha.cn/gczhengjing/2017_10_31_432994.shtml

回應 回應給此人 推薦文章 列印 加入我的文摘
引用網址:http://city.udn.com/forum/trackback.jsp?no=53732&aid=5720057
ARAMCO would actually become ARChino
推薦0


solpaonew
等級:4
留言加入好友

 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/26/china-is-eyeballing-a-major-strategic-investment-in-saudi-arabias-oil/
回應 回應給此人 推薦文章 列印 加入我的文摘
引用網址:http://city.udn.com/forum/trackback.jsp?no=53732&aid=5718043
金一南
推薦0


solpaonew
等級:4
留言加入好友

 

Nancy Tucker: 一个强大统一的中国不符合美国的战略利益。你们永远不要以为美国会支持大陆与台湾和平统一。即使中国现在的政治制度与美国的一样,美国也不会那样做。这是美国立国原则、基本价值观念和战略利益决定的。

http://www.hongdezk.com/a/hantangguilai/20171026/185530.html

回應 回應給此人 推薦文章 列印 加入我的文摘
引用網址:http://city.udn.com/forum/trackback.jsp?no=53732&aid=5717721
The Donald Trump-Kaiser Wilhelm Parallels Are Getting Scary
推薦0


solpaonew
等級:4
留言加入好友

 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/12/the-donald-trump-kaiser-wilhelm-parallels-are-getting-scary/
回應 回應給此人 推薦文章 列印 加入我的文摘
引用網址:http://city.udn.com/forum/trackback.jsp?no=53732&aid=5714815
China’s Pivot to World Markets, Washington’s Pivot to World Wars…
推薦1


solpaonew
等級:4
留言加入好友

 
文章推薦人 (1)

lukacs

https://www.globalresearch.ca/chinas-pivot-to-world-markets-washingtons-pivot-to-world-wars/5541802
回應 回應給此人 推薦文章 列印 加入我的文摘
引用網址:http://city.udn.com/forum/trackback.jsp?no=53732&aid=5714809
As U.S. Retreats From World Organizations, China Steps in to Fill the Void
推薦0


solpaonew
等級:4
留言加入好友

 

As U.S. Retreats From World Organizations, China Steps in to Fill the Void

Beijing is trying to repurpose abandoned international agencies like UNESCO to serve its strategic interests — such as controlling the internet.

http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/06/as-u-s-retreats-from-world-organizations-china-steps-in-the-fill-the-void/
回應 回應給此人 推薦文章 列印 加入我的文摘
引用網址:http://city.udn.com/forum/trackback.jsp?no=53732&aid=5712897
近年西方中國著作整理
推薦0


solpaonew
等級:4
留言加入好友

 
http://www.guancha.cn/WuXu/2017_10_09_430181.shtml
回應 回應給此人 推薦文章 列印 加入我的文摘
引用網址:http://city.udn.com/forum/trackback.jsp?no=53732&aid=5712885
China's Alternative Diplomacy
    回應給: lukacs(lukacs) 推薦0


lukacs
等級:8
留言加入好友

 

China’s Alternative Diplomacy

Chinese president Xi Jinping has certainly kept China experts busy since he came to power in 2012. Xi has made major changes to Chinese policies, domestic and foreign. These policies have been quite different from those of his predecessors, keeping China scholars occupied explaining their meaning and implications. This has been particularly evident in the foreign policy sphere. China watchers have been combing through the details of the new initiatives and proposals Xi has recently introduced, such as “One Belt, One Road” (1B1R) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Even though these new initiatives are still under construction, the fact is that this has been the biggest foreign policy shift in Beijing since 1989. The bigger question here is, what is the grand strategy behind Xi’s plans?

I call it China’s “alternative diplomacy.” Xi’s strategy is a sophisticated and progressive one. Instead of directly challenging the current existing international institutions, the Chinese are trying to create new platforms that Beijing can control or substantially influence. Through these new initiatives, Beijing aims to create a new international environment that is more favorable to China, one that will limit strategic pressures from the United States. Beijing wants to gradually take progressive, but not provocative, steps forward in these endeavors. On the surface these steps aim only to further economic development enterprises, and Beijing is trying to promote them as pure economic and trade initiatives. Below the surface, however, Beijing is trying to work for China’s greater security and long-term strategic objectives.

During last November’s APEC meeting, Beijing presented its proposals for regional integration. These included the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) and the AIIB. The FTAAP is basically a Chinese alternative to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); rather than directly working against and undermining the TPP, it’s a Chinese version of the proposed trade bloc. Similarly, the AIIB is a Chinese version of the Asia Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank. While the new institutions will be open to all and multilateral, they are to be centered within China. Beijing wants to maintain influence and control within the organizations, and provide incentives for other states to participate. Instead of withdrawing from existing institutions and systems, China is trying to progress one step at a time. In creating its own alternatives, China maintains more control, and can make a greater impact.

Scholars have long debated whether China is a status quo or revisionist state. From a Chinese perspective though, a key question for a rising nation is how to handle its relationship with existing global institutions and systems. Although China is the largest economy in Asia, Japan dominates the ADB. Japan’s voting share is more than twice that of China’s, and the bank’s president has always been Japanese. Looking at the landscape from Beijing’s point of view, this is unquestionably a biased situation. Even with the IMF, reforms to give China a greater voice have been delayed for years. In response, China’s new strategy is to try to establish new institutions and platforms as tools for Beijing to play the kind of role China cannot play in the ADB or IMF. However China has been cautious not to upset the current global system and has been taking a two-track approach in this endeavor. On the one hand it is creating new institutions, and on the other is still actively participating in existing institutions such as the World Bank, WTO, IMF and ADB.

In the realms of security and politics, China has also been working hard to strengthen or revitalize several organizations, such as the BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA). With the same alternative strategy, Beijing is trying to use these organizations to counterbalance the NATO and U.S. military alliances in Asia. Even though it cannot control these three organizations, Beijing is still trying to bolster its leadership within them.

One Belt, One Road: China’s Asia Pivot

On the surface, “one belt, one road” simply addresses a far-reaching economic development plan and focuses on improving trade, infrastructure and connectivity in this region. The new Silk Road Economic Belt will link China with Europe through Central and Western Asia, and the so-called 21st Century Maritime Silk Road aims to connect China with Southeast Asian countries, Africa and Europe. The real purpose of this initiative, however, is security. China is using this plan as an attempt to improve relationships with its Asian neighbors. Its neighbors in East and Southeast Asia meanwhile hope this initiative will help mend relationships after much divisiveness over the South China Sea in recent years. China is also looking to increase friendly dealings with countries in Central Asia and West Asia. Its reasons are twofold. First, it simply wants greater access to resources, specifically oil and gas. The second relates to China’s trouble with the Muslim population in western China, especially the Uyghur separatists who have connections with Central and West Asian countries. Beijing hopes this initiative will help in dealing with these security challenges by gaining better support and collaboration from the governments of the Central and West Asian Countries.

“One belt, one road” can also be seen as China’s first formal response to the United States’ Asia pivot. Since the U.S. announced its Asia rebalance policy the Chinese have perceived it as a major threat to its security. While making Beijing very uncomfortable, for several years there has been no direct response in the form of policy or behavior from Beijing. In fact, 1B1R is China’s own Asia pivot. Beijing is in a manner masking the real intent of the proposal to avoid a direct confrontation and challenge to the U.S. rebalance. Beijing has been smart in borrowing the Silk Road moniker to name the initiative, reducing the sensitivity of the geopolitical connotations, and the PRC government has refused to agree that the initiative is China’s Marshall Plan.

Beijing also wants to use 1B1R to make the best use of the strengths it does have. With these initiatives China is planning to build highways, express railways, pipelines and ports, and to use these new outlets to bind China with other countries in the region. This is an area where China has strengths. First, it has a large trade surplus and seeks effective ways on using that surplus. Moreover, in the wake of the global financial crisis, investment in Europe and America became more risky, thus allocating its surplus to Asia-Pacific infrastructure looks a good option for Beijing. Second, excess capacity has been a problem for China with all its development ventures in recent years, and all this has created huge environmental issues, such as smog generated by steel factories in the north of the country. By promoting 1B1R and regional infrastructure development, China could send these factories and manufacturing hubs to other nations in the region. We shouldn’t be surprised to see China’s steel manufacturing move to Kazakhstan or Cambodia in the next several years. Still, China has seemingly unending human capital and infrastructure development experience, which makes it unique in its ability to put this plan into action and export these large reserves to its neighboring states, fully enabling these grand plans to take place.

By exporting technologies and deepening economic and trade relations with surrounding regions China also hopes to find new and bigger markets for “Made in China.” This development will improve transportation and integration between China and the Asian regions, which may also encourage China’s neighbors increase their reliance on Chinese markets and capital. Finally, this would help China take on a leadership role in the region, allowing it to more successfully balance the U.S. pivot to Asia.

From ‘Free Rider’ to Provider

In an interview with the New York Times in August 2014, U.S. President Barack Obama called China a “free rider” for the last 30 years and blamed it for not taking on more of its international obligations. The accusation is not without foundation. For a long time, Beijing has mainly been a participant and follower in global affairs, rather than an active leader, initiator, or provider of public goods. With these new initiatives, however, China’s shift to a more active leadership role is clearly on display. For Beijing, this is indeed a major transformation. In a response to Obama’s comments, Xi has openly talked about China welcoming its neighbors to be free riders on China’s development through these new initiatives. This change of attitude is positive, and one that needs to be encouraged. The international community should welcome a rising China that willingly takes on greater global responsibility and leadership, no matter whether Beijing has any special strategic motives behind its investment plans. It is also important that in this globalized world we avoid seeing everything from a zero sum perspective.

It is still too early to foresee the success of these new initiatives China has planned. It will very much depend upon how China’s neighbors respond. Beijing still has some major hurdles to clear. It is possible that China’s neighbors will welcome the influx of money and resources to their shores, but won’t reciprocate in granting China greater influence or closer political and security ties. In recent years we have seen a rising anti-Chinese sentiment in many neighboring states, one that could magnify with the new initiatives. People in area nations have grown weary and unhappy in regards to the major Chinese presence already in their home. China’s new investment will definitely bring with it a greater Chinese presence, and this could even cause new tensions. The recent presidential election in Sri Lanka saw pro-Chinese President Mahinda Rajapaksa voted out of office, after President-elect Maithripala Sirisena strongly criticized Rajapaksa during the campaign on his China policy, accusing him of turning Sri Lanka into something of a new Chinese colony.

The worst scenario for Beijing is for all the new proposals and plans to wind up being China doling out money to regional states without getting the influence it seeks in return. Many of these countries will still choose to work with the United States on security issues while cooperating with the Chinese on development. As it goes in international relations, money cannot buy loyalty. Influence does not derive from a country’s coffers, but rather from the promotion of shared values and soft power. Whether China can accomplish its strategic objectives will be very much dependent on whether Xi’s new initiatives and policies are supported by China’s ability to inspire its neighbors to share in their vision. The integration of Asia will not work itself out only through railroads, highways and pipelines, but will depend on whether Asian countries can build common identity and values.

Additionally, taking the new leadership role is also a challenge for Beijing. It is always easier to be a follower than a leader. Leadership builds on capabilities in policy research, communication and implementation, as well as soft power. For China to fill this leadership role it needs to strengthen the instruments that shape these ideas, improving policy research and think tanks. To serve as a leader without being well prepared for the role could be risky. Ultimately, the extension of hard power will also be dependent on soft power.

Zheng Wang is the Director of the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at Seton Hall University in New Jersey and a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

回應 回應給此人 推薦文章 列印 加入我的文摘
引用網址:http://city.udn.com/forum/trackback.jsp?no=53732&aid=5268823
史提格里茲論2015年為中國元年
    回應給: 沙包(solpao) 推薦0


lukacs
等級:8
留言加入好友

 

諾貝爾經濟學獎得主史提格里茲在美國《名利場》雜誌2015年1月號(提前出版)發表文章《中國世紀從2015年開始》。文章指出,在書寫2014年的歷史時,需要留意一個幾乎被忽視的重大事實:2014年是美國能夠號稱自己是全球第一大經濟體的最後一年。中國經濟以拔得頭籌之勢進入2015年,並很可能長時間執此牛耳。

史提格里茲說,世界銀行根據「購買力平價」方式公布的最新數據顯示,中國將以遠遠超乎所有人預料的速度成為世界第一大經濟體,此一目標即將於2014年底實現。

或許以「購買力平價」方式計算的GDP尚不為一般人廣泛接受,中國大陸官方也予以排斥,即使如此,但GDP之外,也有愈來愈多的類中國世紀現象在最近頻繁出現:

—國際外交方面,從中國作為主場的北京APEC峰會,到緬甸舉行的東盟峰會,再到澳洲舉行的G20峰會,中國領導人的鋒頭,獨領風騷;習近平上任兩年以來,累計出訪了30個國家,遍及七大洲、三大洋,從大國到新興國到太平洋小國,可謂縱橫捭闔。

—氣勢方面,開始積極主導議題:倡議與建立亞太自貿區、金磚新開發銀行、亞洲基礎設施投資開發銀行、一帶一路等,甚至引導及設定規格,如高鐵出口、浙江烏鎮舉行世界第一屆互聯網大會等。

—這一切靠的都是綜合國力。經濟上,除了GDP即將超美,2014年中國GDP已是日本的兩倍,出口額、貿易額、製造業、外匯儲備等,都是世界第一;軍事上,在東海中國已有針對美國介入的反介入能力,中國也在南海填海擴島。在印度洋廣設海港,甚至開始在西非的納米比亞興建港口;另外,也即將在泰國及尼加拉瓜分別開鑿兩條新運河。當然,也包括在太空領域的成就及深海科研領域的表現等,均已位居世界前段班。

如何解讀中國這近乎井噴式的全方位各領域的表現?其實並不困難,因為除了近200年,中國從來就是第一,也就是史提格里茲說的,「中國回到了它在人類歷史上大多數時間裡所占據的地位」。他所說的「大多數時間」,準確的說法是「人類3,000年歷史或30個世紀中的前28世紀」。

這裡,有三個問題需要處理:一、中國為什麼從來就是世界第一?二、為什麼從來第一的中國近200年卻急轉直下?三、為什麼近30年又谷底翻升,重新崛起?

先談第二、第三個,再談第一個。為何從來第一的中國國運會急轉直下,是因為中國在近幾百年中連續錯失了海洋、工業革命及資本主義市場經濟三個寶貴機遇,因而被抓住這三個機遇的近代九個海洋強國(葡、西、荷、英、德、法、俄、日、美)輪番欺壓。

其次,為什麼近30年又重新崛起,正是因為鄧小平的改革開放抓回了市場經濟及工業革命,而現在的習近平正在抓回海洋強國機遇。

至於中國為什麼從來就是全球第一,是因為中國從來就是市場經濟,意思是政府除了極少數經濟活動如鹽、鐵專賣、統一貨幣等之外均開放民營,對市場價格並不干預,最多是徵一些必要的稅賦及設平準基金,但必須補充一點,市場經濟並非放諸四海而皆有用,必須配上中國擁有的另兩個條件,即勤奮的民族性及巨大的人口規模,才能起大作用。

抓住了三個寶貴機遇的英國,在拿破崙戰爭及鴉片戰爭先後打敗了法國與中國後,稱霸全球,版圖橫跨全球四分之一,時間約100年,是謂英國世紀。19世紀末,美國GDP超過英國,但英國霸主地位完全被美國取代則是20世紀二次大戰之後的事。所以,20世紀是美國世紀,特別是1991年拖垮蘇聯之後,而那時中國剛開始啟動改革開放,所以美國獨領風騷,顧盼自雄。

進入21世紀,現在,中國世紀現象已然萌現,但21世紀會不會真的成為中國世紀,不能只看GDP,還要看包括政治體制改革在內的全面深化改革,及能否在文化、思想及意識形態各方面獲得更大的解放,及如何處理好國際特別是與美國的關係而定。這些條件能否具備也決定了「2015:中國世紀元年」後面跟的究竟是一個「!」或是一個「?」。

【2014/12/26 經濟日報】 

回應 回應給此人 推薦文章 列印 加入我的文摘
引用網址:http://city.udn.com/forum/trackback.jsp?no=53732&aid=5257565
頁/共7頁 回應文章第一頁 回應文章上一頁 回應文章下一頁 回應文章最後一頁